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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
North Korea (also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) 
is one of the world’s last remaining communist countries. The Juche ideology 
created by Kim Il-Sung, preserved by his son, Kim Jong-Il, makes it one of the 
most isolated countries. DPRK’s insistence on self-sufficiency since the 1950s 
has seen their neighbours, South Korea (also known as Republic of Korea, 
ROK), over take them in terms of gross national income (GNI) and per capita 
income, as well as become one of the world’s leading technologically advanced 
countries. Production efficiency in the factories declined due to a lack of work 
incentives, agricultural fields remained barren due to shortage of fertilizers, and 
the transport distribution system collapsed due to decrepit infrastructure.  
 
Their closest ally, China, is beginning to be exasperated by DPRK’s constant 
threats of developing nuclear weapons in exchange for humanitarian aid and 
economic incentives. The health of Kim Jong-Il remains a great concern for 
those countries that follow with great interest with the developments in the 
Korean Peninsula. Countries, including China, and the United States of America 
(USA), ROK, Japan, and Russia all have important stakes should DPRK 
collapse suddenly.  
 
The top echelon of this anarchical hierarchy is only concerned about political 
survival and economic gains. This can be seen by the occasional 
announcements of foreign investments in strategic parts of DPRK using special 
economic zones (SEZs) such as Kaesong and Rajin-Sonbong. The former 
being part of the unsuccessful ‘Sunshine Policy’ signed with the late ROK 
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President, Kim Dae-Jung. Under its previous administration, small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) were encouraged to invest in DPRK under the processing-
on-commission concept in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). Even though 
companies ran into barriers such as political instability resulting in the closure of 
the complex and sudden rise in the wages of the local workers, many other 
SMEs have continued to express interest to invest in DPRK due to perceived 
cheaper land and labour cost (Jung 2011).  
 
The author had the opportunity to visit DPRK on two occasions from 2006-2007. 
The impressions obtained from the trip found the country to be interesting and 
unique. However, strict restrictions were placed on foreigners as passports and 
mobile phones were confiscated upon arrival into the airport. In addition, data 
collection was also impossible as local citizens and officials were only allowed 
to speak to foreigners in a controlled environment. This is consistent with the 
literature where official estimates and data on DPRK are not readily available. 
Even when they are, the reliability of the data is always in question.  
 
This thesis contributes to existing knowledge by examining the implications of 
ROK companies’ location decisions on transport and logistics policy 
developments in DPRK. The research objectives are as follows: 
 
• To analyse the political and economic factors affecting DPRK; 
• To appraise the present conditions of transport and logistics infrastructure in 
DPRK; 
• To propose scenarios surrounding development in DPRK;  
• To evaluate the factors affecting potential investors’ location choices to 
develop transport and logistics strategies.  
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In order to achieve the research objectives, a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative research methods is used. In the qualitative research phase, an 
exploratory study with eight experts was employed to gain deeper 
understanding of the issues surrounding DPRK. The insights gained, together 
with the comprehensive literature review led to the next stage of research, (i) in-
depth qualitative interviews with 38 experts and (ii) quantitative survey with 80 
SMEs and 50 logistics companies. Cross-tabulations and a principal component 
analysis were used to evaluate their perspectives. The findings add to existing 
knowledge and provide theoretical and practical implications for governments 
and companies interested in DPRK.  
 
This introductory chapter begins with an overview of what has been written on 
DPRK and identifies some gaps in the relevant literature which was dated up to 
2008 when the data collection was concluded. It moves on to explain the nature 
of the thesis before concluding with an overview of the structure of the study. 
 
1.2 The Literature on DPRK and Location Choices 
 
This section investigates what research has been conducted into DPRK and 
factors influencing SMEs location choices.  
 
1.2.1 DPRK 
 
Researchers constantly face dilemmas when investigating DPRK. The main 
reason is the lack of meaningful data coming out of the country. DPRK stopped 
publishing national statistics after the mid-1960s. The lack of information and 
data is one of the major problems about DPRK (Deok 2002). Scholars 
researching into DPRK have to rely on predictions and any information that 
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trickles out of the country from time to time. The most recent economic 
information published by DPRK was in 2002 and 2009 when the country 
underwent currency and wages reform. The most widely cited figures in public 
discussions are those produced by ROK’s central bank – Bank of Korea (BOK). 
However, Noland (2000) is sceptical of the method used by the BOK.  
 
It is important to point out that research into DPRK has tended to focus on the 
political and economic aspects. Research into DPRK’s politics centred on 
nuclear weapons, succession of Kim Jong-Il, scenarios of DPRK while interests 
in its economy varies between economic conditions, humanitarian aid, SEZs 
and reunification costs. Due to the nature of the country, limited research has 
been conducted into transport and logistical developments in the country. It is 
imperative to mention that there has been more descriptive than empirical 
research. Academics have used the historical approach comparing China and 
Vietnam with DPRK (Harvie, 1992; Herold, 1996; Lee, 1996; and McMillan 
1996). ‘Poverty trap’ and ‘big push’ theories have been used to explain 
economic development and regime change (Lee 2000). A managerial approach 
(Park, 2005) and marketing concepts (Choe, et al. 2005) have been used to 
analyse it’s economic strategies. Statistical approaches such as the ‘CGE 
models’ (Noland et al. 2000), Social Accounting Matrix (Lee and Deok, 2004), 
and ‘IMAGE Model’ (Meade 1997) have been employed to estimate the 
deficiency in data.  
 
There is limited literature on the topic of transport and logistics in DPRK. Oh’s 
(2001) work was one of the pioneering studies looking at the strategies for 
developing transport infrastructure in DPRK. Kim et al (2001) focused on 
railways which form a major part of the transport network in DPRK, linking all 
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major cities. DPRK is part of the Trans-Asian Highway programme supported by 
UNESCAP. The project coordinates the development and upgrading of existing 
regional highways among member countries. Ducruet (2008) focused on ports 
and shipping.  
 
1.2.2. Factors Influencing the Location Choices of Enterprises 
 
Location theories, such as Dunning’s OLI paradigm, have been well researched 
with regards to FDI by MNEs (Ruzzier et al. 2006). In recent years, more 
emphasis have been placed on SMEs and their entry strategies (Nakos and 
Brouthers 2002; Mazzarol and Choo 2003; and Aidis 2005). Much discussion 
has also focused on the investment decisions of enterprises in emerging 
economies such as China and Vietnam (Liu et al. 1999; Zhou et al. 2002; 
Cheng and Stough 2006 and Kawai 2009). However, limited research was 
found on ROK foreign direct investment (FDI) location choices. Only two 
research papers were found: (i) Kimura and Lee (1998) investigated the 
determinants of ROK FDI in manufacturing industries using empirical study and 
(ii) Kang and Lee (2004) used aggregate and firm level data of Korean and 
Japanese foreign enterprises in China to investigate the FDI trends and factors 
which influence location choice.  
 
Business enterprises have to consider an array of factors when determining 
their location choices. They face various types of risks such as political, 
economic, social and cultural risks. Many studies have criticised the sole use of 
quantitative factors such as costs (Czamanski 1981 and Bhatnagar and Sohal 
2005) in assessing location factors. Oum and Park (2001) used a triangulation 
approach using literature review, personal interviews and a quantitative survey.  
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1.3 Nature of This Thesis 
 
This thesis focuses on DPRK and industrial location choices. It investigates 
factors which influence the location choices of SMEs and logistics companies 
which have implications for future transport and logistics policy developments in 
DPRK. 
 
There are many questions that might arise when planning strategies for 
transport infrastructure and logistics development. How is DPRK going to 
finance the redevelopment of its transport network? Will ROK or international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB) or Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) provide a majority of the financing? Which transport mode should be 
prioritised? How is DPRK going to induce an increase in freight cargo base? 
What type of logistics concepts should be introduced in DPRK? What are the 
likely short, medium and long term strategies? The qualitative phase of the 
research aimed to answer these questions and develop scenarios for transport 
and logistics strategies. 
 
In the foreseeable future, ROK investors, besides the Chinese, will be the only 
companies to invest heavily in DPRK. ROK investors have an added incentive 
to invest in the North due to a number of factors such as relatively lower costs 
of labour and land. Accordingly, this research seeks to survey ROK investors 
about their opinions on factors that will determine their investment in DPRK, 
which has implications on the priorities for transport developments and 
introduction of logistics concepts. 
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1.4 The Structure of This Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of ten chapters, including this introductory chapter.  
 
Chapter 2 examines the political economy of DPRK. The chapter begins with an 
introduction of the geographical landscape, consisting of hills and mountains in 
the central region, depicting the difficulty for development of transport and 
logistics. Next, it discusses the three periods in the country’s historical 
development which reflects the current transport system. The chapter then 
examines the Juche ideology and the way it affects foreign relations. It moves 
on to analyse the economic evolution of DPRK where it was more dominant 
than the South in the 1970s and early 1980s until it was overtaken. The chapter 
concludes by considering DPRK’s attempts at reforming its economy with 
special economic zones and currency reforms which had little success. 
 
Chapter 3 appraises the current transport and logistics developments in DPRK. 
The chapter begins by discussing the theories surrounding transport and 
economic development in developing countries. It goes on to examine the 
problems and conditions of the transport system in the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU) prior to its collapse to provide an understanding of the similar 
environment in DPRK. Next, it provides a detailed background underpinning the 
present conditions of the transport infrastructure in DPRK and strategies for 
investment to build up the decrepit transport system. It concludes by reviewing 
selected location theories and models. A summary of the factors influencing 
location choices is examined along with different ways of grouping the factors. 
 
Chapter 4 evaluates the scenarios surrounding DPRK. This chapter introduces 
the disintegration and reunification scenarios; national and supra-national 
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development scenarios; peace scenarios; internal stability and economic 
change scenarios. Next, the use of scenarios in transport planning on a regional, 
national, supra-national and international level is discussed. The chapter 
concludes with analysis of scenarios constructed for DPRK. It shows that the 
majority of the studies did not use any techniques used to derive the scenarios.  
 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the exploratory research. The nature of the 
exploratory study is to generate an understanding of the research topic in 
question. Therefore, statements from experts have been compared and 
contrasted to generate insights for the next stage of research. The chapter 
analyses the comments and statements made about the political, economic, 
technical, managerial, spatial and social aspects relating to DPRK and 
discusses the findings and develops the central and sub-research questions to 
be answer in this research.  
 
Chapter 5 begins with the rationale for choosing the appropriate research 
philosophy. Next, the justification of choice and process of data collection and 
analysis methods (qualitative exploratory and in-depth interviews with experts 
and quantitative survey addressing ROK SMEs and logistics companies) are 
described in greater detail. The chapter concludes by discussing the ethical 
considerations applied to this research.  
 
Chapter 7 presents the results of the qualitative research phase covering the 
different factors relating to DPRK. Chapter 8 presents the results of the 
quantitative survey in relation to the research questions posed. It also provides 
a description of the statistical techniques used for analysis.  
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Chapter 9 triangulates the research through linking, comparing and contrasting 
the discussion of the qualitative and quantitative research and findings 
generated from the literature review.  
 
Chapter 10 summarises and concludes with the research by answering the 
central research question and research objectives. Next, it discusses the 
theoretical implications and describes how this research contributes to the 
existing knowledge on DPRK and provides policy implications for governments 
and companies. Limitations of this research are addressed and further 
recommendations are provided for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 – INTRODUCTION TO DPRK’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
This chapter explains the political economy of DPRK, which has shaped the 
development of its transport and logistical system. Historically, DPRK’s 
topography creates difficulties for an efficient transport network which is centred 
on railways and roads. It incorporates an overview of the Juche ideology, which 
is the driving force behind all decisions made in one of the most isolated 
countries, including transport and logistics infrastructure. This chapter also 
explains the economic aspects of DPRK’s position as a centrally planned 
economy since the Korean War. It underlines DPRK’s attempts to reform its 
economy since 2002. An economic overview is important to show that transport 
and logistics never played a major part of DPRK’s plans. Transport and logistics 
are not considered as part of the social infrastructure, but as an element of 
production, require to meet the demand for transport created by other economic 
activities. DPRK stopped publishing official figures since late 1960s. Since then, 
data on DPRK has been published by ROK and is perceived to be most reliable. 
Hence, there has been more qualitative, descriptive research than quantitative 
analysis. 
 
2.1 General Overview 
 
The geography of DPRK underpins transport and logistical considerations. With 
a population of 23 million people, it is strategically located at the centre of 
Northeast Asia with an area of 120,540 square km. A 238km-long demilitarised 
zone (DMZ) separates DPRK and ROK close to the 38th Parallel. Construction 
on the reconnection of rail links between both Koreas began in 2004 and has 
yet to be completed. Besides the DMZ, DPRK has a 1,425km-long northern 
border with China following the Yalu River southwest between Sinuiju and 
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Dandong cities to the West Sea and the Tumen River that flows northeast to the 
Korean East Sea (Willoughby 2003). DPRK forms a 19km border with Russia 
with the Tumen River flowing through it. Figure 2.1 presents the geopolitical 
map of Northeast Asia, which shows DPRK’s size and location with respect to 
other Northeast Asian countries. DPRK’s warm temperate climate divides into 
four seasons, which are dry except during the rainy season of summer. Over 
half of Pyongyang’s annual rainfall occurs in July and August. Typhoons pound 
the coasts, causing frequent floods and wind-damage to infrastructures. 
Approximately 80 percent of DPRK’s land area is made up of hills and 
mountains separated by deep, narrow valleys with coastal plains wide in the 
east and west. As a result, DPRK’s transport network is concentrated on the 
east and west coast consisting of single-tracked railways and unpaved roads. 
This prevents an effective and efficient flow of transport connectivity and 
accessibility. Figure 2.2 presents a map of DPRK indicating the major cities, 
main roads and railways. DPRK’s major natural resources include coal, copper, 
magnesite, iron ore, gold and zinc.  
 
A great success for DPRK has been the implementation of free, universal, 
compulsory education for 11 years, from ages four to 15, in state-run schools. 
DPRK enjoys a high national literacy rate for citizens 15 years of age and older 
is 99 per cent. Since the 1980s, there have been changing trends in DPRK’s 
education. Priorities are placed on strengthening the political ideology, 
increased emphasis on science and technology, computer and foreign 
languages, and the introduction of optional courses as well as expansion of 
higher education for adults (Cho 2001). This is advantageous for both Koreas 
as they share a common language and culture. DPRK will be able to attract 
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much needed investment from the South while ROK companies will be able to 
take advantage of cheaper labour and land. 
 
Figure 2.1: Geopolitical Map of Northeast Asia  
 
Source: http://www.erina.or.jp/En/Asia/map.htm 
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Figure 2.2: Map of DPRK showing main roads and railways  
 
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/korea.html 
 
2.2 Historical Evolution of DPRK 
 
Transport systems in DPRK reflect three distinct periods of recent historical 
development – the Korean War, and the reigns of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il. 
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2.2.1 The Korean War 
 
Colonial and military influences shaped DPRK’s supply chains in WWII until 
Korea gained liberation from Japanese colonial rule. However, the Yalta 
Conference in February 1945 did not produce any formal agreement by the 
Allied powers on the future status of Korea, only agreeing to establish a four-
power trusteeship (Library of Congress 2005). In December 1945, a joint 
Soviet-American commission was established for the future settlement of Korea 
but was deadlocked for almost two years over the issue of establishing a 
national government. In November 1947, the U.N. General Assembly adopted 
the proposal by the USA to hold a general election in Korea under the 
observation of a U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea. In August 1948, a 
government was established in ROK under Syngman Rhee with the help of the 
USA. The United Nations (UN) assembly declared that the republic was the only 
lawful government in Korea. In September 1948, the Soviet Union installed Kim 
Il-Sung as the premier of DPRK declaring that it recognises the north as the 
only lawful government in Korea. In June 1950, DPRK invaded the South and 
began a four-year long Korean War. The War was suspended with an armistice 
but never concluded, splitting the peninsula along a DMZ. Since then, ROK has 
followed the capitalist road of a market system as introduced by the USA with 
huge amounts of subsequent economic aid intended to help it recover from the 
depths of economic misery. DPRK, in contrast, has adopted and practices the 
Marxist-Leninist command economy as imposed by the FSU (Hwang 1993, 26). 
In the areas of logistics, the concept of international supply chains have 
developed in the South, integrating the country with global systems. This can be 
seen with the development of ports and shipping in ROK. On the contrary, 
logistics concepts are eschewed in DPRK as a result of a command-economy 
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which placed little emphasis on development of transport and logistics 
infrastructure. 
 
2.2.2 Reign of Kim Il-Sung 
 
After the Korean War, Kim Il-Sung established a socialist command economy, 
with emphasis on heavy industry, centralised government control and 
unquestioned, highly personalised leadership. Transport and logistics 
infrastructure was not considered important. Kim Il-Sung took this period (1947-
1958) to consolidate his power within DPRK by purging his fellow cadres and 
political opponents. By the end of 1955, he had gained full control of DPRK by 
purging out his fellow cadres who fought with him during the Japanese 
Occupation and anyone else who posed a threat to him. Kim set out his vision 
for DPRK by introducing the ‘Juche’ ideology (to be discussed later) of self-
sufficiency and self-reliance, which provides guidance in politics, economy, 
national defence and foreign policy. Now, Kim Il-Sung had achieved 
unchallenged supremacy in the Korean Workers Party (KWP). With tight control 
over all aspects of the DPRK policy and society, Kim II-Sung became the “Great 
Leader” (Library of Congress 2005). He reigned in DPRK till July 1994 when he 
died of a sudden heart attack. 
 
2.2.3 Reign of Kim Jong-II  
 
Since the early 1970s, Kim Jong-Il was groomed as DPRK’s next leader, the 
rightful heir of Kim Il-Sung’s power and authority (Willoughby 2003). From 
1980s, he was appointed to numerous important positions in the Party and in 
that year, it was announced that he would indeed succeed his father. After the 
death of Kim Il-Sung in 1994, the country went into mourning for the next three 
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years while the posts of General Secretary of the KWP and the President of 
DPRK remained empty. In October 1997, Kim Jong-Il took over the post of 
General Secretary and assumed command as chief of the Korean’s People 
Army. He continued the legacy of his father by ruling the country in dictatorial 
fashion amidst severe economic decline and famine. In June 2000, he met the 
President of ROK, Kim Dae-Jung for summit talks, which resulted in greater 
inter-Korean exchanges, in hope of reconciliation and peace on the Korean 
Peninsula. However in October 2002, tensions escalated in the region when 
DPRK admitted it had been developing a clandestine nuclear weapons 
programme (Library of Congress 2005).  
 
2.2.4 Succession Plans 
 
Since Kim Jong-Il suffered a stroke in 2008, there has been wide speculation 
regarding his choice of successor. Traditionally, it has always been the eldest 
son who assumes the successor position. However, Kim’s eldest son, Kim 
Jong-Nam has been ignored due to his various reasons (e.g. being caught 
using a fake passport). Kim Jong-Il has appointed his youngest son, Kim Jong-
Un as his successor, promoting his to several important positions in KWP (IFES 
2011). The effects of this succession plan will only be felt after the passing of 
Kim-Jong-Il. However, the objective has always been steadfast, to maintain the 
present regime. 
 
2.2.5 Juche Ideology 
 
An understanding of the basic tenets and theories of Juche, as well as 
theoretical antecedents, is necessary to understand DPRK today, its world-view 
and its economic system (French 2005). Western scholars have attempted to 
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provide meanings to the word albeit creating more confusion. According to Suk 
(2003), the first syllable of the Korea word, ‘Ju’ means “the main or 
fundamental” principle; the second syllable ‘Che’ means “body, self or the 
foundation of something. Cumings (1997) noted that Juche is most commonly 
translated as ‘self-reliance’ while Willougby (2003) definition was the “Master of 
one’s self”. Scholars have found it difficult to grasp Juche’s meaning since ‘self-
reliance’ is both insufficient and disingenuous as Pyongyang has continue to 
rely on China and Soviet Union for aid and subsidies. A book was written by 
Kim Jong-Il and published in 1982 entitled ‘Kim Jong Il on the Juche Idea’. An 
excerpt from the book describes the Juche ideology (pg. 36): 
 
“To establish Juche in ideology means having the consciousness 
that one is the master of the revolution and construction, thinking 
and doing everything, centring on the revolution in one’s own 
country, and acquiring the viewpoint and attitude of solving all 
questions by one’s own talents and initiative. The party and 
people of a country are masters of the revolution in that country, 
and to carry out the revolution in one’s country successfully is the 
basic mission of the party and people’s of one country.”   
 
Juche theory was originally introduced by Kim Il-Sung in 1955 as an ideological 
system and later refined by Kim Jong-Il in 1970s to extend it to all aspects of 
North Korea.  According to Suk (2003, pg.13), DPRK’s economy prominently 
applies to the ideological principle of Juche under the following three principles. 
First, the 1998 revision of the DPRK’s constitution stipulates that all means of 
production are owned solely by the state and cooperative organisations. Under 
the second economic principle of central planning, the state formulates unified 
and detailed plans, including transport and logistics infrastructure, to guarantee 
a high rate of production growth and balanced development of self-sufficiency. 
The third economic principle of Juche is self-sufficiency.  
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As an economic system, Juche was a disaster as the forced industrialisation 
between 1950s-1970s could be maintained only through massive Soviet and 
Chinese aid. Seliger (2004) concluded that Juche is very much a Soviet-type 
central planning plus some Chinese-style additions, with many problems 
including: constant shortages and bottlenecks in production; soft plans (easy to 
fulfil for producers); bureaucratisation; distorted price structure; and emphasis 
on quantitative rather than qualitative growth, resulting in zero or negative 
growth rates once all factors of production are employed.  
 
2.3 Foreign Relations  
 
Up until the 1990s, due to its autarkic economy, DPRK only conducted foreign 
relations with selected countries, namely the COMECON countries including 
Russia, China, some Nordic countries and some in the African continent. 
According to Koh (1994), DPRK’s foreign track policy record in the post-cold 
war era is mixed. Most notable setbacks are the diplomatic normalisation 
between ROK and both China and Russia. Since 2004 relations between DPRK 
and the United States remained intense after Washington accused Pyongyang 
of arms trafficking and counterfeiting (Straits Times 2005). Japan is still 
pursuing the kidnapping of their citizens by DPRK spies in the 1960s and 1970s. 
On the contrary, relations with China are improving with more trade and 
economic links between both countries. DPRK’s regime has been criticised in 
its domestic and foreign policies for being out of touch with reality. This theme is 
also central to Buzo’s (1994, 244) view of DPRK’s foreign policy. He argued that 
DPRK displays a crude, predatory outlook on foreign relations. With the 
collapse of the FSU and cutback in Chinese aid to DPRK, Pyongyang was left 
with only one potentially major source of aid in the 1990s – the General 
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Association of Korean Residents in Japan (known as Chonsen Soren in 
Japanese). This “money pipeline” funnels very substantial volumes of aid to 
DPRK every year (Eberstadt 1996). DPRK has been seeking to improve 
relations with the European Union (EU). DPRK and the EU have mostly 
maintained a traditional form of economic exchange and kept trade exchange to 
a minimum. Relations began to change after 1995 and 1996, when DPRK 
appealed to the international community for aid. The EU is likely to play an even 
more crucial role in the future in keeping DPRK connected to the rest of the 
world and in the role of introducing the country to the international community. 
As trade between DPRK and EU countries continues to grow, there will be a 
need to develop transport infrastructure, especially ports and its hinterlands, to 
cope with the growth.  
 
Another issue that dominates DPRK’s foreign relations with its neighbours and 
the USA are nuclear weapons proliferation and missile sales. Pyongyang has 
twice withdrawn from the ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” 
in 1994 and 2003 and withdrew from talks. DPRK uses this tactic to obtain more 
food aid and economic subsidies. It has expertly used the Six-Party Talks to 
obtain more concessions from the various countries. Up till 2011, DPRK has 
promised to return to the table for more talks but to no avail. The other five 
countries each have their own agenda in bringing DPRK back to the table. The 
USA is concerned about a nuclear attack on its own soil. At the same time, they 
want to maintain a strong presence in the Korean Peninsula. China wants to 
maintain stability in the region as any form of collapse will send millions of 
migrants into its border regions. At the same time, they would like to exploit the 
untapped mineral resources in DPRK for its own use and also to boost the 
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economy of its Northeast provinces (i.e. Jilin and Heilongjiang). They would also 
want to use the ports to export their cargoes through to Japan. ROK wants to 
continually engage DPRK through trade and talks to smoothen the eventual 
cost of reunification. Japan would like to resolve the abduction issue. They will 
be willing to contribute to the rebuilding of DPRK. Russia does not have any 
interest or the political clout to have a major say in the political developments in 
the region. Their interest also lies in the minerals and transport projects which 
can be developed to boost their regional economy (Donga Daily 2007) 
 
2.4 Economic Evolution of DPRK 
 
The structure of DPRK’s economy consists of three economies: official, military 
and private. In the official economy, the government carries out the planning 
while prohibiting unregulated economic activities. DPRK manages the military 
economy (second economy) separately from its other economies. The second 
economy committee decides independently on production and distribution and 
has first priority in allocation of necessary materials and resources. Activities 
outside the plans have been termed the “unofficial economy” or the “private 
economy”. A private economy operates according to market mechanisms and 
structure. According to Lee and Yoon (2004), in DPRK, informal markets have 
developed from the farmers’ markets, where farmers within cooperative farms 
can sell agricultural products from their private plots to consumers. Farmers’ 
markets expanded gradually in the 1980s and 1990s. Several factors caused 
the markets to grow rapidly: chronic food shortages; DPRK learned necessary 
market skills from Chinese peddlers; and the DPRK government allowed its 
citizens to engage in production of consumer goods. 
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After the Korean War, both Koreas experienced very diverse economic 
transformation. ROK, with the help of the USA, implemented market economy 
mechanisms while DPRK adopted the Soviet model with emphasis on heavy 
industry aided by subsidies from its neighbours, China and Soviet Union. Table 
2.1 presents a comparison on both economies. Noticeably, DPRK’s economy 
outgrew the South in the initial years. In 1960, DPRK’s GNI and per capita 
income was twice of the South. Choe et al. (2003) provided three reasons why 
DPRK’s per capita income was higher than ROK’s during the initial periods. 
Firstly, DPRK possessed extensive resources to build a modern economy. It 
has 43 sizable varieties of mineral deposits and nonferrous metals that were 
non-existent or less available to ROK. Secondly, DPRK inherited the basic 
infrastructure of a modern economy because of Japan’s substantial investment 
in development during the Japanese occupation. Thirdly, DPRK opted for inner 
directed economy, which was centred on building its heavy industries at home 
while avoiding commitments abroad. However from the 1970s DPRK became 
victim of its own success. The old equipment, including trucks and railways, that 
was used successfully during the early days of heavy industrialisation became 
obsolete and dilapidated. DPRK had to borrow heavily from its neighbours, 
Soviet Union and China, as well as other Western countries. This is reflected in 
Table 2.1 where ROK’s GNI and per capita exceeded the North’s from 1980s. 
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Table 2.1: Comparison of the Korean economies 
 GNI (US$ 100 million) Per Capita Income (US$) 
 South North South North 
1953 14 7 67 46 
1960 19 35 79 177 
1970 78 90 243 304 
1980 627 434 1,645 1,161 
1990 2635 572 6,147 1,142 
2000 5096 168 10,481 757 
2003 6086 184 12,720 818 
2009 8732 224 19,450 389 
Adapted from Hwang (1993), Bank of Korea (2005) and Hankyoreh (2010) 
 
After the collapse of the FSU and Eastern Bloc in 1990, DPRK’s economy went 
into a decline. According to Kang (2000, 174-175), besides production problems 
that arise from inadequate work incentives, fertilizers, and working tractors, 
there was also the problem of distribution. No trains were available for transport. 
The only alternative was the country’s aging fleet of run-down trucks, which kept 
breaking down on the unpaved roads. Rice that was needed in the cities sat 
rotting in the countryside, while manufactured goods the country people needed 
never left the city. It is difficult to assess DPRK’s economy since the 
government stopped publishing annual economic statistics in the mid-1960s. 
DPRK scholars have to rely on predictions and any information that trickles out 
of DPRK from time to time. The most recent economic information published by 
DPRK was in July 2002 and 2009 when the country underwent price and wages 
reform. This will be discussed in later sections. The most widely cited figures in 
public discussions are those produced by the BOK. However, Noland (2000) is 
sceptical of the method used by BOK. The annual BOK estimate of DPRK 
national income is constructed by applying ROK added-value weights to 
physical estimates of DPRK output obtained through classified methods. 
According to Noland, this method may differ significantly from the true 
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underlying figure due to the inadequacy of the calculation method and it is not 
verified by outside analysts.  
 
This section details DPRK’s economic development and plans since Japanese 
Occupation. Table 2.2 presents DPRK’s economic plans from 1948 to 1995. 
 
Table 2.2 DPRK’s Economic Plans 
Plans Goals and events Results (DPRK figures) 
1-Year Plans 
(1947,1948) 
Nationalise major industries 
Increase production of basic 
necessities 
Industrial production: 
1946-47: 54% increase 
1947-48: 38% increase 
2-Year Plan 
(1949-1950) 
Consolidate economic 
foundation 
Industrial production: 
3-4 times greater than 
1946 level 
3-Year Plan 
(1954-1956) 
Production of basic necessities 
Juche introduced 
Nationalise and collectivise 
farms 
Industrial production: 
Annual growth rate: 41.5% 
5-Year Plan 
(1957-1961) 
Complete nationalisation 
Production of basic necessities 
Chollima movement 
Chongsan-ri and Taean 
systems 
Industrial production: 
Annual growth rate: 36.5% 
Industries and farms 
nationalised 
First 7-Year Plan 
(1961-1967) 
(extended to 1970) 
Continued emphasis on heavy 
industry 
Military buildup 
More emphasis on Juche 
Industrial production: 
Annual growth rate: 13% 
Bottlenecks appear 
Stop publishing statistics 
6-Year Plan 
(1971-1976) 
(extended to 1978) 
Improve technology 
Improve light industry 
Purchase foreign plants 
Three-Revolution Team 
Movement Speed battles 
Industrial production: 
Annual growth rate: 16.3% 
Default on loans 
Second 7-Year 
Plan 
(1978-1984) 
(extended to 1986) 
Frugality/conservation plans 
August 3 Consumer Goods 
Movement 
Independent Accounting 
System 
Foreign Joint Venture Law 
Ten major targets for 1980s 
Industrial production: 
Annual growth rate: 12.1% 
Third 7-Year Plan 
(1987-1993) 
(extended to 1995) 
Ten major targets for 1980s 
Open foreign economic trade 
zone 
Pass more joint venture laws 
Socialist trade relations end 
Industrial production: 
Annual growth rate: 12.2% 
Admitted failure of plan in 
1993 
Shortages in many sectors 
GNP decline beginning in 
1990 
Source: Lee, D.W. (1996, 317-336) 
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2.4.1 Initial Years: 1948-1956 
 
After WWII, the remaining, undamaged equipment and infrastructure, including 
railways and roads, left behind by the Japanese were considered to be the most 
advanced and suitable for heavy industry. DPRK became the main beneficiary 
and began to nationalise major industries. They inherited 76 per cent of the 
peninsula’s mining production, 90 per cent of its electrical generating capacity, 
and 80 per cent of Korea’s entire heavy industrial facilities.  
 
The first One-Year Plan from 1947-1948 reported an industrial growth of 54 
percent while the 1948-1949 Plan reported a 38 percent increase. Major 
economic policies during this period were three fold. The first goal was to 
consolidate factories and enterprises in workable order. Next was to promote 
the production of necessary goods. The last aim was to encourage agricultural 
production. Reconstruction of transport infrastructure was not deemed 
necessary by the government as it was considered to be adequate. By the end 
of 1950, industrial growth was three to four times greater than in 1946 as DPRK 
further consolidated its economic foundation, and productivity surged, pushing 
DPRK ahead of the South in industrial development. Economic growth was 
temporary halted during the Korean War. After the armistice was signed in July 
1953, capital and technology assistance from the Soviet Union and its Eastern 
European allies, combined with manpower from the Chinese “volunteer” 
soldiers, helped the DPRK economy recover during the Three-Year Plan of 
1954-56 (Oh and Hassig 2000). In 1955, Kim Il-Sung introduced Juche as an 
ideological system to justify DPRK’s equidistance stance between China and 
the Soviet Union. A year later, when aid from both countries declined, Juche 
25 
 
was extended to the economy, setting economic self-sufficiency as the long 
term goal. 
 
2.4.2 Transition Stage: First Five-Year Plan (1957-1961) 
 
The objective of this plan was to strengthen the material base for a communist 
economy and to ensure a supply of basic necessities for the people (Hwang 
1993). By 1958, nationalisation of all remaining industries and collectivisation of 
all farms was completed. However, as a result of a decline in foreign aid and 
subsidies and to squeeze out more productivity from the economy, the 
‘Chollima Undong’ (Flying Horse) movement was launched. Chollima, designed 
to boost output by increasing worker’s motivation, is a mass mobilisation 
campaign suitable for development of heavy industry. Chollima was suited for 
the initial period, with its inbuilt ability to drive production through ideological 
support and basic industrial techniques (French 2005). In order to ensure the 
success of Chollima, the Chongsan-Ri method and Taean Work System was 
implemented. The Chongsan-ri – “on-the-spot” management method, was 
developed by Kim Il-Sung in 1960 during a visit to the Chongsan-ri Cooperative 
Farm. This method has three important components: Party officials were given 
much greater input in the production process in the farms and factories; Party 
cadres were placed as hands-on managers empowered to solve any problems 
and use ideas that workers confronted them with; and output was to be 
increased by whatever means worked, usually increased shares in the output or 
material rewards to the group. This kind of management developed in the 
Taean Work System applied and refined agricultural management techniques to 
industry (Willoughby 2003). Higher level functionaries assist lower level 
functionaries and workers in a spirit of close consultation and camaraderie. 
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Party committees control the general management of factories and enterprises 
and stress political or ideological work as well as technological expertise. The 
system allows for material incentives to production. The Five-Year Plan was a 
success with an annual industrial growth of 36.6 percent. However by 1961, the 
economic policies of nationalisation and collectivisation, central planning and 
mass mobilisation were reaching their limits of effectiveness.  Transport 
infrastructure was becoming dilapidated and inefficient thus needed new 
investment.  
 
2.4.3 First Seven-Year Plan (1961-1967)  
 
Although DPRK first patterned its economic system on the Stalinist model, 
Chinese influence on DPRK economic policy has been increasingly important 
since the mid-1960s (Kang and Lee 1992). Buoyed by the strong economic 
growth in the last decade, DPRK continued to emphasise heavy industry and 
labour mobilisation and extended Juche as the guiding thought to military self-
defence. Kim Il-Sung began to increase the rate of investment in heavy industry 
from 40 percent to in excess of 65 percent of total state investment by mid-
1960s. Pyongyang launched its ‘Great Leap Outward’ policy of buying up plant 
and machinery from the West and Japan and Western businessmen travelled to 
DPRK to sell, encouraged by the annual published growth rates in the 1950s 
and 1960s. As a consequence of achieving a certain level of economic 
progressiveness, the country was destined to enter a new phase of 
industrialisation. According to French (2005), DPRK acquired the world’s largest 
cement factor as well as a watch factory, paper mill, steel mill, fertiliser and 
chemical plants. However, as labour and resources were stretched to their limit, 
bottlenecks appeared in the economy causing widespread slowdowns and 
27 
 
reverses in growth for the first time. There were shortages of arable land, skilled 
labour, energy, transportation and minerals. These bottlenecks were clear signs 
that the economy was suffering from central planning and required 
diversification of production and emphasis on technology as a means of 
increasing productivity. However, Kim Il-Sung had no economists who were 
able to tell him that those plans need to be changed. Disappointing performance 
forced the planners to extend the plan three more years until the 1970s 
suggesting that some economic targets had not been met. After the early 1960s, 
DPRK stopped publishing official economic statistics except for percentage 
increases over previous periods.  During the last part of the de facto ten-year 
plan, emphasis shifted to pursuing parallel development of the economy and 
defence capabilities. This was due to the threats posed by the military takeover 
in ROK by General Park Chung Hee, involvement of American troops in 
Vietnam, and the widening Sino-Soviet conflict. In the end, the necessity to 
divert resources to defence became the official explanation for the plan’s failure 
(Library of Congress, 2005).  
 
2.4.4 The Six-Year Plan (1971-1976) 
 
The Six-Year Plan of 1971-1976 followed immediately in 1971. In the aftermath 
of the poor performance of the previous plan, growth targets were scaled down 
substantially. As some of the proposed targets from the previous plan were not 
achieved, the Six-Year Plan did not deviate much from its predecessor in basic 
goals. The Six-Year Plan placed more emphasis on light industry and 
technological modernisation, self-sufficiency in industrial raw materials, 
improving product quality, correcting imbalances among different sectors, 
developing the power and extractive industries and reduction of the bottlenecks 
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of the previous plan. The plan called for attaining a self-sufficiency rate of 60 to 
70 percent in all industrial sectors by substituting domestic raw materials 
wherever possible. Improving transport capacity was seen as one of the urgent 
tasks in accelerating economic development as it was one of the major 
bottlenecks. In recognition of the limitations inherent in its home-grown 
technologies, DPRK purchased some $500 million worth of industrial plants, 
mostly from Japan (Oh and Hassig 2000). The oil crisis on 1973 depressed the 
price of the minerals that DPRK exported. As a result, Pyongyang defaulted on 
its debts from 1974, halting the importation of western technology. In order to 
speed up the early accomplishment of the plan, DPRK launched the Three 
Revolution Team (TRT) Movement. This movement was more ideological than 
economic, which required teams to visit farms and factories throughout the 
country spreading technological, ideological and cultural ideas. DPRK also 
employed new speed battles, which exhausted labour resources and did little 
for the long-term growth of the economy. DPRK claimed to have fulfilled the Six-
Year Plan by one year ahead of schedule, with an annual growth of 16.3 
percent. Under these circumstances, the next plan would start without delay in 
1976. However, there was a prolonged delay and the next plan did not start until 
1978. This suggests that the targets were under fulfilled and a buffer period was 
needed to attain the plan’s goals. The inability of the planners to continuously 
formulate and institute economic plans reveals as much about the inefficacy of 
planning itself as the extent of the economic difficulties and administrative 
disruption facing the country (Library of Congress 2005). Aside from under 
fulfilment, widespread disruptions and imbalances among various sectors of the 
economy further complicated plan formulation.  
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2.4.5 The Second Seven-Year Plan (1978-1984) 
 
DPRK launched its second Seven-Year Plan in 1978 with aims of strengthening 
the economy, promoting self-reliance and exports of manufactured goods and 
modernising the transportation sector. The emphasis on self-reliance was 
twofold: the influence of Juche on all economic policies and mounting foreign 
debts originating from large-scale imports of Western equipment and machinery 
in 1970s. By this time, Kim Jong-Il, the son of Kim Il-Sung, was making many of 
the major decisions. He initiated the ‘August Third Consumer Goods Movement’, 
which aimed at improving the lives of the people. However, this movement was 
doomed to fail due to the substandard quality of the goods products and 
shortages of raw materials. In addition, the transport equipment has become 
obsolete and run down. Even when raw materials were available, there were no 
trains and trucks often broke down.  Performance of the second Seven-Year 
Plan was comparatively good for the first three years, from 1978 to 1980, but 
industrial production became extremely unstable after the Sixth Congress of the 
KWP in 1980. At the same time, Kim Il-Sung announced the grand plan to 
achieve “Ten Major Targets of Communist Economic Construction in the 1980s” 
for electricity generation, coal, steel, cement and mineral production, fertiliser 
and grain production, textile and tideland reclamation (Oh and Hassig 2000). 
Towards the final part of the plan, two economic adjustments were initiated. The 
Independent Accounting System gave more autonomy to state enterprises at 
local level. According to the new provisions, DPRK enterprises can retain part of 
their plan-quota profits as enterprise funds when they over-fulfil their profit plans. 
In addition, the Foreign Joint Venture Law was enacted with optimism that 
western companies will bring investment into DPRK. From all indications, it 
appears that the second Seven-Year Plan was not successful as DPRK 
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generally downplayed the accomplishments of the plan. Although it was 
declared that the targets of the plan were met on schedule, with an annual 
growth rate of 12.1 percent, there was no new economic plan for two years, 
indications of both the plan’s failure and the severity of the economic and 
planning problems plaguing the economy.  
 
2.4.6 Third Seven-Year Plan (1987-1993) 
 
The final Seven-Year Plan continued to focus on Kim Il-Sung’s ten major goals 
of the 1980s for fulfilment. By 1989, majority of the targets were still unfulfilled 
resulting in revision of the targets till 1993. The plan also gives a great deal of 
attention on the development of science and technology, and on foreign trade 
and joint ventures. In 1991, Rajin-Sonbing Free Economic Zone (FEZ), located 
on the Russian-Chinese-DPRK border, was created in conjunction with the 
United Nations Tumen River Economic Development Plan. However, the FEZ 
attracted only a total of US$67 million during a seven year effort until 1997, then 
the government closed down the area. New investment laws were passed in 
1992 to supplement the original 1984 laws to make it more attractive for foreign 
companies. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 destroyed any hopes of 
fulfilling the ten major goals. It had a detrimental impact on DPRK causing the 
economy to go into a decline. DPRK was unable to change its economic and 
trade policies to cope with the sudden shock of the Soviet Union demise. Soviet 
Union had been DPRK’s major trading partner and aid contributor. In 1991, it 
supplied over 40 percent of DPRK’s imports; by 1993 it had fallen to below 10 
percent. Table 2.3 below shows the overview of DPRK’s economy from 1985 to 
2004. From 1990, the gross national product (GNP) of DPRK started to decline 
from $23.1 billion to $20.5 billion in 1993 while the total trade decreased  by 
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more than 40 percent from $4.72 billion in 1990 to $2.64 billion in 1993. The 
government was force to admit the failure of the third Seven-Year Plan (1987-
1993), stating that some major indices including electric power, steel and 
chemical fibre failed to be attained due to international events and the acute 
situation created in Korea (French 2005). An adjustment period of two years 
was set aside to concentrate on agriculture, light industry and foreign trade. 
With the sudden death of Kim Il-Sung in 1994, the third Seven-Year Plan (1987-
1993) and the ten major targets were forgotten in the struggle to avoid 
economic collapse (Oh and Hassig 2000).  
 
Table 2.3: Overview of DPRK’s Economy (1985-2008) 
Year GNP Per Capita Exports Imports Total Trade 
  (US$ billion) GNI (US$) (US$ billion) (US$ billion) (US$ billion) 
1985 15.1 757 1.31 1.78 3.09 
1986 17.4 853 1.51 2.07 3.58 
1987 19.4 936 1.65 2.50 4.15 
1988 20.6 980 2.03 3.21 5.24 
1989 21.1 987 1.91 2.89 4.80 
1990 23.1 1,142 1.96 2.76 4.72 
1991 22.9 1,115 1.01 1.71 2.72 
1992 21.1 1,013 1.03 1.64 2.67 
1993 20.5 969 1.02 1.62 2.64 
1994 21.2 992 0.84 1.27 2.11 
1995 22.3 1,034 0.74 1.31 2.05 
1996 21.4 989 0.73 1.25 1.98 
1997 17.7 811 0.91 1.27 2.18 
1998 12.6 573 0.56 0.88 1.44 
1999 15.8 714 0.52 0.96 1.48 
2000 16.8 757 0.56 1.41 1.97 
2001 15.7 706 0.65 1.62 2.27 
2002 17.0 762 0.74 1.52 2.26 
2003 18.4 818 0.77 1.61 2.38 
2004 20.8 914 0.91 0.93 1.84 
2005 24.2 1,056 1.04 1.07 2.11 
2006 25.6 1,108 1.21 1.23 2.44 
2007 26.7 1,152 1.38 1.41 2.79 
2008 27.3 1,065 1.58 1.63 3.21 
Source: Bank of Korea (2011)    
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2.4.7 Economic Crisis (1994-2002) 
 
By now, DPRK was facing the full effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
causing the economy to spiral into a crisis. At the same time, the whole nation 
was still suffering from the shock death of their ‘Great Leader’. DPRK became 
increasing isolated internationally and was being described as a ‘pariah state’ 
(French 2005, 112). The collapse of the official economy led to a dramatic 
decrease in government investments. The country came to a standstill because 
the citizens were concerned with feeding themselves. As the weight of the 
government declined after 1994, the private economy continued to expand. 
Even though the private economy has the capacity for investment, there were 
no channels in place to facilitate it. The country was reaching a dire strait. 
However the government under Kim Jong-Il continued to persist with ineffective 
policies. Table 2.4 presents the economic development strategy under Kim 
Jong-Il’s leadership from 1994 onwards. He designated the period between 
1994-1996 to promote revolutionary strategies focusing on agriculture, light 
industry and trade. The DPRK leader stressed the need for a change in the 
attitudes of the economic experts to develop foreign trade. However in 1994, 
DPRK admitted that food shortages had deteriorated into famine and appealed 
to the international community for food aid. Famine in DPRK occurred as a 
result of failed economic and agricultural policies. According to French (2005, 
126), political answers to agricultural inadequacies are not uncommon in 
planned economies. In the FSU, a regular event was the mass mobilisation of 
soldiers, and often students, to help first plant and then gather the harvest, 
though much remained left in fields or warehouses to rot due to the poor 
internal transportation structure. To worsen the situation, there was serious 
flooding in 1995 and 1996 which left millions dead. 
33 
 
 
Table 2.4 Economic Development Strategy under Kim Jong-Il’s Leadership 
Year Strategies 
1994-1996 The period of “revolutionary economic strategy,” characterised 
by the three “firsts” – agriculture, light industry and trade 
1997-1998 The period of transformation, characterised by reinstatement 
of the self-reliant national economy policy 
1999-2001 The motto of “building an economic powerhouse” and/or 
development of technology and improvement of economic 
management. 
2002-Present Reform and open-door policy or “defence industry first” policy? 
Source: Park (2004) 
 
Realising the failure of its revolutionary economic strategies, DPRK renewed its 
commitments to the self-reliant national economic policy in 1997. The regime 
returned to its traditional economic development strategy composing of inward-
oriented industrialisation, “heavy industry first” policy and intensive development 
methods. The economy was at its lowest point in 1998 with its gross national 
product and trade amounting to US$12.6 billion and US$1.44 billion respectively. 
Imports, consisting of mainly food aid and fertiliser, amounted to only US$0.88 
billion. This was partly due to the ‘1997 Asian Financial Crisis’. In 1998, DPRK 
amended its constitution to allow a more flexible economic system reflecting the 
growth of private economic activities. Reudiger (2003), made some conclusions 
from the new amendments. The overall goal of the leadership in DPRK is to 
stay in power, to stabilise its position and to actively pursue its goals. 
Transparency, a basic demand of international organisations, was also 
emphasised in connection with the reforms.   
 
DPRK’s aims from 1999 onwards were to be an economic powerhouse and/or 
improve technology and management. Kim Jong-Il knew that his regime faced 
certain collapse without foreign investment in DPRK’s crumbling economy. So 
he embarked on a strategy of building up positive foreign relations with its 
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neighbours and the USA in order to attract much needed foreign investment. 
DPRK’s relationship with the USA was at its highest point when the Clinton 
Administration was still in office in 1999. Up until 1998, DPRK had experience a 
negative growth rate since the collapse of the FSU. Choe et al. (2003) provided 
several reasons why DPRK suffered from negative economic growth for almost 
10 years. Firstly the collapse of the FSU deprived DPRK of their major trading 
partner and provider of economic assistance. Secondly, consecutive floods in 
1995 and 1996 and record drought in 1997 caused massive loss of crops and 
cultivated land. Thirdly, DPRK built its economy mainly with heavy industries to 
support its military while neglecting consumer goods. Lastly, poor 
implementation of the rationing system and an uneven distribution of wealth 
among the people caused the DPRK economy to sink. In 1999 and 2000, DPRK 
enjoyed growth of 6.2% and 1.9% respectively. This is mainly due to the 
increased inter-Korean relations, which will be discussed later.  
 
According to Park’s (2004), DPRK’s economic development strategy under Kim 
Jong-II’s leadership can be said to have undergone relatively positive changes. 
Table 2.5 provides an assessment of those strategies. He concluded that the 
future of DPRK economy depends on achieving internal consistency in its 
economic policies and improving relations, including a resolution of the nuclear 
conflict with the United States. 
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Table 2.5: Economic Development Strategy of Kim Jong-Il Era 
 Reform Opening Resource 
allocation 
Technology 
revolution 
1994-1996: 
Revolutionary Economic 
Strategy 
Weak Stressed Normal Weak 
1997-1998: 
Transition Period Emphasis Weak Normal Emphasis 
1999-2001: 
Strong and Prosperous State Emphasis Weak Distorted Emphasis 
Since July 2002 Practicing Practicing Distorted Emphasis 
Source: Park (2004) 
 
2.4.8 Foreign Trade and Investment (1971- present) 
 
Foreign economic relations have been influenced by Juche ideology and the 
development strategy of building an autarkic economy. These factors led to an 
inward-looking and import-substituting trade policy, which has resulted in the 
small scale of foreign trade and a chronic trade deficit. Theoretically, DPRK 
adheres to its principle of self-reliance. However, Pyongyang is flexible 
whenever the economic need arises. After the Korean War, DPRK received a 
massive amount of economic aid from Soviet Union and China to reconstruct its 
war torn economy. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was an influx of Western and 
Japanese machinery. In the 1980s, DPRK opened its economy through joint 
venture laws. 
 
Historically, DPRK’s main trading partners have been communist countries, 
mainly China and Soviet Union, as well as Japan who has been a major trading 
partner since the 1960s. Figure 2.3 below shows DPRK’s foreign trade with 
Japan, China and the Soviet Union from 1971-1991. Up until 1991, after its 
collapse, Soviet Union has been DPRK’s main trading partner. Soviet Union 
was the only place where DPRK’s goods could be sold due to two reasons. 
Firstly, the difficulty of marketing its products elsewhere and secondly, western 
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countries were reluctant to extend financial credit to DPRK after its default on 
foreign loans in 1970s. DPRK’s principal exports were non-ferrous metals, 
textile, military equipment, and marine products. Its main imports were 
advanced machinery, transport equipment, crude petroleum, wheat and 
chemicals. DPRK has two main ports which it uses – Chongjin, located in 
northeast of DPRK, and Nampo, situated in the southwest.  
 
Figure 2.3 DPRK’s Foreign Trade with Japan, China and the USSR 1971-
1991 
 
Source: Adapted from Lee (1994)  
 
The volume of contribution from foreign countries has declined substantially, 
especially in terms of total trade volume. Both imports and exports dropped 
because of the breakdown in the international cooperation network as well as 
internal industrial organisation. From Figure 2.4 we can see that exports 
decreased significantly from US$1.96 billion in 1990 to US$0.65 billion in 2001. 
Imports dropped from US$2.76 billion in 1990 to a low of US$0.88 billion in 
1998 before recovering slightly to US$1.62 billion in 2001. As mentioned earlier, 
there were no markets for DPRK goods thus accounting for the decreased in 
exports. A majority of the imports can be attributed to a small amount of aid 
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from China and Japan. Since 2002, DPRK’s foreign trade has been steadily 
increasing though still insignificant compared to the pre-Soviet collapse era.  
 
Figure 2.4 DPRK’s Exports and Imports 1990-2008 (US$ Billions) 
 
Source: BOK (2011) 
 
In recent years, DPRK’s main foreign trade is conducted with four countries. 
Figure 2.5 presents DPRK’s estimated trade with its major trading partners in 
from 2000 to 2008. China remains the largest trading partner with, followed by 
ROK, Russia and Japan. The official trade figures between DPRK and China in 
2004 and 2008 was US$1.39 and US$2.79 billion respectively. The unofficial 
figures could be higher considering the amount of illegal cross-border trade up 
in the northern part of DPRK (Marquand 2005). Trade (the Ministry of 
Reunification in ROK prefers the term “inter-Korean exchanges”) between both 
Koreas average around US$0.71 billion. It was expected to reach a high of 
US$1 billion in 2005 due to the opening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (IHT 
2005). As of 2008, trade between both Koreas is $1.82 billion. 
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Figure 2.5: DPRK’s Trade with Major Trading Partners 2000-2008 
 
Source: BOK (2011) 
 
Recent developments show that foreign companies are gradually showing 
confidence in investing in DPRK. British American Tobacco admitted to having 
a US$7million joint venture in Pyongyang since 2001, making two billion 
cigarettes a year for the local market (Foster-Carter 2005). In May 2005, a 
Singapore law firm received a licence to practice in DPRK (Greenlees 2005). 
The firm is the first wholly owned foreign legal practice in DPRK after the 
country re-enacted its foreign investment laws and permit full foreign ownership 
of some ventures. Beijing’s presence is growing too. In October 2005, a new 
US$24 million Chinese-aided glass plant near Pyongyang was opened. China 
has also invested more than US$12 million in Musan iron ore, located in 
northern part of the country near the Chinese border, importing a million tonnes 
of ore a year. In order to facilitate trade and regional growth, DPRK needs an 
efficient transport infrastructure which is severely lacking at the moment.  
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2.5 DPRK’s Economic Reforms (2002 – present) 
 
By 2002, the economic situation in DPRK had become calamitous. There were 
chronic food shortages and aid donations were declining due to political 
standoff between DPRK and USA as well as donor fatigue. The industries were 
left on a standstill. Pyongyang has always resisted reforms, which might lead to 
undue influence on its citizens. However, with collapse imminent, Pyongyang 
announced a series of new economic measures aimed at revitalising its 
declining economy and imposing a greater control on the country. Table 2.6 
summarises the reform measures and direction of economic changes. 
 
Table 2.6 July 2002 Reform Measures in DPRK and Direction of Economic 
Changes 
Direction of 
Economic Changes 
Contents of Reform Policy Measures for 
Reform 
Changes in economic 
management 
Planned economy to 
monetary economy 
Increase in prices and 
wages, abolition of 
rationing systems 
Reintegration with the 
international market 
Isolation from 
international market to 
connect with international 
market 
Readjustment of 
exchange rate, abolition of 
exchange coupons 
Change in business 
management 
Ethical, social motivation 
to material, individual 
motivation 
Strengthening the self-
supporting accounting 
system of corporations, 
material incentives, 
increase in autonomous 
distribution of agricultural 
products 
Source: Lee and Deok (2004) 
 
2.5.1 July 2002 Reform Measures 
 
A cornerstone of the new economic policy is the change in DPRK’s economic 
management system aimed at creating incentives and accountability. Table 2.7 
presents the major changes. DPRK installed younger managers, aged 30 to 40, 
in major enterprises. These more reformed minded managers had received 
prior overseas economic training in the market economy. Another change was 
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the revaluation and enlargement of the role of farmers markets. Private markets 
gained additional importance as the official economy became unable to provide 
sufficient food to the people. The government expanded the farmers market into 
comprehensive consumers market, managed under a government enterprise 
system, and enhanced the diversification of consumer goods. Price ceilings, 
revised every 10 days according to supply and demand, are set on essential 
goods such as rice and oil. The government also permitted more autonomy for 
factories and state enterprises. The state still sets a standard price for goods 
but factories can specific prices that differ from this standard price if they first 
gain approval from a supervisory organisation. Government enterprises and 
cooperative bodies are permitted to procure as well as sell their output. Reform 
measures also introduced economic concepts such as monetary economies 
emphasising price control mechanisms and, science and technology. 
 
Table 2.7 Major Changes in DPRK’s Economic Management System in 
2002 
Changes Details of Changes 
Replacement of 
managers 
Managers aged 30 to 40 have been named in major 
enterprises. 
Revaluation and 
enlargement of 
the market’s role 
Farmers market has been expanded into a comprehensive 
consumers market. 
Enhanced diversification of consumer goods. 
Price ceiling set on essential index goods such as rice and oil. 
Prices are set every 10 days according to supply and demand. 
Markets run under a government enterprise system. 
Market fees and government payment imposed on market 
vendors. 
Enhanced 
autonomy of 
factories and 
enterprises 
Government enterprises/cooperative bodies permitted to 
participate in market activity. 
Factories/enterprises permitted to supply basic goods within a 
bound of 30 percent. 
For Pyongyang Tongil Market, about 5 percent of returns 
allocated to factories and enterprises. 
Introduction of the 
notion of 
competition 
Competition in soap and toothpaste encouraged via price 
equalisation. 
Introduction of 
other economic 
Massive commercial ad placed in downtown Pyongyang. 
Economic courses reorganised emphasis on financial and 
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notions monetary economies; emphasis on price control mechanism. 
Science and technology reorganised as intellectual market 
goods. 
Contracts between research labs and enterprises are made 
obligatory. 
Source: Lee and Deok (2004) 
 
2.5.2.  Special Economic Zones 
 
SEZs are administrative zones with special economic legal status and are 
physically and legally separated from the rest of the country. Strong economic 
autonomy is provided under the guidance of market economy principles, and 
special economic consideration given to foreign companies investing in the 
SEZs (Jung et al. 2003). DPRK’s experiments with special economic zones 
have been going on for more than a decade. The first economic zone located in 
Rajin-Sonbong was created in 1991, close to the Russian and Chinese borders 
in the northeast. Due to a lack of investment from the government and its 
remote location, Rajin-Sonbong was officially deprioritised in 1997. In 2001, Kim 
Jong-Il visited China and saw first-hand the benefits of the SEZs on China’s 
economy.  In September 2002, as part of its efforts to reform and opening, 
DPRK announced the creation of a 132 square mile special administrative zone 
similar to Shenzhen and Suzhou developments in China. In addition, Kaesong 
Industrial Complex was announced. Kaesong is the first major industrial 
collaboration between the North and South. DPRK anticipates the SEZs to aid 
in earning hard currencies, which will facilitate trade with other countries. In 
addition, foreign companies will transfer technology and management skills to 
the SEZs thereby boosting productivity of local labour. This section will review 
the developments of both Rajin-Sonbong and Shinuiju SEZs. Table 2.8 
presents the differences between SEZs.  Kaesong Industrial Complex will be 
discussed in detailed in the next chapter.  
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Table 2.8: Comparison between Rajin-Sonbong and Sinuiju Zone 
 Rajin-Sonbong zone Sinuiju Area 
Location • Belongs to Hamkyongbuk-do 
• Riparian to the Tumen River 
• Close to border with China 
and Russia 
• Remote from major 
consumer markets 
• Belongs to Yanggakdo 
• At mouth of Yalu  
• Bordering Dandong 
• Convenient for export to 
China and Korea 
Population • Rajin-Sonbong (200,000) 
• Hunchun (300,000) 
• Shinuiju (321,000) 
• Dandong (700,000) 
Nature of 
zone/area 
• Mainly for multilateral 
economic cooperation 
• Laboratory of market 
economies 
• Mainly for trade between 
North Korea and China 
• Good harbour with natural 
trading 
Major target 
markets 
• Markets of Russia, Japan 
and China 
• Korean domestic market 
• Chinese domestic market 
Industries for 
FDI 
• Light industries for export 
processing 
• Infrastructure 
• Light industries for export 
processing 
Central 
government’s 
support 
• Strong policy and institutional 
support 
• Weak because of security 
concern 
Political 
sensitivity 
• Insensitive as it is remote 
from Pyongyang 
• Little political intervention 
• Very sensitive 
• Frequent intervention by the 
party and government 
Infrastructure • Less developed than 
Nampo-Haeju area 
• Ambitious plan for 
infrastructure expansion and 
improvement 
• Relatively good 
infrastructure for ocean, 
railway and road 
transportation 
Sourcing of 
raw materials 
• Disadvantageous for the 
outsourcing of raw materials 
• Advantageous for the 
outsourcing of raw materials 
Tax benefits • 14 percent corporate income 
tax 
• No corporate tax for three 
years, 50 percent for the next 
two years. 
• 25 percent corporate 
income tax 
• No tax holidays 
Labour supply • Priority in supply of labour • Uncertain policy 
Currency for 
settlement 
• Foreign exchange 
certificates abolished in June 
1997 
• North Korean won 
Cross-border 
trade 
• Border trade with Primorsky 
and Jilin province 
• Border trade with Liaoning 
province 
Source: Kim (2001) 
 
The Rajin-Sonbong zone is located in the United Nations designated Tumen 
River Economic Development Area (TREDA), together with Hunchun in 
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northeast China and Posyet in the Russian Far East. Part of the reason for 
establishing Rajin-Sonbong was the creation of Hunchun Development Plan 
made public by China in July 2000 (Young 1999). DPRK realised that China 
would take initiative in the TREDA if the Hunchun Development Plan made 
rapid progress and would ultimately undermine the potential of Rajin and 
Chongjin as export bases. In 1991, DPRK declared Rajin City and Sonbong 
County a FEZ, in which foreign owned enterprises would be permitted to 
operate. Rajin, Sonbong and Chongjin were declared free ports and various 
taxation benefits were offered to the investors in this zone. According to Cotton 
(1996), the government had envisaged three types of development. Firstly, 
Rajin was to become a major container and transhipment port for the Northeast 
Region, with linkages to Mongolia and China. Sonbong will specialise in crude 
oil and petrochemical products while Chongjin will handle bulky cargo including 
cement, iron ore, coke and grains. Secondly, the zone is to become a major 
tourist destination. Thirdly, the zone is to host export oriented industry which will 
ultimately enjoy a majority of the working population. The location of the zone 
presents several advantages. The zone may work as a transit centre between 
Asia and Europe making use of the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR). It may serve 
as a competitive export processing base as its wages are lower than China. 
Given its rich natural resources in the region, the zone may provide potential 
foreign investors with good opportunities to develop and process natural 
resources, including forest, energy and rare mineral ore, targeting the nearby 
export markets of Northeast Asian countries (Kim 2001). The zone encountered 
numerous problems. It faced stiff competition from China’s SEZs where 
infrastructure was better established and political conditions was more 
predictable. Most importantly, the zone was unattractive to foreigner investors 
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due to its remote location. By 1997, there were only 111 cases of investment 
contracted and their total amount was about US$751 million. However the 
actual amount realised was only US$62 million in 77 cases (Young 1999). At 
the end of 1997, the government decided to close the zone. In analysis the 
failure of Rajin-Sonbong, there were political and non-political factors. Political 
obstacles include leadership subjectivism, overindulgence in Juche ideology, 
insistence of economic self-reliance, and fear of economic domination by Japan 
and ROK (Kim 2001). Non-political impediments include inefficient 
transportation and telecommunications infrastructure and wrong location 
decisions. Location advantage is realised in the long term only if and when 
appropriate transport infrastructure is in place in the zone. Many foreign 
investors view a modern and efficient transport and logistical infrastructure as a 
prerequisite for their investments. This was lacking in roads and railways in 
DPRK. Roads were so inefficient that it took almost twice the time normally 
required to deliver goods for the same distance in ROK. Four ports in the 
Russian Far East, equipped with modernised transport and logistics 
infrastructure, took away a substantial proportion of cargo otherwise would have 
been channelled through DPRK ports. The zone may soon experience a new 
lease of life. In October 2005, a Chinese entrepreneur secured a deal with the 
DPRK government to open and develop the dilapidated port of Rajin (Anderlini 
and Yan 2005). In 2007, Russian authorities agreed to invest in the port (Donga 
Daily 2007). 
 
After the failure, DPRK stopped experimenting with special economic zones 
until they saw firsthand its benefits to China’s economy, more importantly, the 
earning of much needed hard currency. In September 2002, the development of 
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Sinuiju Administrative Zone (SAZ) was announced. Sinuiju is located across the 
Yalu River from the city of Dandong, China. For a 50-year term, the SAZ will 
operates its own legislative, judiciary and administrative functions and have its 
own legal and economic system, free of central government interference (Kim 
and Lee 2002). It seems that the SAZ enjoyed a high level of autonomy and a 
legal infrastructure to attract foreign investors. The plan also called for 500,000 
current Sinuiju residents to be replaced by 200,000 technically skilled residents 
from DPRK and China. Sinuiju was created to facilitate trade between China 
and DPRK targeting domestic markets in both countries. Cross border trade is 
prevalent with Chinese traders selling electronic equipment, stainless steel 
goods and gleaming appliances while DPRK merchants trade agricultural, 
textile and clothing. According to Marquand (2005), Sinuiju possesses relatively 
good infrastructure for ocean, railway and road transportation. According to Kim 
and Lee (2002), due to Sinuiju’s strategic location, it is likely to benefit from the 
TSR and Trans-China Railways (TCR) transportation connections which are 
being actively reconstructed, that will allow people and goods to move from the 
Korean peninsula to Europe on land. To show the international community that 
it was serious in attracting foreign investment, the government appointed a 
foreign national (Yang Bin – Chinese/Dutch entrepreneur) as its first 
Administrative Minister. However, this appointment did not please the Chinese 
government. Yang Bin was later prosecuted for tax evasion charges. Presently, 
Sinuiju is left in a shambles with little progress.  
 
2.5.3 Transition and Reform Strategies 
 
As the focus of this research centres on the development of transport and 
logistics, a detail discussion on transition economies will not be relevant here. 
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However, it is important to briefly mention some examples of countries that 
have successfully transited from a centrally planned to an open economy 
assessing their applicability to DPRK. It is important to mention that copying any 
of the models would deny the idiosyncratic nature of development in DPRK 
(McMillan 1996). Some recent examples of reforms will be highlighted.  
 
Discussions on the appropriate transition models that DPRK should adopt have 
tend to focus on China, Cuba, and Vietnam. China’s “step-by-step” reform 
approach is most commonly advocated (Herold 1992 and Harvie 1992). This 
approach’s refers to the whole gradual process of market reforms which 
contrasts with the radical transition of the Soviet Union and East European 
Countries. Key features of China’s reforms include abolishing agricultural 
collectives; massive entry by new non-state industrial farms; new incentives for 
state-owned enterprises; creating competition and fostering entrepreneurship. 
However, despite its reasonable success, it is believed that China is not a 
model for DPRK to emulate (McMillan 1996 and Reudiger 2003). Kim (2001) 
proposed the Cuban model, which has more similarities with DPRK’s current 
situation. Ruediger (2003) suggested that ROK in the 1960s is a much better 
example than China. Cultural, demographic and geographical factors provided 
strong arguments. Jo (2004) also points out fundamental differences between 
the case of DPRK and cases of China and Vietnam. DPRK fears of being 
absorbed by the SK economy as an outcome of opening and economic reform. 
Economic opening and reform are inevitably followed by some negative effects 
on the traditional political system, and worst scenario could be a collapse of the 
regime. E.g. Vietnam would still exist, since there is not another Vietnam even 
in the worst scenario. The same holds for China as it is unimaginable for China 
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to be absorbed by Taiwan. Unfortunately, ROK is much stronger economically 
and politically.  
 
Research has been conducted into DPRK’s future development and several 
strategies have been suggested. Babson (2001) rationale DPRK’s need to 
lower major cost factors, particularly transport costs. According to data from the 
Federation of Korean Industries, transportation accounts for 40 percent of total 
production costs. The costs of transporting a twenty-foot container from Incheon 
port in ROK to Nampo Port in DPRK are four times higher than the cost of 
shipping the same container to China. Herold (2002) recommended basic 
infrastructure projects (e.g. electricity and transportation) as one of the short 
term (two to five years) priorities for development of DPRK. The plan for 
infrastructure rehabilitation should be linked to overall macroeconomic policy. 
Transport strategies should be developed for rehabilitation of roads, ports and 
railways and projects should be prioritised. The government needs to address 
issues relating to intermodal coordination, planning and development to come 
up with a rational plan for sector development. On a wider scale, Jo (2004) 
suggested a development strategy for DPRK (Table 2.9). According to the 
vision of building an economically powerful nation, DPRK should alter its self-
sufficiency food strategy by allocating fewer resources to food production, and 
substituting domestic shortages with imports. To secure supply of consumer 
products, DPRK should promote light industry in local areas and also improve 
distribution system of consumer products. It is Important to imitate technology 
from more-developed nations to enhance production technology. Infrastructure 
facilities can be improved through more effective logistics by balancing 
development among railways, highways, waterways and ports. 
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Table 2.9 Development strategy of the DPRK economy 
The Vision To build an economically powerful nation 
The goals To improve people’s living condition 
To establish a foundation for growth 
- sustain an annual growth rate of 7 percent 
- to reach per capita income of US$1000 
The strategy New Planned Economy for the 21st Century 
- allow market economy in the islands 
- uphold plan mechanism in the mainland 
The preconditions Improve foreign relations 
Efficient and reliable leadership 
The six major tasks Increase food supply 
Security of consumer products supply 
Improvement of human capital 
Enhancement of production technology 
Enlargement of infrastructure 
Fortification of strategic industries  
Source: Jo (2004) 
 
Market reforms are slowing changing the face of DPRK society, most noticeably 
in the capital Pyongyang. On the streets, vendors are hawking fruits, kiosks 
sells the North’s famous cold noodles and Internet café owners are soliciting 
business from foreigners (Lee 2005). In the northern part of the country, near 
the Chinese border, consumer electronics are penetrating the state’s isolation. 
After DVD players swept northern China since 2005, entrepreneurs collected 
castoff videocassette recorders and peddled them into the country (Brooke 
2005). In line with its reforms, the government adjusted the party’s ranking 
system and relocated 30 percent of salaried party members to production 
facilities (Park 2005). The recruiting system for public officials has become more 
stringent. Applications have to pass economics and politics whereas in the past 
they were only required to pass an interview, in which they present other 
officials’ recommendations. Younger technocrats in their 40s are now placed in 
charge of economic-related policy making bodies. Senior DPRK officials also 
received courses on multilateral diplomacy and market economy in Geneva 
(Yonhap News 2005). 
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2.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has presented a geographical overview of DPRK illustrating that 
due to its topography a majority of the transport network is concentrated on the 
east and west making it especially difficult for planners to develop an efficient 
and effective transport network in the country.  
 
DPRK has been under the regime of Kim Il-Sung and his son, Kim Jong-Il since 
World War II. The elder Kim quickly established his own regime by eliminating 
opponents, who spoke out strongly against him. Juche was first introduced as 
an ideological principle and was later refined to provide guidance to economic 
and defence policies including transport and logistics. DPRK conducted very 
little foreign relations with western countries from 1950s to 1980s. The situation 
changed after the country appealed to the international community for aid in 
1995 and 1996. However, foreign relations are still volatile as DPRK attempts to 
embrace a foreign policy which is out of touch with reality. 
 
This chapter has presented an economic evolution of DPRK highlighting that its 
persistence in maintaining an autarkic economy throughout the last few 
decades has seen the country missing out on economic prosperity which ROK 
has enjoyed. The reliance on Juche ideology plunged the country into a serious 
economic crisis which was exacerbated by a series of natural disasters in the 
mid-1990s.  
 
This chapter also discussed DPRK’s attempts at reforming its economy with 
special economic zones, designed to boost foreign investment and earn hard 
currency. In July 2002, the DPRK government introduced a series of economic 
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reforms, which resembled a desperate attempt to narrow the gap between 
official and black market prices rather than opening up its economy. In the 
development strategy for DPRK, major cost factors, including transport, needs 
to be lowered. The government should devise a master plan for the 
rehabilitation of transport infrastructure.  
 
The next chapter appraises the present conditions of transport and logistics 
infrastructure in DPRK, which are central themes of this research. It includes 
strategies and plans for future developments of the transport network and 
introduction of logistics concepts. 
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CHAPTER 3 – TRANSPORT, LOGISTICS AND LOCATING IN DPRK 
 
This chapter appraises the present conditions of transport and logistics 
infrastructure in DPRK, which are central themes of this research. It includes 
strategies and plans for future developments of the transport network and 
introduction of logistics concepts. It incorporates a discussion about the debate 
in the literature concerning the relationship between transport development and 
economic growth in any country.  
 
The main objective is to discover from the literature whether the development of 
transport is likely to exert any major influences on the economic growth of 
DPRK or vice versa. It incorporates an overview of transport in developing 
countries to relate it to the transport conditions in DPRK. It discusses transport 
in the command economy of the Soviet-era, which is relevant because DPRK’s 
structure was similar to the FSU.  
 
This chapter also provides a brief overview of location theories from two 
dominant perspectives – international business and economic geography. It 
also discusses the various ways of classifying location factors, which might aid 
in developing a set of factors for analysing ROK’s SMEs decisions to locate in 
DPRK. 
 
3.1 Transport and Economic Development 
 
Transport is an epitome of the complex relationships that exist between the 
physical environment, patterns of social and political activity, and levels of 
economic development (Hoyle and Smith 1998, 13). The relationship between 
transport and development has been the subject of theoretical and practical 
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interest over the years sparking debate in the literature (Gauthier 1968; 
Goldstein 2001; Hilling 1996; Hoyle 1973; Simon 1996; Ullman 1956; Wilson 
1973). Rostow (1971) believed that the development of transport networks was 
an essential precondition for economic development, a view supported by the 
work of Taaffe et al. (1963). Hoyle (1973, 50) also claims that the emergence of 
a viable and efficient system of modern transportation is clearly an essential 
element in the growing infrastructure upon which the expanding economies of 
the less developed countries must be based. Fogel (1964) argued that 
economic development in the 19th century United States was due more to 
technological innovations in manufacturing and agriculture and socio-cultural 
change rather than railroads. This was supported by the discussion in Hilling 
(1996), where a number of empirical studies during the 1960s and 1970s 
showed that there was no simple relationship between transport and 
development. Gauthier (1970) was more diplomatic when he distinguished three 
possible relationships between transport and development – positive, 
permissive and negative. Positive relationship occurs where an innovation in 
transport is responsible in a direct way for expansion of economic activity. 
There is a permissive effect when transport does not itself stimulate economic 
growth but is such that it does not inhibit such growth when other stimuli are 
operating. In a negative relationship, transport causes the possibility of an 
actual decline in per capita income of a country.  
 
As a result of decreasing transports costs, transport rarely featured in  studies 
of economic and regional development during the 1970s and 1980s (Pedersen 
2001). Consequently, the debate was renewed in the early nineties as a result 
of globalisation and advances in transport. Leinbach (1995) highlights that in 
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less developed countries, up to 40 percent of public expenditure is devoted to 
transport infrastructure providing evidence of the important role of transport in 
development. This is supported by studies elsewhere. Buurman and Rietveld 
(1999)’s research on transport infrastructure and industrial location in Thailand 
found that there is an indirect link between transport infrastructure investments 
and growth of gross domestic product. Their findings conclude that roads and 
ports have a positive impact on industrial location, although the size is modest. 
Goldstein (2001)’s work on air transport infrastructure development in Sub-
Saharan Africa displays similar characteristics. Démurger (2001) provides 
empirical evidence on the links between infrastructure and economic growth in 
China. The results indicated that transport facilities are a key differentiating 
factor in explaining a growth gap in 24 provinces. In contrast, Banister and 
Berechman (2001)’s research showed that transport infrastructure investment 
acts as a complement to other more important underlying conditions, which 
must also be met if further economic development is to take place. They further 
argued that a series of necessary conditions (economic externalities, 
investment factors and political factors) must be present to allow for economic 
development to take place and individually they will have little or no impact on 
development. This is underlined by Hilling (1996, 12) where the author 
concludes that development is based on a range of inputs (including transport) 
and is most likely to take place where these are considered not separately but 
as part of a package and planned in a coherent way. This is also the view of this 
research which seeks to ascertain the implications of economic and political 
developments on transport and logistics in DPRK. 
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3.2 Transport and Logistics Development in Developing Countries 
 
This section traces the links between transport and logistics development in 
developing countries. A majority of research on developing countries tends to 
be centered on Africa (Hoyle 1973; Hoyle et al. 1998; Pedersen 2001; Pedersen 
2003; White and Senior 1983; and Taaffe et al. 1963) with very little in Asia. 
Research into logistical developments in developing and transitional economies 
in Asia has included focus on the challenges presented (Razzaque, 1997) or 
requirements for high-technological equipment and skilled labour personnel 
(Goh and Ling, 2003). Some of the common problems which plague most of 
these economies, especially in DPRK’s transport system are:  
• very large, congested and rapidly growing urban agglomerations with 
inadequate transport systems;  
• poor quality, low capacity and badly maintained inter-urban transport 
infrastructure;  
• high cost rural transport using poor quality roads; and  
• inefficient railway systems requiring large government subsidy but 
providing a poor and deteriorating quality of service.  
 
Present day transport and development patterns owe much to the emergence of 
a world mercantile system and the ensuring colonial period, which laid the 
foundations not only of the global links but also of the urban hierarchies that 
form the transport node (Hoyle and Smith 1998). It is worthwhile to briefly look 
at two models of transport development and determine their applicability to this 
research. According to Hilling (1996), many of the transport development 
models are designed to identify phases in the evolution of spatial organisation. 
Rimmer’s model (1977), applied to Southeast Asian countries, identified four 
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phases in the development of transport in less-developed countries. In his 
model, the starting point is a pre-contact phase in which there are no overseas, 
external links supported by a limited network of tracks, together with navigable 
waterways where there is a restricted socio-economic and political system. The 
early colonial phase involves establishment of direct contacts by sea between 
advanced and developing countries but not producing far-reaching changes in 
the Third World societies while the Europeans were content to dominate sea 
transport routes (Hilling 1996). The third phase of high colonialism involves 
more fundamental changes of roads and railways, port facilities and inland 
transport modes, establishment of political control and the diversification of 
economy activity. The fourth neo-colonial phase required modernisation of the 
transport system to adapt to demand. Taaffe et al’s (1963) work on transport in 
the developing countries became widely accepted as a model of transport 
development for resource exploitation in Ghana during colonial and post-
colonial rules. The model represents the parallel evolution of political, economic 
and transport systems in a developing country. Initially, a large number of small 
ports are established to represent initial points of political contacts and 
economic exploitation, and forms a basis for the introduction of inland transport 
modes (Hoyle and Smith 1998). As time passes, railways and roads are 
constructed and extended, linking the ports to their hinterlands. The connectivity 
of the network will gradually increase while some places will prosper, others will 
decline. Eventually, the last phase involves a fully integrated transport network 
corresponding to the development of a fully integrated national economy. Taaffe 
et al.’s model has been criticised in various ways. Hoyle and Smith (1998) 
argued that it is an oversimplification of reality and questioned its feasibility and 
relevancy to the demands and objectives of modern-day transport systems. 
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Pedersen (2001) revisited the model and discovered that the ports in Ghana 
remain the important focal points in the transport system and the integration of 
inland transport that was expected has not taken place.  
 
In the midst of all the discussions, the development of transport systems has 
been influenced by the logistics revolution that during the last 30 years has led 
to structural changes in the global transport system. The advent of 
containerisation has changed the way trade is being conducted. The shipping 
industry, especially ports and shipping lines had to reinvent themselves 
(Notteboom and Winklemans 2001; and Robinson 2002). Focus has shifted 
away from individual modes of transport to integrated intermodal transport 
networks. With relatively low transport costs, the trend in international trade is 
leaning towards global sourcing of raw materials and international assembly of 
manufactured goods. Through the introduction of logistics concepts, transport 
has increasingly become an integrated part of the whole supply chain (see 
Figure 3.1). Supply chains encompass all activities (manufacturing, packaging, 
warehousing, distribution) associated with the flow and transformation of goods 
from raw materials stage through to end user, as well as associated information 
flows, financial flows and product flows in both directions. Despite the changes, 
transportation still plays an integral role in international logistics. The 
globalisation of the economy is based on the ability to transport goods around 
the world. Reducing the cost and improving the quality of transport and logistics 
system improves international market access and leads directly to increased 
trade and through this to higher incomes and the scope for significant 
reductions in poverty (Carruthers et al. 2002, 117).  
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Figure 3.1: Logistics evolution to supply chain management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coyle, Bardi and Langley (2003, 14) 
 
Moving onto the discussion of logistics in developing countries, Wood et al. 
(1995) describe four key attributes of a “First World”, “Emerging” and “Third 
World” logistics system (see Table 3.1). Their “First World” includes countries 
such as the USA, Japan and the EU. Emerging nations include Taiwan, China 
and Brazil while Sudan, Afghanistan and Haiti constitute the Third World. 
Dadzie (1998) classifies Third World countries as those who resort to central 
planning mechanisms rather than free market forces to regulate the supply of 
goods and services, especially during periods of economic scarcity. Therefore it 
is reasonable to classify North Korea under the “Third World” category.  
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Table 3.1: Regional differences in logistics attributes 
 First World Emerging Third World 
Infrastructure Highly developed Under-
development 
Insufficient to 
support advance 
logistics 
Supplier 
operating 
standards 
High Variable Typically not 
considered 
Information 
system 
availability 
Generally 
available 
Support system 
not generally 
available 
Not available 
Human resources Available Available with 
some searching 
Often difficult to 
find 
Source: Wood et al. (1995, 21) 
 
The challenges that many developing and transitional economies face in 
developing their logistics systems are legacies of their past (Razzaque, 1997). 
These fundamental inherited problems also stem from a lack of understanding 
of the role and importance of logistics. Efficient distribution of products and 
services must also be supported by an efficient transport system. Dadzie’s 
(1998) work on the transfer of logistics knowledge to Third World countries 
identifies several logistics characteristics that are also prevalent in DPRK today. 
In these countries, the economies reflect a sellers’ market environment, i.e. 
fewer products and services are available than consumers want to or can 
absorb. This is true in DPRK with high prices and low wages. Governments 
exercise strong controls over many physical distribution activities, in most cases, 
delegating state agencies to perform these functions. Transport and 
warehousing facilities are subjected to government regulations and price 
controls. Optimum cost trade off logistics decisions are not possible. Existing 
transport infrastructure is constructed during the period of colonial rule for the 
purpose of exporting raw materials and transporting imports to major urban 
population centres. Delays are prominent in unloading and loading at the ports. 
Yoo and Rhee (2002) explored the practical problems and limitations of the 
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current supply chain of the enterprises that advanced into DPRK. Some of the 
problems they identified include: conveying goods from DPRK requires the 
approval of both governments; stringent customs inspection; management of 
companies in ROK to control the activities for the production and transportation 
in DPRK becomes difficult due to the lack of related information; and weak 
linkages among chains.  
 
Carruthers et al. (2002) provided an East Asian (which includes China, ROK, 
Japan, DPRK and Mongolia) perspective to the relationship between trade and 
logistics. The authors concluded that East Asia’s progress on logistics has failed 
to keep pace with its growth in trade. This justifies Bookbinder and Tan’s (2002), 
research into Asian and European logistics systems when they found that 
research literature on international logistics has heavily emphasised the USA 
and Japan. Those countries were followed by UK, Australia and Canada. North 
America led in quantity, then Europe and finally the Asia Pacific, but logistics in 
the latter is usually discussed on a piecemeal basis. High logistics costs derive 
from poor transport infrastructure, underdeveloped transport and logistics 
services, and slow and costly bureaucratic procedures. Carruthers et al. (2002) 
suggested a way of organising thinking about logistics in East Asia by placing 
economies on a graph of trade openness and accessibility (See Figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3.2: Potential contribution of transport to economic growth in East 
Asia 
 
Source: Carruthers et al. (2002, 119) 
 
Those economies lying above the horizontal axis score high on measures of 
openness. The economies to the right of the vertical axis are accessible to 
world markets, in the sense of having superior logistics and low transport costs. 
The combination of these two measures groups these economies on the basis 
of their current logistics status, as well as on the value of improved openness 
and logistics services in the future. Two other additional variables are measured: 
per capita income and the commodity structure of trade. The economies in the 
upper-right quadrant enjoy higher incomes than those in the lower left and their 
exports are high-technology manufactures rather than resource-based 
commodities. According to the study commissioned by the World Bank, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, both of which score highly on openness and 
accessibility, have grown rich in part because of their past investments in 
superior logistics which have facilitated trade. In contrast, Mongolia, Laos and 
Cambodia still suffer from poor basic road access (Table 3.2). Naturally, given 
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the situation in DPRK one would expect the country’s degree of openness and 
accessibility to be situated close to that of Laos or Cambodia. Jin’s (2003) 
research on openness and growth in DPRK supports the notion of the state’s 
closed economy. However, an anomaly arises when comparing DPRK’s 
accessibility with that of Laos or Cambodia. DPRK has more basic road access, 
though the conditions of their roads are inferior to both countries. DPRK has 
longer railway tracks although this is understandable as railways were the main 
form of passenger and freight transportation under the centrally-planned 
economy. The author would argue that DPRK enjoys a fair degree of 
accessibility, possibility similar to Malaysia, though the present conditions of its 
transport infrastructure deter usage.  
 
Table 3.2: Availability of transport infrastructure 
 Total roads 
Km/1000km2 
% of 
roads that 
are paved 
Railways 
Km/1000km2 
No. of airports with 
pave runways 
longer than 
1523/1000km2 
Cambodia 78.6 11.6 3.3 22.1 
China 146.3 28.3 7.1 27.4 
Lao PDR 59.1 24.0 0 25.3 
Korea 888.9 74.7 31.7 375.7 
Malaysia 196.1 75.3 5.5 63.7 
Mongolia 2.2 46.1 1.2 4.5 
Thailand 125.7 97.5 7.9 75.9 
Vietnam 283.1 25.1 9.5 45.5 
Argentina 78.6 29.5 12.3 32.8 
Poland 1218.6 65.6 74.9 236.7 
DPRK 258.8 6.4 43.3 257.0 
Source: Adapted from Carruthers et al. (2002) and Author (2008) 
 
3.3 Transport in the pre and post-Soviet-era 
 
This section incorporates an overview of transport during the Soviet-era to 
understand the conditions in a centrally-planned economy, which is relevant to 
present-day DPRK. Some of the solutions from the post-collapse era might be 
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applicable for the rehabilitation of transport and introduction of logistics 
concepts in DPRK.  
 
The Soviet system, as mentioned in previous chapters, was developed on the 
basis of communist economics which was characterised by meaningless prices, 
uncalculated subsidy, artificial markets, unrealistic demand, a lack of incentive 
and a failure to recognise the significance of this within an international market 
(Roe 2001, 1). Industrial enterprises could not buy raw materials or sell finished 
goods without permission from the controlling body. One of the most important 
distortions was the hypertrophy of the producer goods sector and defence 
related industries at the expense of underdeveloped light industry and 
agriculture. Heavy and defence-related industries always had top priority as far 
as the rationed distribution of scarce materials resources at the highest political 
and/or administrative level was concerned (Rodnikov 1994).  
 
Transport infrastructure had been poorly maintained as a result of higher-priority, 
competing demands placed upon scarce capital (Cullinane and Toy 1998). 
Railways were the preferred mode of transport of cargoes and passengers. In 
some countries, the development of highways was ignored (Buchofer 1995 and 
Skayannis and Skyrgiannis 2002). Waters’ (1998) research on Poland’s road 
transport identified several specific problem areas: poor organisation; industrial 
policy; lack of coordination; shortage of capacity; little profits; reduction in 
transport investment; aging vehicle fleet; poor access to roads; slow border 
crossing and high costs. According to Kim (2001), the sources of poor transport 
infrastructure include:  
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• a Stalinist accounting system which treats investment in transport and 
logistical services as a non-productive component;  
• a lack of economic incentive due to low tollgate fees and port usage 
charges; and  
• insufficient cooperation between different transport authorities due to 
jurisdictional conflicts.  
 
Logistical systems in a centrally-planned economy are typically monopolistic 
with a single sourcing policy presenting little motivation to implement more 
effective or efficient methods for undertaking production or business. The 
quality of products is often poor and consumers are offered few alternatives. A 
centrally planned economy has also led to an irregular supply, causing 
production and distribution firms to maintain higher inventories (Vanden 
Bloomen & Petrov, 1994). 
 
After the breakup of the FSU, there were distinct changes in the field of 
transport and logistics. According to Lijewski (1996), changes include: 
• the type of goods transported;  
• direction of international trade and transport; means of transport, with 
more emphasis on road and maritime transport;  
• transformations in human behaviour including passenger traffic and an 
increase in international mobility; and  
• transformations in ownership and share in transport business.  
 
It would be reasonable to believe that DPRK will undergo similar gradual 
changes as it continues to reform its economy. The collapse of the FSU also 
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compelled former communist countries to restructure its transport and logistics 
infrastructure, with low cost efficient production the driver behind 
implementation of basic logistics practices in Bulgaria (Vanden Bloomen & 
Petrov, 1994) and privatisation, the main reform in Poland, requiring 
government to provide the right environment for restructuring the transport 
sector (Rydzkowski & Spraggins, 1994). Five years after the FSU collapsed, the 
Baltic States were struggling with deficiencies in a dilapidated transport network 
due to an inability to attract foreign direct investment for infrastructure (Buchofer, 
1995). Russia learned that loosening state control without introducing market 
forces leads to chaos in the distribution of both producer and consumer goods 
(Rodnikov, 1994). These examples serve as initial lessons for DPRK, that it is 
important to install a proper institutional structure advocating cooperation 
amongst the relevant transport authorities and securing foreign investment to 
rehabilitate its transport network. One possibility could be securing development 
funds from international financial institutions such as the ADB, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.  
 
3.4 Overview of Transport and Logistics in DPRK 
 
DPRK’s economy grew steadily after the Korean War in 1953 but stagnated 
since the mid-1970s, lacking in logistics facilities and infrastructure with a 
shortage of warehousing in industrial areas and poor connectivity between 
transport modes. Good logistics management requires effective and efficient 
networks of information and product flows, currently lacking, to facilitate 
distribution of products. Managers in DPRK do not possess the necessary 
logistics skills. Currently, logistics concepts are eschewed with transportation 
considered not as part of the social infrastructure, but as an element of 
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production, the purpose of which is to take care of the demand derived from 
other economic activities. This section reviews the present conditions of the 
transport and logistics infrastructure in DPRK. Due to its autarky economy, 
DPRK stopped publishing external statistics and information since the early 
1960s. This posed problems on conducting any reliable research on the country. 
Data in the following sections are obtained from ROK and international 
institutions, which is considered the most reliable information available.  Figure 
3.3 presents an overview of the transport infrastructure in DPRK. 
 
3.4.1 Railways 
 
Railways, the dominant transport mode in most communist countries, likewise 
forms a major part of the transport network in DPRK, linking all major cities and 
accounting for 90 per cent of cargo and 62 per cent of passenger movements 
(Library of Congress 2008) with 5,512 kilometres of track encompassing 60 
main and local railway lines. Since 1958, 4,000km of track accounting for 79 per 
cent of the total rail network, which is higher than that of ROK, has been 
electrified to improve operations and overcome the difficulties in mountainous 
regions. Table 3.3 presents the major arterial railways of DPRK. The 1,435mm 
standard gauge, railway networks are H-shaped, consisting of east and west 
railways and railways connecting east to the west (Figure 3.4). With 98 per cent 
of the network being single track and dilapidated, it cannot be sufficiently 
utilised. The conditions of the rail beds, linear rails and rail tracks are so poor 
that the railways are known for their slow speed and low capacity (Kim et al. 
2001, 28). The network primarily consists of routes from Kaesong-Sinuiju, 
Wonsan-Rajin and Pyongyang-Wonsan. For international routes, presently, the 
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rail link between Chongjin-Namyang-Tumen is used as a major route for freight 
movements with China.  
 
Figure 3.3: DPRK transport system 
 
Source: Ducruet (2008) 
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Table 3.3: Major arterial railways of DPRK 
Name of railways Operating 
section 
Total 
railway 
length 
(km) 
Ratio of 
electrified 
sections 
Ratio of 
double-
tracked 
sections 
West 
railways 
The Pyongui 
Railway 
Pyongyang-
Sinuiju 225 100% 15% 
The Pyongbu 
Railway 
Pyongyang-
Kaesong 187 100% - 
East-
west 
railways 
The 
Cheonnyeon-
Incheon 
Railway 
Pyongsan-Sepo 141 - - 
The Pyongra 
Railway Ganri-Rajin 781 100% - 
East 
railways 
The Hambuk 
Railway 
Banjuk 
(Hoeryeong)- 
Rajin 
327 - - 
The Gangwon 
Railway 
Gowon-
Pyongyang 145 100% - 
The 
Geumgangsan-
Cheongnyeon 
Railway 
Anbyeon-Gueup 102 - - 
Inland 
railway 
The Manpo 
Railway 
Suncheon-
Manpo 303 - - 
West 
circular 
railway 
The Hwanghae-
Cheongnyeon 
Railway 
Sariwon-Haeju 100 - - 
Source: adapted from Kim et al. (2003, 28) 
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Figure 3.4: Arterial railways in DPRK 
 
Source: Kim et al. (2003, 29) 
 
In June 2000, the historic summit between the leaders of DPRK and ROK, Kim 
Jong-il and Kim Dae-Jung, resulted in the idea of reconnecting the Trans-Korea 
Railway (TKR). Four TKR lines were constructed during the Japanese colonial 
period: Kyongui Line (Seoul-Shinuiju), Gyeongwon Line (Seoul-Wonsan), Mt. 
Gumgang Line (Seoul-Mt. Gumgang) and Donghae North Line (Samcheok-
Anbyeon). Table 3.4 presents the inter-Korean railways reconstruction plan. 
Both Korean governments agreed to make the reconnection of the Kyongui Line 
the highest priority. Connecting the South-North transport network can turn both 
sides’ weaknesses into strengths from which both can benefit (Yang 2002). 
According to Ahn (2002), if the railway and highway between the two Koreas 
69 
 
are connected, logistics costs will be reduced by 75 percent of the current level 
and shipping period shortened by 80 percent. This project has formed part of 
the catalyst leading to an increase in inter-Korean exchanges. Reconstruction 
commenced in September 2000, and ROK completed most of the construction 
on its side, 10km section excluding the 2km zone which is part of the southern 
portion of the DMZ (Ahn 2002). Other structures to be constructed include: two 
new stations, Dorasan station and Imjin River station; Customs, Immigration 
and Quarantine (CIQ) facilities; electrical power facilities and telecommunication 
and signal facilities.  
 
Table 3.4: Inter-Korean railways reconnection plan 
Railways Track sections to 
connected 
Length 
(km) 
Current Status 
(2010) 
Kyongui Line 
(Seoul-Shinuiju)  
South: Imjin River-MDL 
North: DML-Kaesong 5.9 12.0 
Completed 
construction of 
main tracks 
Gyeongwon Line 
(Seoul-Wonsan)  
South: Shintari-MDL 
North: MDL-Pyongyang 
16.2 
14.8 
Land acquisition 
(1998) 
Kumgangsan Line 
(Seoul-Mt. 
Gumgang) 
South: Chulwon-MDL 
North: MDL-Naekumgang 32.5 84.1 
Railway drawing 
(1999) 
Donghae North Line 
(Samcheok-Anpyun) 
South: Kangrung-MDL 
North: MDL-Onjongri 127.0 18.0 
Completed 
construction of 
main tracks 
Source: adapted from Ahn (2002, 115) and Ministry of Reunification 
 
The previous ROK government under Roh Moo-hyun had ambitious plans and 
hopes for railroads linking both Koreas. On May 14th 2007, Unification Minister 
Lee Jae-joung announced a three-step plan for the inter-Korean railroad (Ser, 
2007). The first step includes connecting part of the Kyongui line from Seoul to 
Sinuiju to serve the Kaesong Industrial Complex. This enables raw materials 
and products to be sent in and out of Kaesong as well as allowing DPRK 
workers to commute to the industrial complex. The next step calls for expanding 
the use for business visitors and tourists visiting Kaesong to ride the train. Prior 
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to the reconnection of the railway lines, road transport was the only mode 
accessible. Finally, the plan calls for regular trips between Seoul and 
Pyongyang. Businesses would be aware that on December 11th 2007, North 
and South began limited yet historic cross-border freight rail links, connecting 
both countries for the first time in over fifty years.  In the beginning, only one 
train a day carried goods to and from Kaesong. Due to low demand and the on-
going political tensions between both countries, rail links was suspended in 
2009. 
 
Longer term, optimists hope that this rail link is the first step of many to connect 
Asia through to Europe by rail. One potential future development includes 
UNESCAP’s plans for a Trans-Asian Railway in the Northern Corridor of which 
DPRK has a major role in two of the five routes (Kyongui Line and Donghae 
Line). Reconnection of the TKR will not only establish a new transportation 
network that covers the Korean Peninsula but also the whole of Northeast Asia, 
creating the world’s largest overland transportation route linking Asia to Europe. 
One suggestion is to create a daily rail connection from Finland – ROK, which 
would effectively link the European Union and Northeast Asia, bringing benefits 
to the Korean Peninsula (Heiskanen, 2003). This idea has been one of many 
which have been suggested by experts and academics. However, the possibility 
of this idea coming into fruition is low given the level of co-ordination required 
between the numerous countries and borders involved and also the problems 
involving the different types of rail gauges amongst countries and poor rail 
facilities in DPRK that needs upgrading, particularly the single line tracks.  
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Plans to connect the TKR and TSR to replace partial maritime shipments 
between ROK and the Russian Far East would permit cargo to be transported 
by rail from ROK to Europe (Tsuji 2005). In ROK’s view, it would benefit China 
and Russia, bringing new economic opportunities and access to one of the 
largest natural resources reserves in the world respectively. DPRK will then 
serve as a transit point between the TCR in the west and the TSR in the north-
east.  
 
Since 2008, both China and Russia have staked interests in the Rajin-Sonbong 
SEZ located in the northern part of DPRK by rapidly constructing roads leading 
from their borders to the port of Rajin. Political-motivation rather than economic 
sensibility has led to both countries vying for territorial advantage close to their 
own borders. China hopes to divert the growing cargo traffic to its own territory, 
offering the efficient network of railroad for delivery of ROK and Japanese 
goods to Central Asian and European markets (Petrov, 2008). Russia has made 
more inroads into Rajin. In April 2008, Russian Railways and DPRK’s Railway 
Ministry signed a contract for the reconstruction of the 55 kilometres Khasan-
Rajin section that will link Russia’s TSR railroad to the port of Rajin. Costing 
approximately US$207 million, Eurasia’s largest transcontinental railroad of 
over 10,000km will be established (Defense Technology blog, 2008). 
Transporting cargo from ROK – Europe takes approximately 14 days compared 
to maritime shipping which requires 45 days. Cargoes from ROK will depart 
through the port of Busan by ship to the port of Rajin or through Donghae 
railway line on the east coast to the port of Rajin where it will be transferred to 
Khasan and through the TSR to Europe. These projects are important to DPRK 
in many aspects (Bulychev, 2006). Firstly, it helps them to gradually establish 
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themselves as an important international transport hub, linking with countries 
like ROK, China, Russia and the EU. Secondly, the decrepit railways are 
upgraded by China and Russia without any investment required by DPRK. 
Thirdly, the additional revenue from transit charges would be widely accepted in 
DPRK. Lastly, the transit alternative is a good opportunity for Kim Jong-il to 
loggerhead China and Russia. Russia benefits from having a port which does 
not freeze during winter and it is also able to profit from the transit dues.  
 
The reconnection of the TKR is said to bring the following benefits - reduced 
tension between both Koreas; lower logistics costs; increased direct trade in the 
region of US$400 million; standardised facilities in both Koreas; and the 
promotion of inter-Korean economic cooperation (Yang 2002). However, these 
benefits have yet to materialise since the historic summits in June 2000 and 
2007 as ROK continues to make concessions to DPRK without receiving any 
reciprocation in return.   
 
Investment is essential to rehabilitate disconnected transportation routes, 
construct double track lines and modernise communication systems and 
equipment to enhance operational efficiency. The DPRK authorities have 
allegedly started preparations to reconstruct and expand the railway connecting 
Hyesan, Yangkang, Province and Samijyeon from a narrow to a broad railroad 
in preparation for 2012, the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung (Daily 
NK 2008). However, DPRK has no money to make any meaningful investment 
in the railway infrastructure. They have to continue to rely on external 
investment in the future.  
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3.4.2 Roads 
 
The development of roads in DPRK started after the Korean War. However, the 
closed economy, a lack of financial resources and mountainous terrain in most 
of the country constrained the road network. Thus road transport in DPRK has 
been neglected except in the capital city, Pyongyang, where many government 
officials reside. Roads account for less than fifteen per cent of national 
movements, with little investment. The total length of roads is 31,200km and 
about 10,000km of this length is known to be narrow roads with widths of 2.4m 
or less, marking driving very difficult (Kim et al. 2002). The ratio of paved roads 
is only 6.7 percent, which in turns lowers the efficiency of roads. Unpaved roads 
are covered with gravel or crushed stones, or have dirt surfaces and are poorly 
maintained. With low personal spending power DPRK has only approximately 
260,000 cars, most under the government control. Presently, there are five 
expressways built around the capital city. Roads are attracting increasing 
government attention with a national construction programme. 
 
The major road network in DPRK consists of three main routes Kaesong-
Pyongyang-Sinuiju (connecting with China) in the west coast, Gosung-Wonsan-
Chongjin-Rajin (along the east coast), Nampo-Pyongyang-Wonsan (east-west 
crossing). Figure 3.5 presents the arterial roads in DPRK. In addition, there is 
the Sinuiju-Manpo-Hassan-Musan link running from west to east along the 
Korea-China border and the inland expressway from Pyongyang to Gangye. 
(See Table 3.5) 
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Table 3.5 Main features of major arterial roads in DPRK  
 Sections Length 
(km) 
Width 
(m) 
Pavement 
condition 
Remarks 
Expressways  616    
East coast 
axis 
Wonsan-
Goseong 
114 12 Concrete High speed 
road 
East-West 
axis 
Pyongyang-
Wonsan 
189 7 Concrete 4-5 lanes 
West coast 
axes 
Pyongyang-
Sunan 
15  Concrete+
asphalt 
 
Pyongyang-
Nampo 
53 7 Concrete+
asphalt 
4 lanes 
Pyongyang-
Gaesong 
170  Asphalt 4 lanes 
Pyongyang-
Huicheon 
120   4 lanes 
Arterial 
roads 
 3,158    
East coast 
axes 
Goesong-
Onseong 
867 2.7-
7.3 
  
Wonsan-
Gimhaw 
143 4.6-
5.5 
Unpaved  
Cheongjin-
Wonjeongri 
113 4.7-
7.3 
Unpaved  
East-West 
axes 
Pyongyang-
Wonsan 
197 7 Concrete  
Shinuiju-
Gomusan 
861 2.7-
6.1 
Unpaved  
West coast 
axes 
Gaesong-
Shinuiju 
461 4.9-
.7.3 
Concrete  
Sariwon-
Haeju 
72 5.2-
7.6 
Unpaved  
Pyongyang-
Nampo 
53 5.5 Paved  
Jeongju-Sakju 100 4.6-
6.4 
Unpaved  
Anju-Manpo 291 3.7-
4.9 
Unpaved  
Grade A 
roads 
 1,252   Radial shape 
surrounding 
Pyongyang 
East coast 
axis 
Bukcheong-
Hyesan 
186 2.7-
4.9 
  
East-west 
axes 
Gaesong-
Haeju 
88 6.1   
Geumcheong-
DMZ 
150 3.7-
6.1 
  
Pyongyang-
Geumyaman 
242 3.7-
7.3 
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Midland axes 
Yangdoek-
Pyongsan 
145 2.7-
4.9 
  
Hoecheon-
Yangdeok 
58    
West coast 
axes 
Pyongyang-
Tosan 
142 3.1-
5.5 
  
Jaeryeong-
Nampo 
47 5.5-
7.6 
  
Suncheon-
Uiju. 
194    
Grade B 
roads 
 2,560   Connected to 
Grade A 
roads 
Source: Adapted from Kim et al. (2003, 31)  
 
Figure 3.5: Arterial roads in DPRK 
 
Source: Kim et al. (2003, 30)  
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Figure 3.6 Disconnected land transport routes between South and North 
Korea 
 
Source: Kim et al. (2003, 38) 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the disconnected land routes between ROK and DPRK. As 
part of the June 2000 summit, the rehabilitation of roads was one of the 
suggestions to improve inter-Korean exchanges. The Panmunjeon-Gaesong 
route attracted considerable interest from both sides due to the establishment of 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex. However, DPRK needs to take steps to 
reconstruct the disconnected route to improve the efficiency of roads.   
 
As DPRK’s trade with China gradually increases, the Dandong-Sinuiju and 
Wonjeong-Rajin routes will play an increasingly important role. According to Kim 
et al. (2002), foreign trucks are currently running from China to Rajin ports by 
this Wonjeong-Rajin road but due to its small capacity, it is known that it will not 
be able to meet future demands. The authors recommended that authorities 
place the highest priority on the construction of a new road between Wonjeong 
and Rajin. In 2007, China started to construct a new automobile highway from 
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Hunchun to the port of Rajin. In future, Sinuiju will be an important location for 
the creation of a special economic zone, similar to Kaesong. The merits of 
Sinuiju have already been mentioned in previous chapters. Therefore, it is 
important that the government provides adequate road access around the 
surrounding areas. 
 
DPRK is part of the Trans-Asian Highway programme supported by UNESCAP. 
The project coordinates the development and upgrading of existing regional 
highways among member countries. Routes recommended for assistance were 
(see Figure 3.7): 
• AH1: Seoul-Kaesong-Pyongyang-Anju-Sinuiju-Dandong (Border of 
China). This route provides links to the capital of China and ROK from 
Pyongyang 
• AH6: Border of the ROK (near to Kaesong)-Wonsan-Sinp’o-Chongjin-
Rason-Yanji (Border of China). This route provides a connection to the 
major seaports, industrial centres and access to seaports for eastern 
China. 
• AH6: Pyongyang-Wonsan. This route provides a link between the two 
routes above. 
• AH32: Rason-border of the Russian Federation. This route connects 
Khasan and Vladivostok. 
 
Oh (2001) provided suggestions for future developments. As the economy 
grows, the government should prepare for rapid motorisation by building an 
expressway network to support truck movements and intercity passenger travel. 
Next, local road networks in cities and rural areas should be improved by 
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widening or paving them. Finally, the government should take advantage of low 
cost advances in transport technologies to improve the operational capacity of 
existing facilities without constructing new infrastructure. 
 
Figure 3.7: Asian highway routes in DPRK 
 
Source: UNESCAP (2001) 
 
3.4.3 Ports 
 
DPRK opened maritime transport routes with Japan in 1962 and with ROK in 
1999. As DPRK traditionally only trades internationally with other socialist 
countries as there has been little need for investment in seaports and given the 
availability of rail and land transportation with China and Russia this has further 
reduced the need for seaports. Maritime transport accounts for under two 
percent of freight movements although humanitarian aid enters from ROK and 
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China through the west coast port of Nampo. Some conventional vessels are in 
service on the DPRK -Japan route. Two shipping lines of ROK are believed to 
be carrying containers on the Incheon-Nampo and Busan-Rajin routes. It is 
known that there are some services being offered to/from the Russian Far East 
ports such as Vladivostok and Nakhodka (UNESCAP 2005). DPRK has 22 ice-
free seaports, including eight trade ports. Due to a lack of investment in ports, 
regular power failures result in slow unloading of ships and few ports can 
handle 40ft containers as there are no cranes available. 
 
Figure 3.8 Location of major ports in DPRK    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook (2008) 
 
From Figure 3.8, the major ports on the west coast are Nampo, which lies on 
the Dandong River and connects directly to Pyongyang, and Haeju just south of 
Nampo. On the east coast, the major ports are Chongjin, Hungnam, Kimchaek, 
Rajin and Wonsan.  
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Nampo Port, a trading port and ship-repairing factory, has a total of ten large 
berths with a combined length of over 2km. They have five multipurpose cranes 
handling a wide range of cargoes from bulk cargoes to containers. Nampo 
handles ships sailing from China, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and 
Europe, as well as ROK.  In 2003, DPRK announced that it is building its first 
container terminal with length of 200m and depth of 13m in the port thus 
enabling a more concrete trade route between Incheon in ROK and Nampo 
(Anderlini and Yan 2005). As Incheon is Seoul’s maritime and air artery, it is 
envisioned that Nampo will play a similar role for Pyongyang. ROK 
manufacturing companies already based near Nampo are expected to benefit 
from this development. In January 2005, ROK’s state-run Korea Container 
Terminal Authority concluded a joint venture with ROK’s Kooyang Shipping Co. 
and DPRK’s Dongnam Shipping Co. to be involved in the development of the 
container terminal. The joint venture company will be responsible for piers, a 
container yard, a container freight system and inland transportation from Nampo 
Port (Hand, 2005). In April 2008, a company, Acheon Global Corporation, run 
by the former head of Hyundai Asan Corporation, obtained exclusive rights to 
use the Ryongnam Ship Repair Factory in Nampo. This allows the company to 
gain businesses in its ship repair and steel-structure manufacturing businesses 
in DPRK (NK Economy Watch, 2008a). During the 2nd Inter-Korean summit, 
Nampo was one of the two areas earmarked for establishing shipbuilding areas. 
One of the major shipbuilders, Daewoo Shipbuilding, has plans to build a 
US$150 million shipyard in the area. However, due to the dilapidated 
infrastructure, the shipyard will probably be in the form of a “block plant” – 
repairing vessels or producing components.  
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Haeju is a major port for DPRK’s fishing fleet and navy and lies just 25 miles 
north of the DMZ. With a wharf length of 800m and depth of 7.0m, it has 
breakbulk and dry bulk terminal facilities, and berths for two 10,000 tonne 
vessels. During the 2nd Inter-Korean summit in October 2007, it was agreed 
between both leaders that Haeju will be developed into a special zone, similar 
to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. ROK experts have further suggested 
converting the area into a business hub comprising of a wide array of industries, 
from fisheries to manufacturing (Ko, 2007).  
 
Chongin port in the east coast has two main harbour areas; one specialising in 
coal and iron exports, while the other mainly handles imports of general and 
bulk cargoes. With floating and multipurpose cranes, container-handling is 
available at the port. DPRK hopes that either China or Russia will invest in the 
ailing port, which will hopefully serve as a transit port for cargoes going from 
Asia to Europe.  
 
Hungnam, a small port on the east coast, is located 10km from Hamhung, 
DPRK’s second largest city. It has minimal breakbulk and dry bulk facilities with 
fertilisers as its main cargoes. DPRK wants to modernise and open the port to 
expand inter-Korean economic exchanges. Pyongyang hopes to induce 
investment or reduce logistics problems in distributing aid shipments from ROK 
(NK Economy Watch, 2008b). 
 
Kimchaek port lies between Chongjin and Hungnam ports. It has only one deep 
water berth of 9.8m which mainly handles timber cargoes. It was reported in 
October 2007 that Tangshan Iron & Steel Group Co. Ltd entered into an 
agreement to set up a 1.5 million-ton steel project in an industrial zone in the 
82 
 
east coast of DPRK, including Kimchaek port and Tanchon Port (SinoCast 
China Business Daily News, 2007). Although the specific location has not been 
mentioned, it is believed that the area nearby the zone has abundant natural 
resources, which China hopes to utilise as it is one of the top users of steel.  
 
Rajin port, located at the Rajin-Sonbong FEZ, has 13 berths totalling 2,520 
metres with a depth of 8-10.6 metres. Rajin is capable of accommodating ships 
of 5,000 to 30,000 tons class (Lloyds 2005) and handling from 3 to 3.5 million 
tons of trade, but its annual throughput is said to be less than 10% of its 
capacity (TREDA, 2006). As mentioned earlier, Rajin port is the subject of 
‘tussle’ between Russia and China as both countries see the area as vital for 
the development of their own border regions. In October 2005, a Chinese 
investor concluded a 50-50 joint venture with the Rajin-Sonbong government for 
a 50-year lease to redevelop the port. Provisions include building and managing 
the road from the Chinese border of Hunchun to Rajin’s port; renovating, 
upgrading and managing port facilities; developing and managing 5 sq. km. of 
land as a re-export tax free zone and the right to build and manage a tourist 
zone near the port with operations scheduled to begin in June 2007 (Anderlini 
and Yan 2005). Later in June 2007, DPRK inked an agreement with Russia to 
allow foreign ships to enter and leave the port of Rajin. Russia plans to use the 
port as the distribution centre of the Russian Far East (Donga, 2007).  
 
Wonsan is a major naval port located in Kangwang province, with limited 
breakbulk facilities. There is a rail link to Pyongyang, though along with the rest 
of the country’s rail network, it is in a poor state of repair and subject to long 
delays. Wonsan still has some activity due to being the major port for sailings to 
Japan (French 2005). There are major problems as Japan has placed 
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restrictions on DPRK vessels without valid ship insurance certificate. Prior to the 
ban, a ferry ‘The Mangyongbong-92’ used to have regular sailings from the port 
to Japan, often bringing in much needed valuable imports for local citizens. 
 
After the June 2000 and 2007 summits, both Koreas began to increase inter-
maritime exchanges. A detailed review of the most recent maritime trade data 
available in 2004 shows that 2,124 vessels were used and a total of 1,108,057 
tons of goods were traded (see Figure 3.9 and 3.10). The number of ships’ 
voyages has increased steadily by 85 percent between 1995 and 2004. Another 
encouraging sign is the increase in volume of goods transport from DPRK to 
ROK. In 2002, the volume of trade was only 156,000 tons. Within two years, it 
grew more than three times to 483,000 tons. Most inter-Korean trade flows 
between the ports of Incheon and Nampo. The most common form of exchange 
between both countries is commission-on-processing trade. Since most 
processing plants are located near Pyongyang and Nampo, equipment and raw 
materials are transported to processing plants in DPRK and then finished goods 
are sent back to the ROK. Inter-Korean exchanges are expected to grow in the 
future which will have a positive impact on maritime exchanges between both 
countries. 
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Figure 3.9: Number of ships’ voyages between both Koreas 
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Source: Ministry of Reunification (2006, 2) 
 
Figure 3.10: Volume of goods transported by ships between both Koreas 
(US$ millions) 
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Source: Ministry of Reunification (2006, 2) 
 
The main problems for DPRK’s maritime trade include the country’s collection of 
exorbitant port-entry fees and poor quality of inland transportation within DPRK. 
The route between Incheon and Nampo is circuitous, taking much longer than 
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necessary. According to Ahn (2002), the optimum shipping period for a round 
trip between Incheon and Nampo is six days. Currently such a trip takes ten to 
twelve days, and costs $900/TEU, three times more than shipping costs on the 
Incheon-Tianjin route. Other bottlenecks identified include the lack of freight 
cargo base; lack of funds for infrastructure development; inadequate shipping 
and port capacity; lack of container handling capacity; and an inadequate 
maritime fleet. DPRK should seek to lower its port charges thereby attracting 
more cargoes through its ports. In addition, as ports provide a gateway to world 
markets and opportunities for access to trade with other countries, the maritime 
sector will be important in DPRK’s future economic development and transition 
to a market economy. As demand increases, investment could be sought to 
redevelop ports, perhaps as private investment from international port operators 
such as PSA or Hutchison, or joint ventures with ports in ROK.  Major benefits 
include transfer of technology and shared-investment costs. High priority might 
also be placed on improving transport links to the ports with many ports 
currently connected to the national railway system. The government could seek 
to improve road links between industrial areas and the ports.  
 
3.4.4. Airports 
 
In 2008, DPRK enjoyed 78 usable airports, 35 of which had permanent-surface 
runways. Soonan International is the only major international airport, linked to 
Pyongyang by a four-lane expressway. It offers about 20 flights per week on 
DPRK, Chinese and Russian carriers with an annual passenger capacity of 
about 20 million (Library Congress, 2008). Presently, airports are underused 
due to low demand. Direct flights from Singapore to DPRK commenced in July 
2008, reflecting a growing demand for tours (Teo, 2008). Air travellers peak 
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during the Arirang Festival which runs about a month every spring and autumn.  
As the economy opens up and logistics develops, air transport will become 
more competitive and assist in development. There is potential for Soonan 
International Airport to develop as a major air logistics hub, but to attract major 
global logistics companies, requires improved terminal facilities and control 
systems. There is also a need to develop civilian airports in other major cities, 
such as Chongjin, Hamhung, Najin, Wonsan and Nampo, to cope with the 
potential demand from tourists, business travellers and home visitors.  
 
3.4.5. Telecommunications 
 
In DPRK, horizontal communication among households and businesses is still 
very limited, where civilian contacts with the Western world have been banned 
for a long time and secrecy is mostly welcome as a means to avoid criticism 
and preserve authority (Yoon and Lee 2001). There are only about 1.1 million 
telephone lines in use with 90 percent of domestic and international 
communications controlled by the government. The severe restrictions on 
civilian usage meant that any investment in telecom infrastructure had to be 
financed by the central government. As time passes, DPRK realised the 
important of information infrastructureIn 1998, the government announced that it 
had already established an optical-fiber backbone network linking 35 major 
cities and countries. This includes trunk lines from Pyongyang to Sinuiju and 
from Pyongyang to Kaesong via Sariwon (Figure 3.11). Cellular phones are 
being smuggled across the Chinese border in the north-west. Such 
developments will assist future development in logistics as information flow is 
considered an integral part of a supply chain network. In January 2008, 
Orascom Telecom, an Egyptian company operating throughout the Middle East 
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and North Africa, announced that it had won the right to provide wireless 
services using 3G technology to DPRK. As Noland (2008) mentioned, if fully 
realised, this deal will represent a major foreign investment in the DPRK 
economy. However, he has reservations since past history dictates that it could 
be the next of many failures in foreign investment.  
 
Figure 3.11: Fiber-optical trunk lines in DPRK 
 
Source: Yoon, C.H. and Lee, Y.S. (2001) 
 
3.5 Transport and Logistics Development Strategies 
 
There are many questions that might arise when planning strategies for 
transport infrastructure and logistics development. How is DPRK going to 
finance the redevelopment of its transport network? Will ROK or international 
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financial institutions such as the WB or ADB provide a majority of the financing? 
Which transport mode should get the priority? How is DPRK going to induce an 
increase in freight cargo base? What type of logistics concepts should be 
introduced in DPRK? What are the likely short, medium and long term 
strategies?  
 
Social infrastructure investments are very capital intensive and require a long 
time for planning and construction. Development of transport and logistics 
infrastructure is based on comprehensive transport planning process. Both Ahn 
(2002) and Oh (2001) agreed that DPRK should develop a master plan that 
envisions a comprehensive transportation network for the whole of the Korean 
peninsula in light of possible reunification. The feasibility plan must take into 
considerations the current status of both countries’ industrial base and future 
prospects; possibility of significant changes in industrial structure; economic 
viability of a transportation network and its influence on regional and local 
development. Active efforts should be made to standardise transportation and 
logistics systems between both Koreas. Ahn (2002) recommended that 
reorganisation of the transport network should be centred on a South-North axis 
connecting the Euroasia continent to the Pacific. Oh (2001) in his research to 
predict investment requirements of transport infrastructure, investigated the 
trend and performance of ROK’s transport investments over the past 20 years. 
This approach, not using scientific demand modelling, was based on the 
assumption that there is a close relationship between economic growth and 
transport development. The study compared trends in population and GNP of 
the two Koreas. Using trend data for the past 30 years, the study assumes that 
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the state of DPRK’s transport infrastructure in terms of capacity and 
motorisation level at that time was similar to that of ROK’s in 1975 (Table 3.6).  
 
Table 3.6 Stock of Transport Infrastructure in both Koreas 
Year 
 
Mode & Item 
North 
Korea South Korea 
1996 1975 1982 1986 1993 1996 
GNP GNP (bill. $) 21.4 20.9 71.3 128.9 330.8 480.4 
GNP per Capita 
($) 910 594 1,824 3,110 7,513 10,548 
Road Total Length (km) 23,369 44,905 53,935 53,654 61,295 82,342 
Paved (%) 10.7 26.9 35.8 54.2 84.7 72.7 
Expressway (km) 682 1,142 1,245 1,415 1,602 1,886 
Rail Total Length (km) 5,112 5,618 6,045 6,324 6,517 6,559 
Electrified (km) 4,030 424 428 441 530 577 
Double Track 
(km) n.a. 563 714 773 852 901 
Port Cargo Handling 
Capacity 
(10,000tons/year) 
3,501 3,164 9,600 15,401 26,894 29,526 
Container Cargo 
Handling 
Capacity (10,000 
TEU) 
n.a. 38 59 105 207 341 
Airport Handling 
Capacity – 
Passengers 
(10,000 
persons/year) 
2,000 n.a. n.a. 9,031 43,138 64,210 
Number 
of 
Vehicles 
by 
mode 
Motor Vehicles 
(1000) 269 194 647 1,309 6,274 9,553 
Locomotives 1,153 793 1,004 1,162 1,851 2,194 
Passenger 
Wagons 1,045 1,717 2,152 2,213 1,921 1,900 
Cargo Wagons 21,271 15,866 16,702 15,858 16,238 14,048 
Ships 
(10,000tons) 92 208 565 665 638 699 
Civilian Airplanes 21 75 102 109 188 245 
Source: Oh (2001) 
 
Ahn’s (2002) research assumed two scenarios for DPRK’s future development: 
(1) high economic growth – optimistic and (2) low economic growth – 
pessimistic. For the first scenario, if DPRK reaches 70 percent of the 1996 GNP 
level of ROK around 2020, the total financial requirement for DPRK’s transport 
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infrastructure development of the next 20 years is estimated to be around 
US$40 billion. In the low growth scenario, estimated costs will be US$28.5 
billion. Comparing DPRK’s 1996 and 2004 stock of transportation infrastructure: 
GNP and per capita income is very similar, with GNP of US$21.4 billion in 1996 
and US$20.8 billion in 2004, and per capita income of US$910 in 1996 and 
US$914 in 2005. However, transportation stock has continued to grow since 
1996. Therefore, the projected stock of transport infrastructure in DPRK is not 
accurate (Table 3.7). As such, it is perhaps important to recalculate the 
investment requirements of transport infrastructure and develop scenarios that 
are similar to Oh’s (2001).  
 
Table 3.7 Projected stock of transport infrastructure in DPRK 
Target Year 
Mode 1996 2005 2010 2015 2020 
GNP (billion $) 21.4 70 120 150 330 
Number of Motor Vehicles (10,000) 27 65 150 350 600 
Road Total Length (km) 23,36
9 
40,00
0 
50,00
0 
56,00
0 
61,00
0 
Paved (%) 10.7 30 50 70 80 
Expressway (km) 682 1,000 1,400 1,500 1,600 
Rail Total Length (km) 5,112 5,600 6,000 6,300 6,400 
Electrified (km) 4,030 4,500 4,800 5,040 5,120 
Double Track (km) n.a. 400 700 800 850 
Seaport Cargo Handling Capacity 
(10,000tons/year) 3,501 9,000 
15,00
0 
22,00
0 
26,00
0 
Container Cargo Handling 
Capacity (10,000 TEU) n.a. 50 100 150 200 
Airport Terminal Capacity 
(10,000 passengers/year) 2,000 3,500 5,000 
10,00
0 
15,00
0 
Target Investment 
(billions $) 
 - 7.76 8.27 16.01 10.60 
Cumulative - 7.76 16.03 32.04 42.64 
Source: Oh (2001) 
 
At present, logistics in DPRK is still in its infancy. They rely most on processing-
on-commission trade. This means that raw materials or work-in-process goods 
are sent from ROK to DPRK for partial or final assembly before shipping back to 
the South for export to foreign countries. It was reported that Samsung 
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Electronics has been outsourcing production of 200,000 cathode-ray colour 
television sets per year to a DPRK electronics maker (Ahn, 2008). Gradually, 
more companies are moving beyond the Kaesong Industrial Complex. A food 
maker, Maniker, one of leading chicken-processing companies in ROK plans to 
set up farms beyond the DMZ, located between Sariwon, south of Pyongyang 
and Samilpo, which is near Mt. Gumgang (Han, 2007).  
 
Logistics and distribution activities can also be seen in the daily lives of DPRK 
people. Since the July 2002 economic reforms where DPRK implemented a 
series of changes resulting in inflation of prices in goods, illegal markets have 
become a vital part of people’s life. From personal observations in the DPRK-
China border-crossing in Dandong and through speaking to private sources, the 
DPRK market system operates from general markets in big cities down to the 
small local markets in remote countryside with brokers in between (see Figure 
3.12). First tier wholesalers or ‘runners’ import goods from China through 
Dandong or Sinuiju into large cities such as Hamhung and Chongjin using cargo 
trains or trucks. Second tier ‘runners’ go to these cities to purchase these 
products and bring them back to smaller hub cities such as Suchon and Nampo 
using motor vehicles which are often rented. Goods are then distributed to local 
store owners, manufacturers or sold to ‘third runners’ who come from the 
countryside. DPRK authorities have allowed these private markets to continue 
as it has continued to ensure the survival of the citizens in the absence of 
official markets as DPRK continues to rely on aid from foreign countries. Hence, 
these private markets are playing an important role in the country. Logistics and 
distribution activities are not customer driven, as the products are ‘pushed’ 
down the process chain. Import of goods from China depends on the ability of 
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first tier ‘wholesalers’ to gain permits from the authorities, which are not 
guaranteed.  
 
Figure 3.12: Distribution flow of imports from China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author  
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3.6 LOCATING IN DPRK 
 
Foreign investors have to decide where and how to set up their operations. 
Location choices have been regarded as a major determinant of firm’s 
performance (Li 2004 and Yamawaki 2006). Prior studies are dominated by two 
major approaches to explain the choice of foreign direction investment, one by 
scholars in the international business field and the other by those in economic 
geography (Nachum 2000). In the current research, much discussion has 
centered on multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Ruzzier et al. 2006). In recent 
years, more emphasis has been placed on SMEs and their entry strategies 
(Nakos and Brouthers 2002; Mazzarol and Choo 2003; and Aidis 2005). Much 
discussion has also focused on enterprise investment decisions in emerging 
economies such as China and Vietnam (Liu et al. 1999; Zhou et al. 2002; 
Cheng and Stough 2006 and Kawai 2009). However, very little research has 
been conducted into the location decisions of enterprises in DPRK, which 
mainly comprises of ROK and Chinese companies. 
 
3.6.1 Selected Theories and Models 
 
Firm location has been studied in various disciplines. An in-depth discussion 
can be found in Li and Park (2006) and Nachum (2000). The traditional 
approach taken by international business scholars focused on immobile 
production factors such as land, labour, raw materials or location. This concept 
was extended from tangible to intangible factors, including cultural and 
institutional framework (Li and Park 2006). Research in economic geography 
focused on the geographical proximity of firms rather than the differences 
between locations. The clustering of firms in a specific location brings more 
advantages and attracts more firms to that location. In the evolution of location 
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research, international business scholars began to incorporate the research of 
economic geographers into their studies of location choice. For example, 
Nachum (2000) integrates location advantages and agglomeration economies 
to develop a model for inward FDI.  
 
Dominant theories in MNEs location research include the internationalization 
theory; the transaction cost theory; Dunning’s OLI framework (also known as 
the eclectic paradigm) and the monopolistic advantage theory (Ruzzier et al. 
2006). Much debate has been generated on the suitability of applying models of 
large firms’ location choices to SMEs. Using Dunning’s eclectic framework, 
Nakos and Brouthers (2002) examined SME entry into Central and Eastern 
Europe with results showing that the framework was highly applicable. The 
following section will be devoted to a discussion of Dunning’s OLI framework, in 
particular location factor which plays a crucial role in the research into ROK 
SMEs and logistics companies location criteria in DPRK.  
 
The OLI paradigm contains three sets of advantages: ownership, location and 
internalisation (Agarwal & Ramaswani 1992; Dunning 1981 and 1993; and 
Brouthers et al. 1999). These three sets of advantages take into account firm 
specific and market specific factors that influence perceptions of risk and the 
related potential return on investment, as well as influencing firm level resource 
commitment and desire for venture control undertake by a firm when it makes 
an entry mode decision (Nakos and Brouthers 2002). According to Dunning 
(1993), the internalisation of economic activity is determined by the realisation 
of the three types of advantages. First, ownership advantages are specific to 
the company and relates to the increase of intangible assets and intellectual 
property rights. Second, internalisation advantages stems from the ability of the 
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organisation to coordinate activities in their internal value chain (Ruzzier et al. 
2006). Third, location advantages refer to institutional and productive factors 
present in a particular geographical area. Meyer and Nguyen (2005) 
commented that recent research has focused on the O and I aspects while 
ignoring the L factor. Dunning (1998) called location ‘the neglected factor of the 
OLI paradigm’. The next section will focus on location advantages and  factors 
relevant to it.  
 
3.6.2 Factors Relevant to International Location Decisions 
 
Enterprises entering new foreign markets have to consider a wide range of 
factors when determining their location choices. A summary of factors 
influencing location choices can be found in Appendix I. They face various types 
of risks such as political, economic, foreign exchange and social environment. 
Political instability, especially in hostile countries such as DPRK, may create 
problems such as trade controls, currency restrictions, new regulations and 
unexpected changes in labour and tax laws, making difficult for foreign 
companies to operate profitably (Erramilli et al. 1997). Hence, location 
advantages may include the (i) size and potential of a market and (ii) the 
political, economic and social stability and policies of the host nation. Traditional 
location advantages also include market attraction, labour costs and physical 
infrastructure (Meyer and Nguyen 2005). Dunning (1993)’s work supports the 
above notion by emphasising on the following four sets of factors as the 
locational determinants of FDI: market-related factors, labour cost, 
transportation infrastructure and government policy. A large market size 
enables economies of scale and potentially high revenue. Labour cost factor 
such as high wage rates may deter FDI flows. Transportation infrastructure, 
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which includes the availability of roads, railways, ports, and other facilities, is 
crucial to production efficiency. However, in an autarkic country like DPRK, 
transport infrastructure is not part of the planned economy. 
 
Government policy, in the form of formal and informal institutions, greatly 
influences location choices. Roe’s (2001 and 2003) research into shipping in the 
FSU, grouped those factors under ten main headings: economic, social, political, 
legal, organisational, managerial, environmental, spatial, logistical and technical. 
DPRK does not possess any formal institutions that govern the legal 
environment when conducting businesses in the country. This poses risk to 
companies who are looking to invest in DPRK. 
 
Location factors can be classified under four broad ways, among others: (i) 
Formal and Informal; (ii) qualitative and quantitative; (iii) supply side and 
demand side; (iv) export and market oriented.  
 
The importance of institutions is increasingly important in the study of location 
choices in particular in transition economies. Meyer and Nguyen (2005) 
analysed how institutions in an emerging economy influence entry strategy 
decisions. Results showed that local institutional variables significantly influence 
the location decisions of FDI in Vietnam. Li and Park (2006) also found that 
institutional changes (open policies, privatization and legal development) have 
positive effects on FDI location. According to institutional theory, institutions are 
defined as the rule of law, which govern social, political and economic 
interactions between multiple actors seeking their own interests and benefits 
(North 1990 and Scott 1995). Kawai (2009) found that institutions such as 
special economic zones (SEZs), protection of intellectual property rights and 
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weak concentration of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) act as crucial 
determinants of recruiting Japanese manufacturing FDI into Chinese during the 
late 1990s. According to North (1990), institutions can be divided into formal 
and informal constraints. Formal constraints include political, economic, and 
regulatory rules and contracts while informal constraints include traditions, 
cultural values, corruption, and ideology. Aidis (2005) classified formal 
constraints as high taxes and ambiguity of tax policies while informal constraints 
are implantation of business regulations, and national and regional 
governmental corruption. 
 
Location factors can be classified under quantitative and qualitative factors. 
There has been criticism on the sole use of quantitative factors to establish 
location choices. Czamanski (1981) expressed his concern that most location 
decisions should involve more than the costs factors. Bhatnagar and Sohal 
(2005) further support the notion in their research on supply chain effectiveness. 
They added that existing literature tended to predominantly emphasise 
quantitative factors such as transport costs, exchange rates, labour rates and 
taxes. Schemenner (1979) advocates those views and states that cost can be 
estimate through any quantitative analysis and should definitely consider the 
intangible and qualitative factors. Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) listed eight 
groups of qualitative factors: cost, infrastructure, business services, labour, 
government, customer/market, supplier/resources and competitors. MacCarthy 
and Atthirawong (2003) identified 13 groups of major factors which include 
social and cultural factors, government and political factors, economic factors, 
legal and regulatory framework, infrastructure, proximity to suppliers, customers, 
parent company’s facilities and competition, labour characteristics and costs. In 
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DPRK where accurate measures of costs are difficult to obtain, it is difficult to 
conduct any purposeful research on location choices based solely on 
quantitative factors. Hence, it would be worth considering the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative factors in ascertaining ROK’s SMEs location 
decisions.  
 
Urata and Kawai (2000), in their research on Japanese manufacturing SMEs 
undertaking FDI in Asia classified their group of location factors into supply-side 
and demand-side. Supply-side factors include abundance of low-wage labour, 
availability of good infrastructure, and good governance while demand-side 
factors include presence of sizable local market. Japanese SMEs regard 
industrial agglomeration, which has element in both supply and demand factors, 
as an important criterion when pursuing FDI.  
 
Location choices can be classified into market oriented and export oriented 
factors. According to Asiedeu (2002), the main objective of market-seeking FDI 
is to serve domestic markets while for market-seeking FDI goods are produced 
in home country and sold abroad. The research suggests that FDI in small and 
poor countries is less likely to be market seeking. This is true for DPRK where 
its per capita income is low and distribution network is dilapidated. Zhang (2001) 
in his study of FDI in China classified export oriented factors as labour cost, 
transportation conditions, favourable fiscal policies, low land fee and market 
oriented factors as access to local markets, level of skilled labour and good 
infrastructure.  
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3.7 Summary 
 
This chapter discussed briefly the relationship between transport and economic 
development. It reviewed transport and logistics development in developing 
countries referencing to several models of development. It also showed that 
transport has developed and become part of the whole supply chain. This 
chapter further examined the problems and conditions of transport and logistics 
in the FSU prior to its collapse and in the new economies to provide an 
understanding of the current situation in DPRK.   
 
This chapter also provided a detailed background on the present conditions of 
transport infrastructure in DPRK and strategies for investment. It showed that 
there is a need to re-appraise and prepare a comprehensive transport and 
logistics road map for DPRK. As with other former centrally planned economies, 
DPRK has huge potential to develop logistics facilities and systems. DPRK will 
need assistance from academics and researchers, the private sector, regional 
and international agencies, and government. Academics can offer ongoing 
research into improving logistics planning and systems. The private sector 
provides technology and skills transfer through investments. Regional and 
international agencies such as the ADB and UNDP can provide monetary 
assistance for developing infrastructure and training and educating managers. 
Government must reduce bureaucracy whilst maintaining an effective 
institutional and organisational structure.  
 
This chapter also presented the types of quantitative and qualitative factors that 
might be considered when generating the factors that will affect the location 
decisions of ROK SMEs in DPRK. 
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The following chapter presents scenarios of DPRK, which focus mainly on 
issues such as politics, economics and nuclear weapons. Transport is rarely 
mentioned in those scenarios although transport infrastructure plays an 
important role in a country’s economic development. Hence one of the 
objectives of this research is to develop transport scenarios for DPRK. 
 
Reviews have also examined the conditions of transport and logistics 
infrastructure in DPRK and evidence from literature shows a positive 
relationship between the level of transport development in a country and its 
level of economic development.  
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CHAPTER 4 – SCENARIOS OF DPRK 
 
The preceding chapters have analysed the economic conditions and history of 
DPRK and determined that its economy is teetered on the brink of collapse. 
They have also examined the conditions of transport and logistics infrastructure 
in DPRK and evidence from literature shows a positive relationship between the 
level of transport development in a country and its level of economic 
development. 
 
This chapter considers the use of scenarios within the broader context of 
different levels (i.e. supranational and national) of planning, and the narrow 
context of transport planning in order to aid in developing composite scenarios 
for the future development of transport and logistics in DPRK. As stated by 
Pearman (1988, 24),  
 
“As a starting point for the preparation of transport planning scenarios, a 
first check should be on whether there exist any relevant higher-level 
scenarios within which the transport scenarios should fit.”  
 
This chapter will analyse DPRK scenarios which are found in the literature 
which has mainly concentrated on the overall scenarios of the country in terms 
of maintaining a status quo position; a collapse in the event of a military coup or 
citizen uprising; and a peaceful reunification with ROK.  Additionally, Appendix II 
provides an overview of the concepts and theories of the scenario planning 
approach. 
 
4.1 Use of Scenario Approach in Country Analysis 
 
Scenario planning has been used widely to help countries look ahead into the 
future, between five to twenty-five years into the future. It serves as a useful tool 
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to aid governments in making the appropriate decisions in terms of economic, 
political, social and technological planning. This section looks at some 
examples of: 
• Countries facing a crucial period of change in their history (the FSU and 
Hong Kong); 
• Environmental analysis of countries’ development at national and supra-
national level (Australia, China, Ukraine and the EU) 
• Countries seeking integration and peace (South Africa, Pakistan, India 
and the Middle East); 
• Countries facing political changes (Thailand and Bolivia); and 
• Countries planning economic changes (Africa, North Cyprus, Columbia, 
and the USA) 
 
These examples would be appropriate to DPRK which is facing a crucial period 
of changes and instability mainly due to the issue of succession of Kim Jong-il, 
who has been reported to have undergone a serious operation at the end of 
2008 and the issue of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, ROK is 
seeking reunification with DPRK hence examples of integration and peace 
would be appropriate.  
 
4.1.1 Disintegration or Reunification Scenarios 
 
Scenario planning has been applied at critical periods in a country’s history. 
This section looks at scenarios of the FSU which are particularly relevant in the 
context of DPRK who are experiencing similar conditions with uncertainty 
surrounding the country. In 1990, an important event occurred which changed 
the face of the world – the collapse of the Former Soviet bloc. Academic and 
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political experts began to ponder the future of the Soviet Union. Earlier before 
the collapsed, Simanovksy and Ushkalov (1990) accessed the underlying 
trends of the situation in the Soviet Union and presented three scenarios for the 
development of the Soviet society. The first scenario, ‘shock therapy’ or ‘Polish 
scenario’ envisage the formation of a multiparty system. Scenario II – the 
‘Yugoslav scenario’, pictures a radical transition to a planned-regulated socialist 
market economy. The last scenario presents alternatives for a non-market 
development, making cosmetic repairs without any essential changes of the 
system. Moving on, Van Zon (1992) and Remes (1992) researched on the 
changes in Central and East Europe respectively after the collapse. Van Zon’s 
analysis focused on three countries, i.e. Hungary, Czech Republic (then 
Czechoslovakia) and Poland on a 15-20 years time scale. He constructed five 
scenarios (see below) highlighting the driving forces within the region.  
 
i. Capitalist scenario – introduce market economy with the State playing a 
regulatory role; 
ii. Populist-authoritarian scenario – government strives towards introduction 
of market economy but highly secluded from the world market;  
iii. Leaning-upon-the-West scenario – heavily relying on the European 
Community and International Financial Institutions like IMF and 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); 
iv. Sustainable Development scenario – well-being of future generations 
v. Muddling On scenario – half hearted reform policies and slow progress 
towards market economy.  
 
Remes (1992) analysed the future developments of East European countries 
after their collapse. Using a time scale of 15 years, he began with intuitive 
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methods through informal discussions with experts in East Europe. Proceeding 
on, through interviews and literature reviews, different factors influencing East 
European futures were identified. Five based scenarios were developed – (i) 
positive integration into the European Union (ii) German dominance in the EU 
resulting in a German-dominated East Europe, which will provide little incentive 
for alternative Western investments (iii) ‘Blocification’ leading to internal social 
and political instability and (iv) general international crisis developing out of an 
international economic recession thus leaving East Europe without any 
economic aid and leading to collapse; and (v) catastrophe in USSR. Of these 
five scenarios, the one that most resembles the majority of the present East 
European countries is scenario one where East European countries like Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland have integrated into the larger EU. However, 
political instability is still inherent within some of these countries. Blanning and 
Reinig (1998) presented scenarios for Hong Kong assessing the impact of 
reunification with the People’s Republic of China. Their work focused on the 
position of Hong Kong as an international business hub. Their scenarios were 
constructed using an ‘Event Matrix’, calculating the probability of the event 
occurring and the degree to which the event is unfavourable to an organisation, 
industry or country. Three scenarios - optimistic, pessimistic and realistic, were 
developed. However, their study did not provide a time-frame for the likelihood 
of the events occurring. As such, it is difficult to assess their scenarios.  
 
4.1.2 National and Supra-national Development Scenarios 
 
This section discusses scenarios of countries which have assessed their long 
term future and sustainable development using environmental analysis at a 
national or supra-national level. Galer (1982) reported that Shell Australia was 
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commissioned to conduct a study into the long-term economic, social, political 
and technological changes affecting Australia. Their team comprising of 
academics, consultants, government officials, and industry experts conducted 
surveys and carried out interviews in each of their own expertise areas before 
integrating the work together. Two scenarios were developed – ‘Libertarian 
Alternative’ and ‘Mercantile Trend’, one being the most plausible scenario, the 
other a more conservative assessment of the future of Australia. 
 
China adopted several economic reforms in the early 1990s which propelled its 
status to become one of the world’s largest economies today. However, its then 
leader, Deng Xiao Ping, was getting frail and experts were most concerned 
about the transfer of power after his death. This is a similar situation in DPRK 
where Kim Jong-il has been reported to be sick and have undergone operations 
in 2008. In the event of the death of Kim Jong-il, a power struggle would ensure 
even though a successor has been identified. Randall and Telesio (1995) 
conducted interviews with 70 leading experts on China from business, 
government, research institutes and academia – both in the USA and China. 
They constructed five scenarios broadly depicting China into the year 2010 (15-
year scenarios) under different political and economic climates. Out of the five 
scenarios – ‘Muddling Through’, ‘Asian Power’, ‘Fragmentation’, ‘Shutting 
Doors’ and ‘Global Powerhouse’, the last scenario has become a reality in 
which China has become an economic power in the world.    
 
Since proclaiming independence in 1991, Ukraine, one of the former Soviet 
states, faced a tumultuous transition. Industrial production declined by 75 per 
cent after the lost of steady production demand before 1991. According to Van 
Zon (2002), Ukraine is a blocked society facing market, hierarchy and network 
106 
 
failure. At present, DPRK is also facing total failure of the economic system with 
deep-rooted issues such as dilapidated infrastructure and lack of market 
planning. It is difficult to predict if DPRK would suffer the same fate as Ukraine. 
Von Zon (2002) used three countries – Mexico, Pakistan and Belarus to help 
him develop three alternative scenarios for Ukraine. His purpose is to extract 
critical elements in their developmental paths which might aid Ukraine.  
 
On a supra-national level, scenarios have been developed for a sustainable 
Europe (Rotmans et al. 2000 and Kok et al. 2006). Both studies adopted the 
Integrated Assessment research paradigm comprising of selected themes, 
storylines and sectors using the Factor-Actor-Sector (FAS) framework. Factors 
referred to employment and consumption; Actors referred to governmental 
bodies, business companies, NGOs and Sectors referred to energy, transport 
and infrastructure. Rotman et al.’s (2000) study developed scenarios for Europe 
up to 2020 and 2050 (20 and 50 years). Kok et al.’s (2006) study adopted two 
scenarios from the earlier work by Rotman et al. (2000) – ‘Big is Beautiful’ and 
‘Knowledge is King (Figure 4.1)’, and added another scenario ‘Convulsive 
Change’ to develop story lines up to 2030 (25 years). In the event of a 
reunification between DPRK and ROK, the dynamics in Northeast Asia would 
be transformed entirely. The interests of different actors (China, Japan, Russia 
and USA) need to be taken into account when constructing the unification 
scenario.  
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Figure 4.1: Connections between Factors, Actors and Sectors in 
Knowledge is King 
 
Source: Kok et al. (2006, 273) 
 
4.1.3 Peace Scenarios 
 
Scenarios have been constructed for countries which are facing political 
instability. These countries have to deal with internal strife (South Africa) or 
long-drawn conflicts with its neighbours or within a region (Pakistan and India, 
and the Middle East). These scenarios are applicable to DPRK as it is still 
technically at war with ROK. At the same time, DPRK is also facing political 
instability due to the issue of succession and the power of the military over 
technocrats.  
 
South Africa is a country which has suffered from many years of apartheid. In 
1990, the then-government started negotiations to end apartheid, culminating in 
the 1994 elections which were won by a Nelson Mandela-led African National 
Congress. In between, Esterhuyse (1992) researched on the problems, 
priorities and prospects facing South Africa over the next 5-10 years. His 
research developed one scenario ‘Changing Gears’ which focused on political 
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stability and social disintegration. Galer (2004) reported several studies 
conducted by different organisations from the early 1980s to 1990s resulting in 
various scenarios describing the different feasible futures for South Africa. Galer 
(2004) wanted to ascertain the value of those studies to changes in South Africa 
and if they could be replicated to other conflict situations. He found positive 
correlation in both questions. Scenario methodology can be applied to help 
countries dealing with changes, in this instance, DPRK.      
 
India and Pakistan have been hostile neighbours for years in South Asia. 
Scenarios developed for both countries have been constructed with main focus 
on their neighbours. Similarly with DPRK and ROK, scenarios developed for the 
Korean Peninsula have to take into account the past hostility between both 
countries. Inayatullah (1992) developed five scenarios for Pakistan using 
literature reviews and interviews. In one of the scenarios, the author likened the 
country to that of DPRK’s social structure and large military. In another scenario, 
the author looked at the issue of national sovereignty being threatened from 
India. Similarly, the sovereignty of DPRK will be under threat from external 
forces if it continues with its hostile actions. Waslekar and Bhatt (2004) painted 
four scenarios of India in response to the geopolitical developments in India’s 
neighbouring countries and India’s response to them, to determine the country’s 
strategic options for the next 25 years. The authors identified a set of drivers 
which will influence India’s strategic future, incorporating them into each 
scenario.  
 
The Middle East has been engulfed with the ongoing conflict between Israel and 
the Palestine. Glenn and Gordon (2005) used literature reviews, interviews with 
experts in the field and a Delphi-study to create three normative, backcasted 
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scenarios of peace in the region. Their study identified seven conditions in each 
scenario which are precursor for peace to take place in the Middle East.  Some 
of techniques might be appropriate when developing scenarios for DPRK 
especially when data is often lacking.   
 
4.1.4 Internal Instability Scenarios 
 
This section looks at two countries facing internal instability – Thailand and 
Bolivia. Thailand has been facing internal instability since its ex-premier, 
Thaksin Shinawatra, was forced to quit his post after several corruption cases. 
Several governments have come and gone without any effect of stabilising the 
situation in the country. One of the five scenarios developed included the 
possibility of a military coup due to ongoing violence between pro- and anti-
government supporters (Emerging Markets Monitor, 2008). Bolivia is another 
country facing internal problems. Political Risk Services (2005) produced three 
regime scenarios for the country on an 18-month and five-year forecast with 
probabilities attached to each scenario. However, the report did not explain how 
they derived the probabilities to show different scenarios.  
 
These examples are relevant to DPRK as it is also facing a certain degree of 
instability due to the power struggle of the military which might result in a coup 
or citizens facing poverty and lacking support from the government might decide 
to try and overthrow the government. 
 
4.1.5 Economic Change Scenarios 
 
Scenarios can be applied in planning for economic futures of countries at 
national and supra-national level. Diouf (1994) developed two scenarios for 25 
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years (from 1995-2020) to achieve economic integration for the African 
continent – status quo scenario based on both pessimistic and optimistic 
assumptions; and a scenario of effective integration bearing positive 
transformations. However, there was no mention on his methodology in deriving 
these scenarios. Next, Ghosh and Aker (2006) used qualitative methods in the 
form of expert interviews and symposium to analyse the economic future of 
North Cyprus. They recognised the impact of major players (E.g. Russia, 
Turkey, the USA, and the EU) on the country and four scenarios were 
developed. Likewise for DPRK, it is important to recognise the role of different 
actors and their impact on DPRK. China, ROK and the USA are major actors 
while Russia and Japan can be considered as less influential.  
 
4.2 Use of Scenario Approach in Transport Planning 
 
Transport planning is often concerned with the medium and long term future 
which is often characterised by high levels of uncertainties including the lack of 
knowledge on the social and economic policies which transport planning have 
to align with. Quantitative forecasting models are frequently of little help, 
because of their reliance on extrapolation of existing trends to picture their 
future (Pearman, 1988). Since 1970s, scenarios have been used an alternative 
to quantitative forecasting models to aid policy makers in long term transport 
planning. The earliest examples can be found on a regional level in a study by 
the SRI for the US Department of Transport (1976) and the Chicago Area 
Transport Study (Schofer and Stopher, 1979). This section will focus on 
transport scenario planning on various levels – regional, national and supra-
national, and the methods used in developing these scenarios to derive the 
most suitable method(s) when developing scenarios for DPRK transport futures. 
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Most of these examples are found in the USA and Europe, with isolated cases 
from Australia, Israel, the UK and Sudan.  
 
4.2.1 Regional Level Planning 
 
This section looks at scenario planning for transport at a regional level. As 
mentioned earlier, the Stanford and Chicago study were the beginning of 
scenario planning examples in transportation. In the 1980s, several projects 
were commissioned by various metropolitan councils to “bring a new 
perspective to long-range transportation planning, particularly in relation to 
varying future conditions” (Mordecai, 1984 and Rutherford and Lattemann, 
1988). Since then, according to Zegras et al. (2004), few scenario-planning 
efforts for metropolitan transportation planning or general regional planning 
appeared in the literature. 
 
Zegras et al. (2004) identified a study which incorporated the scenario-planning 
exercise for the Mendoza Province in Argentina and applied it to the Houston 
Metropolitan transport planning. They used two different approaches – inductive 
and deductive when applying it to the Houston case. According to Van der 
Heijden (1996), the inductive approach “builds step by step on the data 
available and allows the structure of scenarios to emerge by itself”, while in the 
deductive approach, the overall framework is started with, “after which pieces of 
data are fitted into it”. Zegras et al. (2004) identified eight steps in the Mendoza 
study and developed a framework for the Houston case. They began by 
defining the objectives of prioritising a transport strategy in metropolitan 
Houston over the 20-25 years. Next, they identified the key local factors (e.g. 
shifts in environmental attitudes/politics and federal/state investments/control) 
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and the key driving forces that impact the key local factors (e.g. state of 
economy, technology and environment). In Step four, they developed potential 
combination of driving forces using two binary possibilities: good or bad (e.g. 
rapid economic growth or stagnation). From there, using their initial deductive 
scenario themes, they ‘flesh out’ three scenario stories, after which they 
assessed each scenario and options before developing a composite matrix by 
aggregating the individual multi-criteria analysis output. It is possible to consider 
the use of deductive and inductive approaches when developing scenarios for 
North Korea due to the lack of meaningful data.  
 
Inayatullah (2003) applied scenario-planning approach to develop transport 
policy in South-East Queensland, Australia.  Three futures methods were used 
in this research to communicative the alternative futures of transport: (1) futures 
triangle; (2) scenarios and (3) causal-layered analysis. Using the futures triangle 
– pull, push and weight of the future, four plausible futures were created. To 
understand the scenarios, four level of analysis was proposed. At the litany 
level, it includes basic trends of population growth and pollution levels. At the 
systems level (social, political and technological level), policies are constructed 
based on the issues at the base level. The next level of analysis, the worldview 
considers the views of different actors in the transportation futures – automobile 
industry, government authorities and citizens. At the last level, myth-metaphor is 
“the unconscious dimension to why we do what we do, what we don’t know we 
don’t know”. Applying it to the DPRK case, transport data records are not 
readily available and very often are not recorded. As with Zegras et al. (2004), it 
is important to identify the various actors and factors which determine the 
different transport scenarios. It is possible to develop different scenarios at a 
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regional level for DPRK, identifying the key cities along with their industrial 
development. 
 
A two-round Delphi expert-based survey was adopted by Shiftan et al. (2003) 
when constructing two scenarios (expected and desired) for the future 
sustainable development of the Tel-Aviv Metropolitan Area in Israel. Similarly 
with previous studies, five individual factors that, according to the authors, will 
determine whether progress in transportation will be sustainable were identified. 
This study used a backcasting approach (2003, 328) which “helps to identify 
future goals and conflicting interests, investigate change in existing functional 
relations and enables value judgement”. The justification using experts lies in 
the fact that they possess the best knowledge in their fields of interests. In the 
case of NK, the pool of experts is not sufficiently large enough to use a Delphi-
study to develop transport scenarios. The Delphi technique has been criticised 
in early literature (Hill and Fowles, 1975). One criticism of Delphi method is the 
relatively narrow range of future images produced. On the contrary, it is useful 
to produce three or more images of the future of transport system in DPRK to 
provide more options to policy makers to aid in planning.  However, the use of 
Delphi method might be restricted due to the lack of experts on DPRK transport.  
 
4.2.2 National Level Planning   
 
This section reviews two studies on countries – Sudan and the UK, which has 
applied scenario planning at a national level. Saaty (1977) in his application to 
the Sudan case first constructed econometrical models projecting it to 1985 – 
10 years ahead. Anticipatory scenario construction was used to develop four 
scenarios, taking into account all major economic, political, social and transport 
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parameters. Anticipatory scenarios starts with the future and work backwards to 
the present to discover what alternatives and actions are necessary to attain 
these futures. A hierarchical prioritisation model using pairwise comparison of 
the four scenarios helped developed a composite scenario in which one 
scenario emerged with the strongest weighting with some elements of two other 
scenarios. One criticism is the use of information derived from econometric 
study and estimations of production and consumption patterns which might give 
rise to errors. It will be important to take into account the political, economic, 
social and transport factors when developing transport scenarios for DPRK. 
However, the applicability of econometric models to DPRK is minimal given the 
lack of historical data.   
 
Potter and Roy (2000) produced four scenarios (cost driven, technology driven, 
quality driven and environment driven) for the future of UK rail transport. The 
projected scenarios were developed until 2010. One of the purposes of their 
work was to assess the usefulness of the scenarios five years on since they 
were first written in 1995. The method used in their research was through a 
conference where main themes were developed for the science and technology 
implication for each scenario. They concluded that the scenario planning 
approach as a futures exploration technique “has proved to be a robust, 
enlightening, and useful approach”. 
 
4.2.3 Supra-national Level Planning 
 
At a supra-national level, many studies have been commissioned by the EU to 
develop scenarios reflecting transport mobility and sustainable development 
(Banister et al. 2000; European Commission DG Energy and Transport, 2003; 
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Foresight for Transport, 2004; May, 2005; Nijkamp et al. 1997a, 1997b and 
1998; and Stead and Banister, 2003). In planning for DPRK transport, transport 
flows have to take into account the potential of reunification between DPRK and 
ROK or the interests of various actors in DPRK’s transport sector (China, Japan 
and Russia). 
 
Banister et al. (2000) and Stead and Banister (2003) adopted both qualitative 
scenario building methods and backcasting approach to develop transport 
scenarios up to the year 2020 in line with the EU’s vision for sustainable 
transport mobility.  Banister et al. (2000) first set clear environmental, regional 
development and efficiency targets, within which strategies are developed. They 
also considered an external element of either greater co-operation or 
fragmentation in developing three images of the future. The conclusion of their 
study leads on to the work conducted by Stead and Banister (2003), which 
includes an eight-stage scenario building process. The result is the 
development of five policy packages which was validated and assessed using 
workshops, interviews and/or questionnaires to explore the levels of 
acceptability of each policy package. Using a backcasting approach to develop 
transport scenarios for DPRK is extremely difficult due to the volatile political 
situation in the Korean Peninsula along with the question of economic funding 
over transport projects to make a backcasting approach viable in the case of 
DPRK transport images.  
 
Nijkamp et al. (1997a, 1998a and 1998b) used a qualitative multi-criteria 
approach known as the “Spider model” (see Figure 4.7) to construct expert-
based scenarios for transport policies in Europe up to the year 2030. In their 
research, they develop two scenarios – expected and desired based survey 
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questionnaires with Dutch transportation experts and researchers with various 
backgrounds. In their analysis, they classified the driving forces which are 
critical for the future of transport systems, into four groups – spatial, institutional, 
economic and social/psychological aspects.  The scenarios developed are a 
response to forces and developments in the four groups. One of the advantages 
mentioned is that “individual assessment criteria do not have to be measured in 
a single quantitative unit; they may be qualitative in nature (e.g. rank orders)”. 
According to Nijkamp et al. (1998), the inner points close to the origin are more 
associated with non-intervention strategies whereas the outer points reflect 
policy interventions. There are a total of eight axes which make up the Spider 
Model. Using the combination of the rank scores on all the eight points, 
expected and desired scenarios were constructed. One of the problems of this 
model is that only two scenarios were constructed and only four major factors 
represented the Spider model. In DPRK’s case, there might be more than four 
factors (e.g. government, economic, legal, spatial, social, organisational, 
managerial, infrastructure) which will influence the future of transport system. 
As a result, the applicability of the spider model might not be appropriate.  
 
4.2.4 International Level Planning 
 
Through various literature search transport scenarios at an international level 
has been less researched due to the complexities of international transport in 
an age of globalisation. Ubbels et al. (2003) considered the development of 
international transport sector for both passenger and freight transport until 2020. 
Each of the images of the future transportation market was constructed at three 
different levels (global, European and Dutch) based on four globalisation 
scenarios (Growth, Core-Growth, Peripheral Growth and Sustainable Growth). 
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Indicators expressed as positive ( + ), negative ( - ) or neutral ( 0 ) formed the 
basis of scenario description and showed the expected impacts of transport 
volumes. Using the WorldScan Model, quantitative transportation estimates 
were calculated to derive the expected volume changes for each transport 
mode in 2020. Due to lack of transport data, it is not plausible to obtain 
estimates of DPRK passenger and freight transport flows. Hence, Ubbels et al. 
(2003) is not considered appropriate in this research.  
 
4.3 Scenarios of DPRK 
 
The purpose of analysing the 19 publications was to identify common scenario 
themes in the literature and internal and external developments which affect 
DPRK as well as to identify the types of methods used in deriving the scenarios. 
Table 4.1 presents a summary of the scenarios, with a majority of the literature 
focusing on two main issues – politics and economics.  
 
Table 4.1: Summary of Scenarios of DPRK 
Author Scenarios 
Van Hippel, D.F. and 
Hayes, P. (1997) 
1. Recovery scenario 
2. Decline scenario  
Maxwell, D. (1997) 1. Reunification with ROK 
2. Bloodless coup 
3. Complete collapse and disintegration 
4. Military coup 
Pollack, J. and Lee, 
C.M. (1999) 
1. Integration and peaceful unification 
2. Collapse and absorption 
3. Unification through conflict 
4. Disequilibrium and external intervention 
Inoguchi, T. (2001) 1. Westphalian scenario (regime survival) 
2. Philadelphian scenario (peaceful reunification) 
3. Anti-utopian scenario (collapse) 
Nautilus Institute 
(2002) 
1. ‘Gridlock’ 
2. ‘Great Leader 3’ 
3. ‘Phoenix’ 
4. ‘Mujige – Rainbow’ 
Noland, M. (2002) 1. Successful reform (regime survival) 
2. Muddling through (status quo) 
3. Elite conflict 
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4. Mass mobilisation (citizen uprising) 
Nautilus Institute 
(2003) 
1. ‘Green Flash’ 
2. ‘Boom Boom’ 
3. ‘Embrace Tiger Retreat to Mountain’ 
4. ‘Eagle Stands Alone’ 
Park, H.J. (2003) 1. Confrontation between DPRK and US 
2. Beginning of negotiation 
3. Adoption and implementation of agendas for 
dismantling 
4. Complete dismantlement and end of negotiations 
Aslund, A. (2004) Used example of Albania to describe how DPRK may 
crumble. 
Lim, W.H. (2004) 1. ‘Outward-Oriented Developmental Dictatorship’ 
2. ‘Half Full, Half Empty’ 
3. ‘Arduous March’ 
4. ‘Neither a Rogue nor a Tiger’ 
Moon, C.I. (2004) 1. Status quo 
2. System modification 
3. System collapse 
Park, H.J. (2004) Constructed matrix with assumption of three possible 
developments for nuclear issue and three possible 
alterations of North Korea’s state capability 
Noland, M. (2004) 1. Cooperative engagement 
2. Neoconservatives dream 
3. International embargo 
Jo, D.H. (2006) 1. South Korea-led scenario 
2. South Korea/China-led scenario 
3. Related countries jointly-led scenario 
Kim, K. (2006) 1. ‘Rogue State’ 
2. ‘Flood-Famine’ 
3. ‘Eco-Tourism’ 
4. ‘Industrial Estate’ 
Scobell, A. (2007) 1. Soft landing – reform and opening 
2. Crash landing – collapse by any other name 
3. Suspended animation – stasis 
Lankov, A. (2008) 1. Market reform – the Chinese way 
2. Regime collapse – Unification by co-option into South 
Korea 
3. Regime collapse – establishment of Pro-Chinese 
Regime 
4. Military revolt – Long term chaos 
Business Monitor 
(2008) 
1. Muddling through 
2. Reformist takeover and rapid reform 
3. Sudden collapse 
4. Internal civil war – military coup 
5. US/South Korea invasion 
Suh, J.J. (2008) Advocates status quo scenario of regime sustainability 
Stares and Wit 
(2009) 
1. Managed succession 
2. Contested succession 
3. Failed succession 
Source: Author 
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Focusing on the issue of DPRK’s energy problems, Van Hippel and Hayes 
(1997) used energy figures available in 1990 as a baseline to extrapolate 
figures for two scenarios: recovery and decline for two time period – 2000 and 
2005. Under the recovery scenario, the assumption is that with a combination of 
external aid and internal transition, DPRK’s economy will surpass 1990 
performance in most sectors by 2005. On the contrary, its economy will 
continue to decline through the year 2000 and recover slightly through the year 
2005 if internal transition is not carried out.  
 
Maxwell (1997), writing for the USA military used a modified ‘backward 
planning’ working backward from fifteen to twenty years focusing on the long 
term regional interests to near term actions in the event of DPRK’s catastrophic 
collapse. Four possible scenarios were proposed. In the first scenario, Kim 
Jong-il approaches ROK and proposes reunification as his power base 
weakens. The next scenario contemplates a bloodless coup in which the 
military takes over and installs a moderate regime embarking on economic and 
political reform. This scenario looks improbable due to the interests on the 
military in maintaining a closure to the rest of the world. The third scenario 
signals a complete collapse and disintegration of the national government. The 
ruling elite would seek asylum in another country and total chaos would besiege 
the country with migration across to China and ROK. This is the scenario which 
both countries will fight hard to avoid as it will bring internal destabilisation. In 
the last scenario, multiple factions exist with infighting occurring as each of 
them struggles for power and one of them conducts a coup to oust the present 
regime.  
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Pollack and Lee (1999) concluded that unification was inevitable as DPRK 
could not continue to ensure regime survival. However, this has been proved 
wrong numerous times as the regime has shown tremendous resilience in 
maintaining status quo. With no mention of the methodology used, they 
examined alternative scenarios leading to Korean unification, dividing into three 
time periods up to the year 2000, 2005 and 2010. Using four considerations – 
major characteristics; potential indicators; preferred and variant paths and 
strategic implications, they focused on: 
1. Unification through peaceful integration and negotiation; 
2. Unification through absorption following a collapse; 
3. Unification through conflict or war; and  
4. Sustained equilibrium and potential external intervention. 
 
Inoguchi (2001) speculated on the situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula 
up to the year 2015 using three viewpoints – state centric; liberal and post-
colonial. In the state centric viewpoint – the Westphalian scenario likens to a 
status quo position, DPRK regime remains strong and it will continue its 
unification policy. ROK will continue to engage DPRK economically with little 
governmental intervention. The next viewpoint - Philadelphian scenario displays 
characteristics of a peaceful unification. This scenario purports elements of 
confederalism, economic interdependence and democratic peace. DPRK’s 
unification policy has long been based on a confederate peninsula but not 
supported by ROK. Economic interdependence has progressed in several steps 
– Mt. Kumgang tourist zone, Kaesong Industrial Complex and other 
infrastructure projects. The last viewpoint – Anti-Utopian scenario depicts a 
complete collapse in DPRK with the need for international intervention.  
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The Nautilus Institute, a think-tank based in the USA, focused on security and 
sustainability issues involving the USA and other East Asian countries with main 
focus on the Korean Peninsula. Over the years (2002 and 2003), they have 
conducted scenario workshops on several occasions, bringing together experts 
to explore uncertainties regarding DPRK including solving the nuclear crisis 
issue and to develop scenarios to help the United States develop strategies to 
cope with DPRK. In 2002, a workshop on ‘Future Scenarios for USA-DPRK 
Relations’ was conducted to answer the question “What will DPRK’s relations 
with the USA look like in 2012?”. Using two uncertainties - the relationship 
between DPRK and ROK and geopolitics development surrounding the Korean 
Peninsula, four scenarios were developed (Figure 4.2). In the ‘Gridlock’ 
scenario, DPRK aligns itself with China while USA-ROK alliance strengthens. 
As satellite phones continue to enter through China and ROK, local citizens are 
able to communicate with the outside world. DPRK, with nuclear weapons, 
begins to collapse. Under the ‘Great Leader 3’ scenario, a new leadership 
emerges after Kim Jong-il and status quo scenario continues to endure while 
ROK will invest in large scale projects in the North with hope of improved 
relations. Under the ‘Phoenix’ scenario, DPRK regimes collapse in rebellion and 
famine savages the country. The UN and multilateral forces work together to 
rebuild a peaceful new reunified Korea. The last scenario – ‘Mujige – Rainbow’ 
supports economic reform and diplomatic normalisation in return for DPRK’s 
abandonment of any nuclear ambitions. Loans will be provided to DPRK to 
rebuild the country with barriers between two Koreas falling. In 2003, the 
Nautilus Institute gathered another group of experts to contemplate about the 
nuclear crisis, with a lead up to the Presidential Election in the USA in 
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November 2004. Four scenarios, normative and generative in nature, were 
developed with objectives based on peaceful outcomes. In the first scenario, 
‘Green Flash’, DPRK admits possessing nuclear weapons but conflict is 
avoided. The next scenario, ‘Boom Boom’ depicts a violent world where DPRK 
establishes its nuclear capacity regardless of consequences. In the third 
scenario, ‘The Eagle Stands Alone’, concessions by the USA to DPRK proves 
futile in avoiding confrontation. In the last scenario, ‘Embrace Tiger, Retreat to 
Mountain’, DPRK stops pursuing nuclear weapons and opts for economic 
development and conflict is avoided.   
 
Figure 4.2: Scenario Matrix 
 
Source: Nautilus Institute (2002, 10) 
 
Noland’s (2002) work considered the internal and external developments that 
will shape DPRK in the near future. In addition, he suggested three wildcards – 
death of Kim Jong-il, international trade shocks and weather, which might affect 
those developments. Four outcomes were developed as a result. The most 
successful outcome results in economic reforms following the China and 
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Vietnam models. The next scenario sees DPRK maintaining a status quo 
scenario with less internal changes. The third outcome results in an intra-elite 
coup in which new leadership assumes control. The final possibility results in 
complete collapse of the regime leading to mass mobilisation.  
 
Park (2003) proposed a four-step scenario for the rebuilding of the DPRK 
economy beginning with confrontation between DPRK and the USA and ending 
with complete dismantlement. Confrontation and threats has been DPRK’s main 
strategy in engaging the USA. Aslund (2004) used the example of Albania as a 
scenario of how DPRK may crumble. Lim (2004) examines the economic 
reforms undertaken by DPRK and alternative economic futures suing a decision 
forecasting model and scenario planning framework. Four scenarios were 
developed as a result. In the ‘Outward-Oriented Developmental Dictatorship’ 
scenario, DPRK undertakes further economic reforms it implemented in July 
2002 and opens up to foreign investments. In the ‘Neither a Rogue nor a Tiger’ 
scenario, DPRK pursues limited reform while at the same time normalises 
relations with the USA and Japan. The third scenario, ‘Half Full Half Empty’, 
depicts DPRK pursuing major reforms but with security issues resolved, 
external economic assistance is limited. In the last scenario, ‘Arduous March’, 
the worst possible circumstances occur with DPRK pursuing limited economic 
reforms and maintaining defiant stance on nuclear weapons which limits the 
amount of economic assistance available.  
 
Moon (2004) suggested that DPRK will maintain a status quo in the near future. 
However, continuation of the status quo cannot assure DPRK’s long term 
survival hence it needs to modify the system towards opening and reform. The 
third scenario focuses on system collapse as a result of blind maintenance of 
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the status quo or failure to cope with transitional instability arising from system 
modification. Park (2004) constructed a matrix to illustrate nine different 
scenarios of DPRK’s internal and external developments with the assumptions 
of three possible developments for the nuclear issue – peaceful resolution, 
stalemate and sanctions, and three possible alterations of DPRK’s state 
capability, strong, medium and weak. Noland (2004) used statistics from the 
BOK to highlight its poverty and generate a model showing the probability of 
regime change in DPRK. In the ‘cooperative engagement’ scenario, DPRK 
opens up its economy and normalises its relations with other countries. The 
likelihood of this scenario was one per cent. In the ‘neoconservatives dream’, 
the global community puts a squeeze on the present regime and aid is cut off, 
something similar to the current situation: its probability was 14 percent. In the 
final scenario of ‘international embargo’, DPRK’s relations with the rest of the 
world deteriorate precipitously with all international trade cut off: although its 
probability was 40 per cent, Noland suggested it might be politically unrealistic.  
 
Jo (2006) suggested three time periods: (i) 2006-2012 (ii) 2013–2020 and (iii) 
2021 and beyond, classifying the scenarios into (a) ROK-led scenario which will 
see a delay in nuclear issues and limited opening by DPRK (b) ROK and China 
co-led scenarios which will see active involvement by China and lastly (c) a 
related countries jointly-led scenario for the resolution of the nuclear issue 
through six-party talks. China has continued to engage in talks with DPRK 
urging the country to return to the table for further talks on the nuclear crisis.  
 
Kim (2006) four scenarios that evaluated the desirability of railway and 
infrastructure project integration in Northeast Asia. Different driving forces, 
strategic concerns, key actors, likelihood, costs and wildcard events helped 
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developed four scenarios - ‘Rogue State’, ‘Flood Famine’, ‘Eco-Tourism’ and 
‘Industrial Estate’. Under the ‘Rogue State’ scenario, DPRK continues to 
maintain its ‘Juche’ policy and any railway projects will enable DPRK to move its 
military assets quicker and also see an increase in illegal activities such as 
counterfeiting or drugs smuggling. In the ‘Flood and Famine’ scenario, DPRK 
faces wide spread droughts which plagued the country in the late 1990s. 
Investment in rail projects will help with the delivery of humanitarian aid; provide 
job creation and upgrading of infrastructure. The ‘Eco-Tourism’ involves building 
on the success of Mt. Kumgang project and upgrading of the two railway lines 
would enable more tourists to visit other destinations, including connection to 
the TSR line. In the ‘Industrial Estate’ scenario, special economic zones are 
created in Rajin and Sinuiju with high level of international investment and 
expansion of industries in DPRK. The Gyeonggui Line would benefit the 
Pyongyang-Sinuiju corridor with connections to Trans-China railway while the 
Gyeongwon Line will serve Rajin-Sonbong and the Tumen River development 
zones. 
 
Scobell (2007) considers three scenarios for DPRK and their implications for the 
USA-China relations for a period of 10 to 15 years. In the soft landing or 
‘muddling through’ scenario, DPRK is expected to adopt partial or ongoing 
economic reforms which is most favoured by China.  However, Scobell 
considers this as an unlikely scenario due to Kim Jong-il’s fear of how the 
reforms will loosen his grip on his rule. In the ‘suspended animation: stasis’ 
outcome, which is essentially a status quo scenario, DPRK is either unwilling or 
unable to change. This outcome is very likely as DPRK does not have to make 
tough choices on reforms. The above two scenarios is expected to last for at 
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least five to ten years. In the last scenario – ‘crash landing: collapse by any 
other name’, it is predicted that collapse could be quiet and trouble-free or noisy 
and chaotic, resulting from internal rebellion.  
 
Lankov’s (2008) scenarios follow closely to previous scenarios mentioned. In 
the first scenario, DPRK follows the China/Vietnam model with focus on 
agriculture and small-medium sized enterprises. However, Lankov thinks that 
this scenario is not feasible due to the inflow of information from the outside 
world which will slowly weaken the present regime. The second and third 
scenario envisages a DPRK collapse with ROK and China taking over the 
country in the former and latter scenarios respectively. The last scenario gives 
rise to a revolt by various factions which neither China nor ROK wants to get 
involved in. Similarly, Business Monitor (2008) believes that DPRK cannot 
maintain status quo scenarios forever and constructed five scenarios for change: 
 
1. Muddling through – slow economic reform with ongoing trade with and 
investment from China and ROK; 
2. Reformist takeover and rapid reform -  Kim Jong-il’s successor embarks 
on rapid political and economic reforms which might lead to either 
adaptation of market reforms or a collapse in the successor regime; 
3. Sudden collapse – either China or ROK could take over the country; 
4. Civil war within DPRK; and 
5. USA/SK invasion. 
 
Suh (2008) analysed the regime sustainability inside DPRK and concluded that 
the status quo scenario is being maintained due to the creation of new regime 
adaptability. The second society, where people are focused on making money, 
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continues to support the failed first society – official economy. He concludes 
that the regime will officially recognise the second society rather than risking a 
collapse by sudden revolt. Stares and Wit (2009) focused on the succession 
issues and how different scenarios would pose different problems for 
policymakers in the USA. Under the ‘managed succession’ scenario, Kim Jong-
il designates a successor from the lineage or the emergence of a collective 
leadership from the military. It is expected that transfer of power would be 
seamless and the new regime would receive support from the military. In the 
‘contested succession’ lies the existence of various factions within the regime. 
Within Kim Jong-il’s lineage, his three sons together with other relatives are 
fighting to be the rightful heir. Other options include a coup within the military. In 
the last scenario – ‘failed succession’ produces no clear leader, creating chaos 
which might lead to a civil war internally. Similarly, China or ROK might take the 
lead to restore peace in the country.    
 
4.4 Summary 
 
This chapter examined the use of scenario planning to aid countries in future 
planning. Analysis focused on disintegration and reunification scenarios; 
national and supra-national development scenarios; peace scenarios; internal 
stability and economic change scenarios. Next, the use of scenarios in transport 
planning on a regional, national, supra-national and international level was 
discussed. A variety of methods were used to develop the scenarios and the 
time lines range from 5-25 years. Lastly, analysis of scenarios constructed for 
DPRK showed that a majority of the studies did not specify any techniques used 
except for the expert workshops conducted by the Nautilus Institute. Several 
common scenarios emerged from the literature: Status quo/muddling through; 
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Regime collapse through military coup; complete collapse of system; unification 
through peaceful means or conflict.  
 
The next chapter presents the research methodology, explaining the research 
philosophy; justification for the choice of research methods; the data collection 
and analysis process and ethical considerations applied to this research. 
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CHAPTER 5 – METHODOLOGY  
 
This chapter describes the research methodology which forms the basis of the 
thesis. It gives the rationale for choose the research philosophy and 
methodology and describes the data collection and analysis process before 
concluding with ethical considerations. Additionally, Appendix III provides an 
introduction to social research in general (addressing different research 
philosophies, research strategies, triangulation/mixed methods approaches, 
data collection methods, time horizons, and important criteria in business 
research) in order to put the chosen research strategy and selected research 
methods for this thesis into context. 
 
5.1 Research Strategy for this Thesis 
 
It is important for researchers to select the most appropriate strategy for their 
research. The right selection is essential for the success of the thesis and 
depends on various factors – nature of research and the research questions. 
Saunders et al. (2003) furthered strengthened the view that no one approach is 
better than another, rather the approach would depend on the research 
question (s) that the researcher is seeking to answer. In addition to that, other 
practical considerations such as money, time or access to data play an 
important role as well. Some research methods might be the key to useful and 
worthy data but are inappropriate because they are time consuming and/or 
prove to be too expensive. In the case of this research, access to data and 
limitation of financial resources/time were crucial factors in determining the 
choice of research methods. The following sub-sections will first present the 
conceptual framework and research questions. Then it will describe the 
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research philosophy and methods selected for the purpose of this research and 
justify their selection. 
 
5.1.1 Conceptual Framework and Research Questions 
 
Chapter 2 described DPRK’s political economy and established that DPRK 
claims to practice self-sufficiency but in fact does earn hard currency either 
through setting up SEZs like Kaesong Industrial Complex or engaging in foreign 
trade with countries such as China, ROK, Russia etc.  
 
Chapter 3 described the transport and logistics infrastructure in DPRK and 
concluded that there is a need to appraise and prepare a comprehensive 
transport and logistics roadmap for DPRK. Location factors were discussed to 
ascertain the potential factors determining the location decisions of enterprises 
in DPRK in the future.  
 
Chapter 4 described the various methods and analytical tools for developing 
scenarios for DPRK which are crucial to providing insights into the future 
development of the country and its transport and logistics infrastructure in the 
next 20 years.  
 
In light of the literature review, the proposed central research question is as 
follows: 
 
“What are the implications of ROK small and medium enterprises’ (SMEs) 
and logistics companies’ location decisions on transport and logistics 
developments in DPRK?” 
 
A conceptual model for the research is presented in Figure 5.1. The model does 
not seek to test or explain casual relationships. However, it does aim to 
generate factors that could influence the development of transport and logistics 
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developments in DPRK. These factors are developed through analysis of the 
literature and in-depth semi-structured face-to-face exploratory interviews 
conducted in the first phase and also drawn from (1) the PESTLIED model, 
which is used for assessing an organisation external environment (Harding, 
1998), (2) MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003)’s study into factors affecting 
international location decisions and (3) Roe’s (2003) work into shipping policy 
making. These contexts provide a framework to analyse the possible strategies 
for transport and logistics development. They will be facilitated into the 
qualitative and quantitative research to answer the research objectives. 
 
The model identified sub-elements which are critical to the development 
process. Political stability between both Koreas and in the region is crucial for 
DPRK to induce much needed foreign capital to rehabilitate its dilapidated 
transport modes (Babson, 2001; Lee, 2004 and Lim, 1997). Currently, DPRK is 
not a member of international financial institutions, which prevents them from 
securing loans. The reconnection of the TKR is the first step in reconstruction 
(Oh, 2001 and Tsuji, 2005). DPRK has to embrace new modern technologies 
(Lee, 2004 and Oh, 2001). Economic reforms in the form of SEZs will enhance 
regional and local development with implications on transport linkages and 
accessibility (Lim, 1997). Transport cost factors will also be an important 
determinant (Babson, 2001; Ahn, 2002 and Jung et al., 2005). New laws are 
needed for international payment methods (Dong, 2001). Managers need to be 
educated in transport planning policies and logistics concepts (Lee 2004 and 
Oh, 2005). The need to find new markets for DPRK products, regional and/or 
local, plays an important role in transport development (Hoon, 2001; Kim, 2003 
and Park, 2004). A pool of skilled, educated workforce is required for 
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understanding operating new technologies (Babson, 2001; Jung et al., 2003 
and Lee, 2005). Organisational factors centre on logistics linkages and 
accessibility as well as the logistics distribution system (Dong, 2001). 
 
In view of the conceptual framework, the following research questions were 
developed and the research philosophy and data collection process will be 
guided by the following questions: 
 
1. What are the impacts of the different DPRK scenarios on the transport 
and logistics developments in DPRK? 
2. Where are the locations in DPRK for future developments as SEZs? 
3. What are the transport infrastructure strategies and priorities for DPRK? 
4. What are the managerial skills that DPRK managers should acquire? 
5. Where are the main markets for DPRK -made products? 
6. What are the different industries which DPRK can focus in? 
7. What are the factors which influence the location choices of potential 
ROK investors? 
8. What are the types of logistics services/concepts to be introduced in 
DPRK? 
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Figure 5.1: Conceptual Framework 
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5.1.2 Choice of Research Methods 
 
Appendix III provided an overview of the research process elements. This sub-
section presents the rationale for the research choices and methods for the 
purpose of this study.  
 
• Research philosophy: As mentioned earlier, social and business research is 
not constrained by a choice between two extremes as indicated by the two 
paradigms of positivism and interpretivism. From the literature review, it is 
apparent that research into DPRK has leaned towards interpretivism 
involving study into the changes that are shaping the reclusive state. At the 
same time, the author believes that developments in DPRK are positivistic in 
nature due to the involvement of foreign companies which will impact on 
transport and logistics policies.  To embrace both trends, the author has 
taken a relativist view of ontology and adopted a pragmatic research 
epistemology as the research questions do not suggest that either a 
positivist or interpretivist philosophy in isolation is appropriate. Rather, a  
mixed methods strategy is deployed.  
 
• Research approach: Sekaran (2003, 27) notes that ‘answers to issues can 
be found either by the process of deduction or the process of induction, or 
by a combination of the two’. The researcher has chosen the combination 
approach in this thesis. Firstly, there is little existing literature on transport 
and logistics development in DPRK as well as investment decisions of ROK 
SMEs in DPRK. In addition, from the author’s trips to DPRK, the lack of 
reliable data would pose hindrances.  Therefore, an inductive approach in 
the initial stage to build up propositions and research questions would seem 
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more appropriate. Subsequently, a deductive approach was selected to 
explain the relationships between several themes in the scenarios and also 
to quantify the opinions and beliefs of the ROK SMEs. 
 
• Research strategies: Social and business research offers a wide range of 
possible research strategies as discussed in Appendix III. The most 
appropriate strategy will help to generate satisfying answers to the research 
questions. Experiments, action research, ethnography and archival research 
were felt to be inappropriate in the first instance. Quantitative forecasting 
techniques were rejected on the basis of the lack of reliable quantitative 
historical data on DPRK due to its autarkic nature. Any data available should 
be subject to strict scrutiny since DPRK has not produced any meaningful 
data since the early 1980s. Case studies were not considered as they are 
time-consuming and inappropriate to this research as they only provide a 
narrow view. With this in mind a combination of research strategies, 
incorporating elements of grounded theory (i.e. exploratory study), survey 
and futures and scenario research were deployed to test the research 
questions.    
 
• Mixed methods choices: Both mono-methods and multi-methods were 
rejected as they were considered too restrictive, only concentrating on either 
quantitative or qualitative world view. After careful consideration, a 
sequential equal status mixed methods design was felt most appropriate. It 
was conducted in three stages. The first stage was an exploratory stage 
using qualitative methods and analysis. The results of the analysis together 
with the literature review were incorporated in the second stage where both 
qualitative and quantitative research was conducted concurrently. The 
136 
 
results of the experts’ interview were then used to develop scenarios for 
DPRK. The results of both ROK SMEs and logistics companies’ surveys 
were used to answer the research objectives and questions. 
 
• Time horizons: Given the nature of this research and the relatively short 
period of time to complete the doctoral thesis, it was decided that a cross-
sectional study would be the most appropriate as part of the research works 
with larger sample population investigating ROK small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs).   
 
• Data collection methods: Saunders et al. (2007, 130) encourage the 
‘evaluation of all possible data collection methods and to choose those most 
appropriate to the research questions(s) and objectives’. It was decided that 
this thesis would adopt the mixed methods approach involving a two-stage 
strategy. The first stage involves qualitative interviews in the form of 
exploratory conversations with experts together with analysis from literature 
reviews to develop the main research questions for second stage study. The 
next stage involves both in-depth qualitative interviews and quantitative 
surveys as the main data collection instruments.  
 
The main rationale for selecting exploratory study was the belief that, in 
order to clarify and define the nature of the problem, it would be most 
appropriate to talk to the people with interest/involvement in DPRK. These 
include academics, present and past government and international officials 
and market researchers. This is in line with Oppenheim (1992), who 
identifies developing ideas and understands how people think and feel about 
the topics of concern to the research as the principal purpose of exploratory 
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interviews. Due to the lack of time and finance, only those in UK and China 
were identified in the initial stage. Another justification is the lack of sufficient 
data through the literature review to be able to gather constructs for any 
meaningful data collection and analysis. As a result of the interviews and in 
combination of the findings of the literature review, several underlying 
themes emerge which were used to generate research questions to be 
tested in the second stage.  
 
Consequently, both in-depth qualitative electronic-mail interviews and 
two quantitative surveys using structure self-administered questionnaires, 
which were sent by post and e-mail, were selected in order to generate 
deeper understanding of the themes develop in the exploratory stage and to 
collect the type of data to answer the research questions generated.  In-
depth interviews were conducted on academic and industry experts while 
quantitative surveys were developed for both ROK SMEs and logistics 
companies.  
 
The research methods selected for the purpose of this study reflect the nature 
of the research, as it investigates transport and logistics developments in DPRK 
from different perspectives.  
 
5.2 Data Collection Methods 
 
This section describes the preparation and analytical methods of the initial 
exploratory interviews and second stage data collection process of the 
electronic-mail qualitative interviews and postal quantitative surveys. 
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5.2.1 Exploratory Study 
 
An exploratory study is a valuable means of finding out ‘what is happening; to 
seek new insights; to ask questions and to assess phenomenon in a new light’ 
(Robson, 2002, 59). It is conducted in the initial research stage to clarify and 
define the nature of the problem. There are three principal ways of conducting 
exploratory research – (a) a search of the literature (b) interviewing ‘experts’ in 
the subject and (c) conducting focus groups. This thesis used the first two ways 
to explore the initial research on DPRK. The last method was rejected due to 
the physical impossibility of gathering experts from different countries together 
to conduct focus groups. The whole process of exploratory study, which took 
place over a one year period, can be divided into two parts – literature review 
and interviews with experts.  
 
5.2.1.1 Pre-Interview Phase 
 
Literature search on DPRK included all aspects and topics in previous studies 
including books, journals, reports, newspapers and magazine articles covering 
a time frame from 1940s to 2008. The main purposes were to gain an in-depth 
understanding of current issues and to pick out the main themes, theories and 
methodologies surrounding research on DPRK in preparation for the next stage 
of semi-structured interviews with experts. The most common themes include 
politics (political leadership, weapons of mass destruction and reunification) and 
economics (financing, economic statistics) due to the state and nature of the 
country. Other themes include tourism, legal and transport.  
 
The initial plan was to carry out interviews with experts who have previously 
worked on or who are presently engaged in DPRK affairs. Due to time and 
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financial constraints, it was decided that the majority of the interviews will be 
conducted in the UK. Later on, the author also had an opportunity to make a 
field trip to China to interview several experts. A list with potential interview 
candidates in the UK and China was produced in April 2006. Some candidates 
were included simply because of their position, for example past and previous 
government and international officials who have worked in DPRK. Others 
attracted attention as a result of their journal/book publications or having 
business dealings in DPRK. In May 2006, the first potential UK interviewees 
were contacted by electronic mail asking for an interview while interviewees in 
China were contacted in July 2006. Electronic mail is a popular tool to make 
initial contact with the other party and it is also a popular means of 
communication widely used by business organisations and government 
departments. The email (Appendix IV) contained a formal enquiry, a brief 
description of the research as well as an invitation to contact supervisors in 
order to cross-check on the validity of the enquiry. A total of five out of ten 
candidates responded positively to the interviews in UK while three out of six 
candidates in China did so likewise. The response was encouraging 
considering the nature of the research but during the course of the interviews, 
interviewees often mention that they were interested to know the outcome of 
this thesis. Those respondents represented the main groups interested in 
DPRK, ranging from governments, researchers, non-governmental 
organisations, business organisations and international bodies. Those who 
declined to be interviewed gave reasons such as lack of time or sensitivity of 
the topic. The UK interviews were carried out between May and July 2006 while 
the field trip to China took place in August 2006.      
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5.2.1.2 Interview Phase 
 
The interviews took the form of semi-structured one-to-one conversations and 
individual interview questions (tailored to each individual due to their expertise) 
which had been created in advance. Semi-structured interviews ‘allow the 
discussion to lead into areas which may not have been considered prior to the 
interview but which may be potentially relevant to the study’ (Goulding, 2002, 
59). The interview questions were sent to the interviewees prior to the 
interviews in order to allow them to think and prepare the questions. It also 
helped to ensure that the interview flowed smoothly. In some instances, some 
questions were dropped in favour of more important questions and discussions 
which arose during the course of the interviews. Tape-recorders were used to 
supplement notes taken down. Easterby-Smith et al. (2008, 150) refer to the 
issue of the effects of using tape to record interviews. Their advice was to ‘hand 
over the responsibility for switching the tape on and off to the interviewee, so 
that when he or she does not wish certain parts to be recorded, they can just 
switch off the machine’. No respondent objected to the recording or to being 
cited.  
By August 2006, the exploratory phrase of the study had been completed. A 
total of eight interviews were conducted. The composition of the interviews is as 
follows: 
 
• Three interviews with academic and market researchers. 
• Two interviews with past and present British government officials. 
• Two interviews with business organisations with interests in DPRK.  
• One interview with a UN official involved in food aid and developmental 
projects in DPRK.  
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5.2.1.3 Analysing Exploratory Data 
 
After collecting the exploratory data, it had to be analysed to facilitate further 
research stages. The first step was to decide whether computer-assisted (or 
computer aided) qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) such as NVivo or 
NUD*IST (Non-Numerical Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching and 
Theorising) shall be used or not. Leybourne (2002, 10), compared the 
advantages and disadvantages of using CAQDAS and concluded that 
‘qualitative analysis software can only assist, rather than undertake the level of 
rigorous analysis required.’ In addition, much time is needed to learn and be 
skilful in using new software. Hence, the use of CAQDAS was not taken into 
further consideration. Nonetheless, a rigorous way of analysing the data from 
the qualitative interviews had to be found. Saunders et al. (2007, 492) describe 
a number of inductively-based analytical procedures to analyse qualitative data 
and one of them will be described below. 
 
Figure 5.2: Interactive Data Analysis Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Miles and Huberman (1994, 12) 
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Miles and Huberman (1994, 10) used an interactive data analysis model (Figure 
5.2) and define analysis as ‘consisting of three concurrent flows of activity: data 
reduction, data display and conclusion drawing/verification’.  
 
• Data reduction: ‘refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, 
abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written-up field 
notes or transcription’.  
• Data display: ‘designed to assemble organised information into an 
immediately accessible, compact form so that the analyst can see what 
is happening and either draw justified conclusions or move on to the next 
step of analysis the display suggests may be helpful’. There are two 
main forms of data displays – matrices and networks.  
• Conclusion drawing and verification: refers to ‘noting regularities, 
patterns, explanations, possible configurations, causal flows, and 
propositions’. Meanings emerging from data have to be tested for their 
validity.  
 
Saunders et al. (2007) point out that the interactive data display model differs 
from grounded theory in that the framework is not specified. The approach of 
Miles and Huberman (2002) is suited to an inductive strategy to analyse 
qualitative data.  
 
Meuser and Nigel (1991) suggested that qualitative interviews with experts are 
most effective when analysed by using six subsequent steps. First, the 
interviews have to be transcribed. The authors pointed out that only the relevant 
passages have to be transcribed and that a system of notification is not 
essential. Second, the interviews have to be paraphrased and relevant 
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passages have to be clustered according to the various subject themes. Third, 
a headline should then be added to the paraphrased passages. Fourth, the 
researcher reaches the level of the individual case by comparing the headlines 
and passages of the individual interviews with one another. After that 
sociological drafting takes place by linking the primary data with sociological 
terminology. The final step is the theoretical generalisation of the results.  
 
Both methods provide useful techniques in analysing the collected data. For the 
purpose of this research, both methods have been combined into a five-step 
analysis process. 
 
Step 1: Transcription 
 
After the exploratory interviews had been conducted, the tapes were 
transcribed within two days by the author in order to get clarity and a feeling for 
the data even though the literature suggests that interviews can be transcribed 
by other people than the researcher.  
Step 2: Creation of themes 
 
The author read through the transcribed notes several times to get a feeling for 
the data and content. Notes and comments were made for each interview, after 
which compared against each other. These led to the creation of relevant 
themes and research subjects/questions in conjunction with the literature review.   
 
Step 3: Selection of statements and allocation to specific themes 
 
After the themes had been created, the transcriptions were read through again 
in order to obtain relevant statements. These statements were allocated to the 
specific themes. 
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Step 4: Comparison of statements within the specific themes 
 
The individual statements within the specific themes were compared with each 
other to distinguish similarities and differences.  
 
Step 5: Conclusions and Development 
 
From the data generated in previous stage, statements were compared with the 
literature to develop conclusions to build research questions to aid in the next 
stage of data collection. 
 
5.2.2 Qualitative Interviews 
 
The whole process of collecting qualitative research data took place over a 
period of six months divided into three phases. In the preparation stage, a 
sample was created by means of content analysis. Then the questionnaire was 
designed and pilot tested before it was sent out and collected. The last stage 
includes analysis of the questionnaire interviews.  
 
5.2.2.1 Preparation Phase – Creating a Sample 
 
When conducting a survey, one of the most important steps is to select a 
suitable sampling frame. The benefits include ensuring accurate and reliable 
results. Researchers have the choice between conducting a census or choosing 
a sample survey. Bryman and Bell (2007, 182) define census as the 
‘enumeration of an entire population which involves data collection in relation to 
all units in a population, rather than in relation to a sample of units in that 
population’. The initial plan was to conduct a consensus of experts on DPRK 
hence an accurate and up-to-base database on all experts were needed. 
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However, there are no such lists of names and addresses available. As such, a 
list had to be specifically created by the researcher. Therefore a content 
analysis was carried out.  
 
The first step was conducted during the literature review stage where a list of 
authors, who have published books, journals, magazines and newspapers on 
topics relating to DPRK were collected and analysed. Topics relating to science 
and arts were rejected due to the nature of this research. At this juncture, a total 
of 140 potential experts were found. The next step included an analysis of 
websites related to DPRK. More potential candidates were found as a result of 
extending the search from the initial list of candidates, whose organisation 
websites included other DPRK experts, as well exploring research think tanks 
(e.g. USA and UK) and universities offering DPRK studies located worldwide. 
During the course of collecting the survey interviews, respondents also offered 
names of other experts not covered during the two stages of analysis. Finally, a 
total of 150 experts along with their email and postal addresses were compiled.   
 
5.2.2.2 Designing the Questionnaire 
 
This section deals with issues related to questionnaire design (i.e. lay-out 
considerations, length of questionnaire, covering letter and pilot testing) 
whereas questions relating to the questionnaire (i.e. questions relating to the 
research areas) will be dealt with in later chapters. 
 
Neuman (2006, 277) noted that a good questionnaire ‘avoids confusion and 
keep the respondent’s perspective in mind’. Saunders et al. (2007, 356) notes 
that the design of the questionnaire will affect the response rate and the 
reliability and validity of the data collected. They emphasise that careful design 
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of individual questions, a clear layout of the questionnaire form, a lucid 
explanation of the purpose of the questionnaire, pilot testing and a carefully 
planned and executed administration of the survey are crucial points in reaching 
a good response rate and ensure validity and reliability.  
 
The length of the qualitative survey was always an issue. As this is an inductive 
qualitative research, the objective was to gather the opinions of experts from all 
over the world, the length of the survey would be longer than usual. However, 
Saunders et al. (2003) recommended that a questionnaire between four and 
eight A4 pages. Hence, care was taken to ensure that it is no longer than eight 
A4 pages. In order for the questionnaire to be manageable for the respondents, 
the questions were separated into different themes.  
 
May (2001, 10) emphasise that ‘the most important part of the actual design of 
questions is to construct them unambiguously and to be clear in your own mind 
what the question is for, who it is to be answered by and how you intend to 
interpret them.’ Bryman and Bell (2007) also lists several rules for designing 
and wording the questions, including bearing in mind the research questions, 
avoiding long and general questions, using simplest language possible to 
convey the meaning of the question, eliminating vague words in order to avoid 
vague answers and ensuring that the respondents have the necessary 
knowledge to answer the questions. As it is an inductive research, open-ended 
questions were used to allow respondents to give their answers in their own 
way. The questions also do not suggest certain kinds of answer to respondents 
resulting in the ability to tap the levels of knowledge and understanding of 
issues. The questions were derived from the literature search and exploratory 
interviews conducted in the first stage.  
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The cover letter, which explains the purpose of the survey and sought to obtain 
cooperation from potential respondents, is as important as the survey itself. 
Dillman (2000) noted that a covering letter will affect the response rate. As the 
qualitative survey is being conducted through electronic sources, the pre-
contact e-mail served as the covering letter. This includes a personal salutation 
as all the respondents are known by name; a brief introduction of the 
researcher and the description and purpose of the research project; a 
reassurance of confidentiality and anonymity and finally contact details of the 
research ‘team’. The statement of confidentiality and anonymity protects 
respondents’ identity but also increases their willingness to take part in the 
survey (Bryman and Bell 2007 and Saunders et al. 2007). Respondents were 
offered a summary of the findings as an incentive. A copy of the covering e-mail 
can be found in Appendix IV.  
 
Pilot testing is not solely to do with trying to ensure that survey questions 
operate well, as it also has a role in ensuring that the research instrument as a 
whole functions well (Bryman and Bell 2007). Oppenheim (1992, 64) adds that 
‘studies which have been adequately piloted, or not piloted at all, will find that a 
great deal of effort has been wasted on unintelligible questions and 
uninterpretable results.’ Because of the relatively small sample size, it was 
decided to test the survey on the eight interview respondents in the exploratory 
interview stage as well as three academics from Plymouth Business School/UK. 
All pilot testers were contacted and asked whether they were willing to test the 
qualitative survey. They then received an e-mail with the survey attached. They 
were asked to assess whether the questionnaire flows, the instructions are 
adequate, the wordings of the items and format are clear, and the survey takes 
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a reasonable time to complete it. On the length of the questionnaire, some 
experts suggested deleting some questions to ensure that the time taken to 
complete is not too long. One expert mentioned that he took an hour to 
complete the pre-tested questionnaire while the shortest time was 20 minutes. 
Experts and academics were happy with the layout and wording of the 
questions. All in all, the pilot testing proved to be useful, as modifications 
according to the recommendations of the pilot testers improved the quality of 
the final survey (Appendix V).  
 
The final qualitative interview relates to research question 1 and 3-6 covering 
the following five themes – politics, economics, infrastructure, managerial and 
spatial. The questions have been developed through analysis of the exploratory 
findings and literature review.  
 
RQ1 is linked with politics, economics and infrastructure. Under politics, experts 
were asked to comment on DPRK’s political situation with the countries in the 
six-party talks and the interests/strategies of the respective countries towards 
DPRK. Experts were asked to give their opinions on the most likely scenario to 
take place in DPRK within the next five to seven years. The possibility and 
process of a reunified Korea was proposed to the experts together with the 
drivers of political change in DPRK. Under economics, experts were given three 
scenarios and asked to comment the economic strategies needed and the 
potential financial sources under each.  
 
RQ3 is linked with the infrastructure theme. Experts were asked to rank the 
transport infrastructure priorities for DPRK amongst seven factors. 
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RQ4 is linked with the managerial theme where experts ascertain the 
possibilities of DPRK managers assuming managerial positions in the future 
and the different skills and knowledge which their managers can acquire.  
 
RQ5 and RQ6 are considered under the spatial theme where experts were 
asked to commend the different industries that DPRK can focus in and the main 
markets for DPRK -made products.  
 
5.2.2.3 Distribution of Questionnaire 
 
After the process of designing the final questionnaire was completed, the next 
step was to decide on the distribution method. In addition, the timing of 
questionnaire distribution must be considered as well as it might have an impact 
on the response rate. Gillham (2000, 46) suggests ‘avoiding mailings at holiday 
periods or when organisations are likely to be closed, or exceptionally busy’. In 
view of this consideration, it was decided to approach the experts in March 
2007.  
 
The next decision relates to the actual distribution method of the questionnaire 
with the options being between online and/or postal methods. Online 
questionnaires can be administered via e-mail or a website. The latter option 
was not considered due to the time, effort and problems in creating a website. 
In some instances, the website might be incompatible and inaccessible due to 
security restrictions on the computers. The remaining options are electronic 
mail and/or postal distribution. Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008, 104) highlighted 
the following advantages and disadvantages of using e-mail questionnaires, 
which is increasingly popular as a reliable research method. Advantages 
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include - the relative low cost as it saves on postal charges; access to 
geographically dispersed population; access to individuals or groups who are 
difficult to reach; and response time is shorter as the mailing route becomes 
irrelevant. However, the disadvantages are – lack of interest and motivation; 
distrust in confidentiality; landing in ‘spam file’; and a relatively new method in 
research. Postal questionnaire offers the advantage of anonymity and avoid 
interviewer bias. On the contrary, they have low response rates and 
researchers cannot control the conditions under which the questionnaire is 
conducted resulting in response bias. Griffis et al. (2003, 255) conducted a 
study comparing the differences between web-based and mail survey methods 
and found that web-based surveys are ‘comparable in quality and achieve 
quicker response as well as somewhat higher response rates, with the added 
ability to collect valuable information about the respondent’s survey completion 
process’. Cobanoglu et al. (2002, 442) whose research also found that web 
surveys have faster response rates, noted that ‘research on mixed-mode 
surveys has suggested that employing more than one method for collecting 
survey data is acceptable and usually yields a higher response rate’. It was 
decided that e-mail surveys would be the main distribution method 
supplemented by postal survey where there is non-response from the list of 
experts. 
 
In preparation for the e-mail survey, the research followed the guidelines 
suggested by Saunders et al. (2007, 390). In March 2007, a pre-survey email 
(Appendix IV) was sent individually to the initial 150 potential candidates to 
seek their consent to participate in the survey. The email included a brief 
introduction of the researcher and the University as well as the purpose of this 
151 
 
research. It also included the option of receiving a copy of the research findings 
upon completion of the research. After the first round of pre-survey contact was 
sent out, a mixture of responses were received. Some e-mails returned as ‘not 
deliverable’ while there were non-responses and those who rejected to 
participate in the survey. A second e-mail was sent out two weeks later to those 
experts who did not respond to the initial e-mail. Finally, a postal questionnaire 
was sent out four weeks after the pre-survey contact, to all the non-respondents 
who did not respond to the first and second e-mail although the effect was not 
great with only few experts responding positively. The first batch of e-mail 
questionnaire was sent out together with a covering e-mail at the end of March 
2007.  The importance of follow-up e-mails for increasing the response rate was 
mentioned by various authors (Bryman and Bell 2007; Collis and Hussey 2009 
and Saunders et al. 2007). The first follow-up e-mails were sent out two weeks 
later to all recipients thanking early respondents and reminding non-
respondents to answer with a copy of the questionnaire included. Three weeks 
later, a second follow up e-mail was sent to those who had not responded. At 
the same time, 10 new potential experts were provided by other respondents so 
a new batch of emails was sent out periodically between April and June 2007. 
The overall response rate will be discussed in the next section.  
 
5.2.2.4 Response Rate 
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) note that one of the factors that will affect the 
quality of the data provided is the relevance of the research to the interviewees. 
Most respondents showed a high interest in the research project. This is 
illustrated by the fact that a majority of respondents (60.5%) indicated that they 
were interested to receive a summary of the findings.  
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After the pre-survey contact, a total of 50 experts responded positively by 
indicating that they will be willing to take part in the survey and questionnaires 
were sent to them together with a covering letter. Seventeen e-mail addresses 
returned a ‘not deliverable’ response and efforts were made to trace updated e-
mail and postal addresses where possible and new pre-survey contact emails 
were sent. There were 43 non-responses and postal surveys were sent to their 
available addresses. 30 experts chose not to participate in the survey by 
replying that they have either ‘retired’, ‘have not conducted research on DPRK 
for a long time’, ‘do not have time’ or ‘not interested in the research project’. A 
further 10 experts were contacted after their contacts were given by earlier 
respondents and three of them responded positively.  
 
After the first round of surveys was collected after two weeks, 18 questionnaires 
were returned. The two follow-up e-mails proved to be a good tactic, with a 
further 20 additional questionnaires returned. However, some of the initial 
experts who responded positively did not returned the questionnaires after two 
follow up e-mails. All in all, 38 (which is 31.6%) out of a possible of 120 experts 
responded.  
 
5.2.2.5 Analysing Qualitative Data 
 
After collecting the primary data, it had to be analysed to answer the research 
questions and to facilitate the next stage of research. In this stage, the analysis 
follows a three-step process.  
 
Step 1: Review of Transcripts 
 
Notes and comments were made for each individual interview.  
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Step 2: Selection and Comparison of Statements 
 
The transcripts were read through again in order to select relevant statements. 
The individual statements within each specific subject themes are then 
compared with each other in order to filter differences and/or similarities. 
 
Step 3: Conclusions 
 
From the data generated in previous stages, conclusions were drawn. These 
conclusions were then used to answer the research questions developed earlier.  
 
5.2.3 Quantitative Survey 
 
The quantitative research phrase was conducted concurrently with the 
qualitative phrase. It took several months to complete and was partially 
conducted in ROK. The author received a scholarship from the Korea 
Foundation to conduct research in ROK. The author was attached with a 
Korean research institute, whose Korean researchers assisted in translating the 
survey and also provided a forwarding address for the questionnaire to be 
received. The main reasons of surveying ROK SMEs and logistics companies 
are the difficulty of entering into DPRK to collect any reliable data and any 
investment in DPRK would be conducted by ROK and foreign companies. ROK 
companies were selected based on the ease of access as compared to 
Chinese or Russian companies. ROK’s main political interest in DPRK is to 
ensure peace in the peninsula and also to boost DPRK’s economy. In the event 
of a reunification or collapse, many experts interviewed earlier believed that 
ROK, together with China would be the country that will invest the most in 
DPRK. At the moment, ROK has established an industrial complex in Kaesong, 
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just across the border of ROK. Economically, SMEs have a strong interest as it 
helps to lower their operational costs through cheaper land and labour costs.  
 
This quantitative research process has been carried out in various stages. First, 
a sample was created. The questionnaires were designed and pilot-tested 
before being distributed and collected. The last stage involved data preparation 
and analysis to test the research questions and scenarios developed after the 
qualitative research stage. All these stages will be described in the following 
sections.  
5.2.3.1 Preparation Phase – Creating a Sample 
 
At present, ROK SMEs form the majority of the companies investing in Kaesong 
and other parts of DPRK. Hence, the initial plan was to survey ROK SMEs. 
According to the Korean Federation of Small and Medium Business, an 
enterprise is defined as a SME if it has less than 300 workers. In addition, for 
each industry, the capital and sales are capped at different amounts. For 
example, in the manufacturing industry, the enterprise should have a capital 
worth of US$8million or less. A table with the different sectors including the 
number of workers and capital and sales are included in Appendix VI. 
According to the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business, there are 
about 3 million SMEs in ROK, which also corresponds to the possible sample 
size of our research. Due to time constraints of the research process and 
difficulty in obtaining membership lists from the SME business organisations, it 
was not possible to sample all of the SMEs. On the advice of the ROK research 
institute that the author was attached with, it was decided to create a list from 
those SMEs who have expressed an interest in investing in DPRK. The main 
reason being they are more likely to invest in DPRK and their 
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decisions/opinions will have an effect on the policies surrounding DPRK. With 
the assistance of the research institute, the author managed to obtain a list of 
potential investors who have expressed an interest in investing in DPRK, from 
the corporation in charge of developing the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The 
list includes the names of CEOs or high level managers, postal addresses and 
contact details of the companies. A breakdown of the overall sample and their 
sectors is listed in Table 5.1.    
 
According to private sources, a number of ROK logistics and shipping 
companies have conducted businesses in various parts of DPRK. Through the 
Korean International Freight Forwarders Association, a list of logistics 
companies who have had previous experiences in DPRK and those who 
expressed interest in investing in DPRK, were obtained. The list includes the 
names of CEOs or high level managers, postal addresses and contact details of 
the companies. 
 
Table 5.1: Sample Frame for the Quantitative Survey 
Sectors Number of Companies 
Hotel 10 
Transportation/Equipment 18 
Finance 20 
Non-metal products 20 
Minerals/Ore 20 
Information Technology service 23 
Leisure (tourism/golf) 24 
Agricultural 25 
Basic metals 25 
Information Technology 25 
Petroleum/Chemical 25 
Machinery 28 
Food Processing 30 
Paper and Pulp 30 
Electrical/Electronics 90 
Textile 90 
Total 506 
Source: Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business 
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5.2.3.2 Designing the Questionnaire 
 
This section will discuss issues related to questionnaire design whereas specific 
details related to the actual content of the questionnaire will be dealt with at a 
later chapter. Hague (1993, 41) listed eight rules guiding the framing of the 
questionnaire. Firstly, the researcher should think about the objectives of the 
survey and how it will be carried out.  Respondents’ knowledge and interest is 
also an important factor as it will determine whether they will respond to the 
questionnaire. A good covering letter is important as it will capture the attention 
of the reader. Next, the order and types of questions is also important as it will 
affect the possible answers and also how the data will be processed.  
 
Saunders et al. (2007, 358) note that the length of the questionnaire should be 
restricted to six-eight A4 pages with the maximum of twelve pages as deemed 
feasible by Gillman (2000). Rea and Parker (2005, 46) notes that ‘the purpose 
of being sensitive to questionnaire length is to make certain that the 
questionnaire is not so long and cumbersome to the respondent that it 
engenders reluctance to complete the survey instrument, thereby jeopardising 
the response rate.’ It is recommended that for postal questionnaires, the time to 
complete it should take less 30 minutes or less. The aim of the research was to 
restrict the questionnaire to five-six A4 pages in the form of a user-friendly 
booklet. Layout of the questionnaire is also an important factor. Instructions 
should be orderly and clear so that respondents can fill in the questionnaire 
conveniently.  
 
Designing and wording the questions can be a tedious process which requires 
putting careful thoughts into the whole process. Bryman and Bell (2007) classify 
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the types of questions into several categories. First there are personal factual 
questions, i.e. personal information such as age, gender, education, 
employment status, income etc. Second, there are informant factual questions, 
i.e. respondents are placed in the position of informants rather than answering 
questions about themselves. They are asked questions about the size of the 
organisation they work for, who owns it etc. Next, there are questions about 
attitudes. Likert scale is one of the most frequently used formats for 
measurement. Fourth, there are questions asking respondents’ beliefs. Fifth, 
there are questions about normative standards and values. Lastly, there are 
questions to ‘test respondents’ knowledge in an area. This research will use 
questions related to personal and informant factual questions and questions 
about attitudes and beliefs. Saunders et al. (2007) highlighted six types of 
closed questions. First, respondents may be offered a list of items, any of which 
may be selected. Second, respondents may be asked to selected only one 
response from a given set of categories. Third, respondents may be asked to 
rank items. Fourth, rating questions are used to collect opinion data. Fifth, 
quantity questions are used to give the amount of a characteristic, e.g. year of 
birth. Finally, there are grid questions recording responses to two or more 
similar questions at the same time. With the exception of the fifth and sixth 
category, all other categories have been used in the questionnaire.  
 
The importance of a good covering letter has been discussed earlier. A 
covering letter must be carefully designed as it helps to seek cooperation from 
respondents and it is the first thing which they see when they receive the postal 
package. The covering letter includes the University logo to emphasise the 
seriousness of the project, a personal salutation (whenever the name of the 
158 
 
contact was known), a brief description of the research project, clear 
instructions on what to do, reassurance of the confidentiality and anonymity, 
and contact details of the researcher. A summary of the findings was offered as 
an incentive as this is normal practice in academic surveys.  
 
Pilot testing is a crucial stage of every questionnaire survey as it enables one to 
‘refine the questionnaire so that respondents will have no problems in 
answering the questions and there will be no problems in recording the data’ 
(Saunders et al. 2007, 386). Due to the small sample size, it was decided to test 
both questionnaires on ROK researchers, business and government officials 
rather than on the sample members. The pilot size involved 25 people, mainly 
ROK researchers in the research institute where the author was based, and 
several officials from business organisations and the government. All pilot 
testers were contacted either by telephone or e-mail beforehand to ask their 
participation in testing the questionnaire. They then received the covering letter, 
the actual questionnaire (in Korean and in the form of a booklet), and a ‘Free 
Return’ addressed envelope by post. They were asked to comment whether the 
questionnaire flows, the instructions are adequate, the wordings of the items 
and format are clear, and the survey takes a reasonable time to complete it. All 
of the pilot testers were happy with the length of the questionnaire as it took 
them between 15-30 minutes to complete the questionnaire. Some suggested 
re-wording some questions regarding the section on ‘factors affecting the 
organisations decisions to invest in DPRK as it appears ambiguous. Most are 
happy with the layout of the questionnaire. The pilot testing proved to be a 
valuable exercise as the modifications according to the recommendations of the 
pilot testers helped improve the quality of the final questionnaire.  
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The first page of both questionnaires covered questions regarding the 
companies’ characteristics. Both questionnaires begin with a question relating 
to the size of the companies. The companies were asked about their annual 
revenue in the previous year. One questionnaire in the SMEs questionnaire 
inquired about the industries the companies were associated with. A similar 
question was asked in the logistics companies’ questionnaire about the types of 
industries served.  
 
RQ2 is linked with question nine in the SMEs questionnaire. Respondents were 
asked to state their location preference for future investment in DPRK.  
 
RQ3 is considered in question eight in the SMEs questionnaire where 
respondents were asked about the main transport mode when exporting goods 
out of DPRK.  
 
RQ5 is linked with question seven in the SMEs questionnaire where 
respondents were asked to indicate the export destination of their products. 
 
RQ6 is linked with question five in the SMEs questionnaire. Respondents were 
asked to list up to three industries to be invested in DPRK. 
 
RQ7 incorporates a block of factors in question eleven of both the 
questionnaires relating to the importance of each factor when considering the 
organisation’s decision to locate investment in DPRK. In order to generate data 
to test the research questions, scales for the eight themes as well as a 
measurement needs to be included. There are two options – drawing from 
existing studies and creating new scales. Bryman and Bell (2007) stated that it 
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is a common practice to use pre-tested variables as it enables the researcher to 
make comparison with other studies. On the other hand, if such variables do not 
exist or do not serve the purpose of the research, it is advisable to create new 
variables based on the understanding of the research topic and develop 
‘measures which have desirable reliability and validity properties’ (Churchill 
1979, 65). This research uses a mix of pre-tested variables and new variables 
as the author felt that this research is unique and not replicable entirely through 
the use of another study. All variables were subject to discussion in the pilot 
testing phase and minor changes to the wordings were made on the advice of 
some pilot testers. Appendix VII and VIII lists all questions relating to the 58 
variables under eight themes asking respondents to state the importance of the 
location determinants on a 5-point-Likert-scale. The following paragraphs 
discuss the variables. 
 
Politics have been measured in many different ways. MacCarthy and 
Atthirawong (2003) used four items measuring stability, structure, consistency 
of policy and attitude towards investment. Oum and Park (2004) only used two 
variables – pro-business government and officials and political stability. 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) used eight variables including stability of 
government policies, protection of foreign investment and level of government 
support. Attitudes of local and state governments have been measured as a 
factor which is closely linked to the level of bureaucracy (Galbraith and De 
Noble 1988). Adis (2005) in the study on transition economies such as 
Lithuania used the level of corruption as a measure to determine political risk. In 
view of the above studies, this study has incorporated six variables, including 
two new variables for political theme. ‘Government and officials support 
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businesses have combined several measures such as presence of support 
agencies and level of government support. Under ‘political stability, with nuclear 
issue resolved’, consideration was given to the current situation where experts 
in the exploratory study commented that solving the nuclear issue is of utmost 
importance. A new variable was created with the tensions in the Korean 
Peninsula with the interests of other stakeholders such as China and the USA 
in mind, this variable ‘Regional Stability’ measures how important it is desired. 
‘Bureaucracy is not excessive’ refers to the levels of red-tape with the local and 
state government. The perception on corruption is important for DPRK where 
corruption is prevalent in transition economies like China and Vietnam hence 
the measure of ‘the risk of corruption is low’. The last variable, ‘there is potential 
for unification’, measures the possibility that with the unification of both Koreas, 
FDI will increase. 
 
Economic sub-factors encompass thirteen variables which are partly adopted 
from various studies with new variables created. ‘SEZs’ and ‘competitive 
financial sector’ was adopted from Oum and Park (2004). Availability of SEZs 
will attract potential investors with economic incentives while a competitive 
financial sector provides assurance to investors that there are interest rates is 
competitive and not monopolistic. ‘Clustering of common industries’ has been 
advocated in many location studies as a determinant for location choice. ‘Good 
levels of local and regional development’, a new variable, measures whether 
development in areas other than Pyongyang and Kaesong will attract potential 
investors. ‘Reforms encouraging a market economy’ and ‘an open market 
economy’ ascertains the importance of a market economy on potential investors 
as DPRK maintains a military-first economy which is only aimed at keeping the 
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military strong. ‘Low levels of exchange rate risk’ and ‘few currency restrictions’, 
which has been used by Urata and Kwai (2000), refers to the volatility of 
exchange rate and the ability of investors to transfer money out from DPRK. 
‘Culture which encourages high profits’ affects the profits of investors. Since 
July 2002 reforms, managers are encourage to make profits for their entities. 
‘Low set up costs for new local establishments’ and ‘state financial incentives’ 
focuses on the policies which encourages investors to set up business with low 
costs and more tax incentives.  
 
Infrastructure measures the availability of transport facilities, energy, 
telecommunications and logistics facilities. This study adopts the measures 
used in MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003) which covers the access to airports, 
rail, road, ports; supplies of energy and water; access to domestic markets; 
telecommunications infrastructure; and logistics facilities.   
 
Legal covers seven sub-factors which have been partly adopted from 
MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003) and Oum and Park (2004) and newly 
created variables as neither study was deemed to have covered the appropriate 
measures. MacCarthy and Atthirawong’s (2003) measures covered ‘laws 
governing logistics practices’, ‘payment methods are flexible’, ‘clear rules 
governing regulations and contracts’ while Oum and Park (2004) used 
‘immigration policies are flexible’ and ‘personal income taxes for foreign 
employees are low’ as their measure of regulatory framework. The last two 
measures, ‘labour and tax laws do not change suddenly’ and ‘new regulations 
are not suddenly imposed’ are added due to the nature of doing business in 
DPRK where it has been found that wages of local workers were increased 
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without any pre-warning and regulations were imposed on ROK companies in 
Kaesong.  
 
Managerial sub-factors are newly created variables based on the analysis of the 
literature and exploratory study. Investors are asked to consider the importance 
the DPRK managers have ‘good knowledge of logistics concepts’, ‘sufficient 
management experience’, ‘good knowledge of management concepts’ and ‘are 
keen to accept new technologies’.  
 
Spatial covers ten sub-factors with focus on market related variables. Some of 
the variables were taken from Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005). These include – 
‘good supply of plentiful and cheap land’, ‘close proximity to markets’, 
‘availability of raw materials’, and ‘proximity to major suppliers’. Newly created 
variables which are specific to DPRK include the following - ‘Gaining a 
bridgehead into the DPRK markets’, ‘promise of new markets for DPRK 
products’, ‘availability of natural resources’, ‘lack of sizable markets’, ‘limited 
purchasing power of local markets’, and ‘good access to markets in China and 
Japan’. 
 
Social comprises of six sub-factors which assess the quality of life and cultural 
factors. All except one, ‘Cultural affinity with other Koreans’ was adopted from 
MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003). The new variable assesses the historical 
links between both Koreas. Other measures include – ‘good housing, schools, 
environmental amenities’, ‘a pool of educated labour with requisite skills’, 
‘common culture and language’, ‘availability of industrial estates’ and ‘good 
supply of low labour cost’ 
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Organisational comprises of three sub-factors which has been partly adopted 
from Oum and Park (2004). ‘Plentiful modern logistics service providers and 
costs’ have been viewed as an important factor in assessing logistics 
companies’ decisions in locating warehouses in Northeast Asia. Other 
measures added include – ‘good logistics linkages and accessibility’ and ‘good 
logistics distribution system’.  
 
RQ8 is linked with question five and seven to nine in the logistics companies’ 
questionnaire. Respondents were asked to tick three types of logistics services 
being provided in their organisations. They were also asked to indicate, if any, 
any past or present logistics operations in DPRK. For those who indicated 
positively, they were inquired about the locations covered as well as volume 
transported.   
 
The fifth and last page of both questionnaires covered questionnaires scanning 
managers’ characteristics. Respondents were asked to fill in their job title to 
identify their position in their organisation. They were also asked to tick their 
experience in the industry and their organisation. 
 
5.2.3.3 Distribution of Questionnaire 
 
After the process of designing of the questionnaires (Appendix VII and VIII) has 
been completed, the distribution was carried out. Several factors need to be 
considered when deciding on the distribution – timing and distribution method. 
The distribution processes started in August 2007 and was completed in 
January 2008.  
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A decision had to be made concerning the actual distribution method of the 
questionnaires, i.e. self-administered and interviewer-administered 
questionnaires. The former include internet-mediated, postal and delivery and 
collection questionnaires while the latter include telephone questionnaire and 
structure interview. The advantages and disadvantages of online and postal 
questionnaires have been discussed in earlier. Delivery and collection 
questionnaires are similar to postal distribution. They have the additional 
advantage of higher likelihood of response rate due to respondent participation 
in delivery and collection. However it is time consuming due to the distance and 
time needed to travel to each likely candidate in the sample. Telephone 
questionnaires ensure rapid data collection, possible costs savings, greater 
anonymity than in-person interview and assurance that instructions are followed. 
However, it is difficult to establish credibility and trust with respondents over a 
telephone and the interviewer has less control over the interview situation as 
the respondent can easily end the interview at any time. Web-based 
questionnaires, delivery and collection questionnaires, and telephone 
questionnaires were rejected due to several reasons. The web-based 
questionnaire option was abandoned because of the time and problems in 
developing a web-base questionnaire. Delivery and collection was rejected as 
the SMEs and logistics companies are spread out all over ROK and the time 
and distance incurred in travelling to each respondent will result in high costs. 
Telephone questionnaires were abandoned due to the lack of credibility 
resulting in low response rates. The choice was therefore limited to e-mail 
distribution and postal distribution. The list obtained did not contain the e-mail 
address of the CEOs/general managers hence efforts were made to contact the 
company through telephone to obtain their e-mail addresses. However, many of 
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the companies were unwilling to provide these details. Hence, the postal 
distribution method was chosen. 
 
The postal package comprised of the covering letter, the actual questionnaire 
(in Korean and in the form of a booklet), and a ‘Free Return’ addressed 
envelope, which is more cost-efficient in comparison to stamped envelopes, as 
only the actual responses are charged. A ‘Free Return’ envelope also makes it 
easier and more convenient for the respondent to return the questionnaires.  A 
total of 503 postal and 250 packages for SMEs and logistics companies 
respectively were sent out on 1 August 2007. The importance of follow-up 
letters for gaining a higher overall response has been advocated by various 
authors (Bryman and Bell 2007, Gillman 2000 and Sauders et al. 2007). 
Following the recommendations by Dillman (2000), a special covering letter was 
created for the second and third mailing, highlighting the importance of their 
contribution to the research and reiterating the objectives of the research 
project. Additional mailings in October and November 2007 led to an improved 
overall response rate, which will be discussed in the next section.      
 
5.2.3.4 Response Rate 
 
A total of 503 and 250 questionnaires were sent out to the ROK SMEs and 
logistics companies respectively in the first batch, of which 25 SMEs and 20 
logistics companies’ completed questionnaires were returned. The first follow-
up letters four weeks later proved to be a good strategy, with a return of another 
40 SMEs and 20 logistics companies’ questionnaires. A second follow-up letter 
was sent five weeks after the second batch to encourage more response, 
another 15 SMEs and 10 logistics companies’ questionnaires were received. All 
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in all, 88 (17.5%) SMEs and 50 (20%) logistics companies responded. Out of 88 
SMEs, eight responses were excluded due to incomplete data. Finally, 80 
usable responses remained in the database. All logistics companies’ 
questionnaires remained usable. The rest of the companies were contacted and 
asked for their reasons for not responding to the questionnaires. Some of the 
reasons given included lack of time of the CEOs/managers, a corporate policy 
of not filling in any questionnaires and no interest in the research project. Even 
though the response rate is lower than recommended, it is acceptable due to 
the sensitive nature of this research. In addition, no similar studies have been 
conducted in these areas previously.  
 
5.2.3.5 Analysing Quantitative Data 
 
After the quantitative data collection process has been completed, the data 
analysis process began. This section provides a brief overview of the data 
analysis process and techniques used. The choice of analysis methods is 
determined by the research questions and hypotheses. Hair Jr. et al. (2007) 
recommend several steps before conducting data analysis. First, the conceptual 
framework and relationships to be studied should be reviewed. Secondly, the 
data obtained from the questionnaire survey should be prepared for analysis. 
This includes data coding and recoding, checking for any errors or non-
responses to questions. SPSS has been chosen as the software for data 
preparation and analysis. Third, descriptive statistics such as frequency tables 
and cross-tabs are used to describe the characteristics of the sample size. Data 
relating to the research questions have been analysed using sound statistical 
methods, i.e. multivariate analysis, in order to examine the relationships, 
differences and trends between variables. Subsequent analysis was carried out 
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using factor analysis (in the form of a principal component analysis) in order to 
reduce the data set and to identify the underlying factors determining ROK 
SMEs’ and logistics companies’ investment in DPRK.   
 
5.3 Ethical Considerations 
 
A pragmatic research philosophy has been adopted to tackle multifaceted 
research questions, which require mixed methods. The relativist view of 
ontology which was selected raises a range of ethical issues relating to both 
data collection and analysis. The nature of the focus of interest in DPRK is 
inevitably controversial, with limited information available and substantial scope 
for suspicion of motivation amongst respondents, gatekeepers and authorities. 
For these reasons, some of the ethical considerations are reported here.  
 
With a very limited numbers of experts to draw on, a clear ethical policy guided 
both the scope of questions discussed with experts, and the process of 
conducting interviews, and recording and analysing data. Inevitably the 
recruitment method employed in preliminary interviews involved theoretical 
sampling to glean the range of expert views available.    
 
A protocol was established which reflects both the sensitivity of dealing with 
both a sensitive regime and a requirement to respect the rights of respondents 
and their views relating to sensitive issues. The protocol for managing 
interviews differed slightly from that for managing questionnaire surveys 
because of pragmatic differences in philosophy and data collection processes in 
each phase of the research, but the same principles underpinned both.  
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To ensure that informed consent was obtained, the intended participants were 
fully informed about the nature, purpose and use of research and their role 
within it. All participants were volunteers and were briefed clearly before 
meeting as to the purposes of the research and why their input is considered 
valuable.  They were informed about the type of information being collected and 
how it would be used to further the research.  Given the limited prior published 
material, a relatively informal inductive variant of grounded theory was applied 
to analyse interviews and identify issues to develop in later interviews.  
 
Openness and honesty protocols were implemented by explaining the scope of 
the project, and its objectives in a clear and transparent manner, and intentions 
for using the research data gathered.  
 
All participants were offered the right to withdraw at any stage in the process, 
and as willing volunteers, no conditions attained to qualify this right. 
Interviewees were informed that they had the right to withdraw from the 
research at any time, and that their data will be removed and destroyed upon 
their instruction.  Protection from harm considerations were not directly 
applicable, except possibly in that all interactions remained confidential to 
researcher and participant, and neither the occurrence, timing nor content of 
any engagement was released to any third party.  
 
In terms of debriefing, an executive summary of the outcomes of the research 
project was offered to questionnaire survey participants who requested it, but 
although this was not possible in interviews, any reasonable requests for 
information by participants were offered as fully and openly as possible. 
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Given the inherent sensitivity of research within the area of security certain 
ethical considerations need to be stressed prior to conducting research 
involving a third party. At no point did any issues raised come within the scope 
of for example the Official Secrets Act and hence no vetting, clearance or 
caveats involving organisations or nations were required. To ensure the 
confidentiality of responses, formal coding of interviews and pre-interviews was 
avoided, relying on an informal process of model building which removed any 
scope for third party interference or disclosure of potentially sensitive 
information. Given that the purpose of the qualitative phases of data collection 
were essentially problem framing and scenario building, any superficial loss of 
rigour attributable to this process was much less significant than ensuring 
confidentiality and hence encouraging maximum participation in the research 
process. Throughout the data collection process, the inalienable rights of 
participants to privacy were paramount, as summarised by Saunders (2007 607) 
“relating to the rights of individuals not to participate in research and to their 
treatment where they agree to participate.” 
 
5.4 Summary 
 
This chapter began with an overview of the different research approaches. It 
went on to describe the research philosophy and strategy employed in this 
thesis, justifying the choice of research methods. A mixed methods approach is 
employed using qualitative and quantitative approaches. A summary linking the 
research questions to the qualitative and quantitative questions can be found in 
Table 5.2 below. The next chapter describes the results and discusses the 
exploratory study which helped in obtaining further insights into DPRK. 
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Table 5.2: Linking research questions to questions in qualitative and 
quantitative questionnaires. 
RQ Experts SMEs Logistics Companies 
1 Politics/Economics   
2  Q9  
3 Infrastructure Q1, Q3, Q5, Q8  
4 Managerial   
5 Spatial Q7  
6 Spatial Q5  
7  Q11 (a) – (h) Q11 (a) – (h) 
8   Q5, Q7-9 
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CHAPTER 6 – THE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE EXPLORATORY 
STUDY 
 
This chapter presents the results of the exploratory study based on eight face-
to-face interviews. As mentioned earlier in the previous chapter, these 
interviewees in UK and China were chosen as a result of time and financial 
constraint as well as their knowledge and expertise on DPRK in various fields 
such as politics, market research, economics, humanitarian aid and foreign 
investment. The presentation of the qualitative data includes some direct quotes 
from the interviewees in order to support views and to illustrate the results. The 
quotations are stated anonymously, but with a specific reference to the group of 
interviewees. The qualitative data were analysed using a five-step approach. 
During the course of analysing the exploratory data, several themes emerged – 
politics; economics; infrastructure; managerial; spatial and social. Two further 
themes, legal and organisational, emerged after further analysis of the literature 
after the exploratory analysis.  
 
6.1 Politics  
 
This section deals with the political issues surrounding DPRK, with particular 
reference to the Korean Peninsula.  Interviewees were asked to comment on 
the main political issues affecting the developments in the Korean Peninsula. 
Several interviewees agreed that the nuclear issue is the immediate issue to be 
resolved in order for the country to move forward economically. However, the 
nuclear issue is only a subset of the larger problems which besets DPRK. Any 
long term reconciliation and investment is dependent on the nuclear dispute 
being resolved.   
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Immediate one is the nuclear issue…I see it as a subset of a larger 
set of questions about the future of DPRK, how it will adapt, whether 
it will adapt, (and) how it will become more peaceful. 
[Expert – UK] 
 
Security and weapons of mass destruction are not the only issues. 
It's the question of the relationship between the two Koreas. Not just 
in terms of security but in terms of the economic links between both 
countries. 
[Ex-Government Official – UK] 
 
Another interviewee mentioned the importance of the relationships between 
DPRK and the other countries in the six-party talks – USA, China, Japan, 
Russia and ROK. 
 
The USA and its other four interlocking sides have their priorities, 
obviously, non-proliferation…matching and co-ordinating the 
interests of five powers, who all have their own slightly different 
calculations of their own interests, is not something that will produce 
an instant solution. 
[Government Official – UK] 
 
As mentioned by the expert, all five countries have their own interests and 
stakes in DPRK, cumulating in different possible scenarios for DPRK. The USA 
and ROK would desire peaceful unification on ROK terms and integration while 
China would prefer the status quo scenario. Other scenarios mentioned were – 
collapse and absorption and military conflict. Another expert stated that the 
most likely scenario would be a collapse and unification in the Korean 
Peninsula as the economic situation DPRK is in dire straits, leaving the citizens 
unable to feed themselves. Another argument was put forward advocating 
‘reunification by stealth’. 
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They try to take various strategic bits of the DPRK economy, which 
its citizens are willing to cede control of due to the fact that they do 
not have money. It is a very calculated plan by the ROK and the 
Chinese. For the Chinese, it is opportunist; it’s about securing 
access to the commodities and access to assets and investments. 
For the ROK, if DPRK collapses, they want control of energy, 
telecommunications and whatever that will reduce their overall 
(rebuilding) cost. 
[Expert – Market researcher] 
 
The political situation in DPRK could be precipitated by the sudden death of 
Kim Jong-il, which might result in a power struggle between different factions 
within the Workers Party. However, at this moment, DPRK’s intention is to 
maintain regime survival while at the same time trying to ‘play off’ both China 
and ROK. 
 
6.1.1 Analysis 
 
Chapter 2 introduced the political economy of DPRK stating that research into 
politics tends to focus on nuclear weapons and succession of Kim Jong-Il. The 
interviewees confirmed the view that nuclear issue is at the forefront of the 
dispute in the Korean Peninsula. In order for the country to move forward, the 
resolution of the nuclear issue is imperative. Several interviewees stated that no 
substantial foreign investment will enter the country unless DPRK is willing to 
abandon their nuclear arms. At the moment, DPRK uses the nuclear issue as 
leverage for more humanitarian aid and economic incentives (Elliott 2003).  
 
Another political issue raised up by interviewees is DPRK’s foreign relations 
especially with countries in the six-party talks – ROK, the USA, China, Japan 
and Russia. The roots can be traced back to the Korean War when the USA 
helped ROK while China aided DPRK (Koh 1971). Interviewees mentioned that 
each country have their own interests and stakes in DPRK. The USA and ROK 
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would prefer to have a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula while China wants to 
maintain its stronghold in the region (Shambaugh 2003). The different interests 
have cumulated in different scenarios for DPRK.  
 
Interviewees raised up another point which might hasten the political change in 
DPRK – the death of Kim Jong-ll. Even though a successor has been named, 
however, the power struggle between different factions within the party might 
set off an internal war. 
 
In view of these findings, the author proposes to develop scenarios of DPRK 
and examine their impacts on the transport and logistics development in DPRK 
in order to ascertain the transport and logistics strategies under each scenario. 
 
6.2 Economics 
 
This section discusses the economic issues surrounding DPRK. Experts have 
commented earlier that politics and economics are correlated. In order to solve 
DPRK’s economic woes, political issues need to be resolved. Several issues 
were highlighted under this broad topic – economic conditions, SEZs, farmers’ 
markets, reunification costs, and investment. 
 
As mentioned earlier in the literature review, any statistics on DPRK’s economy 
is extremely difficult to obtain. Even though ROK publishes annual figures on 
DPRK, these are only based on estimates. Experts echoed similar sentiments 
on the lack of reliability of any data published.  
 
Figures are famously difficult. One way that we’ll know that they are 
really reforming is when we get a budget with numbers.  
[Expert – UK] 
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Dire is the word. DPRK is such a unique (country) having achieve a 
second world status and then slid back to third world. DPRK remains 
structurally reliant on external supplies of food and energy.  
[Government Official – UK] 
 
Experts agreed that the July 2002 reform package provided a glimpse of the 
planning inside DPRK and the positive effects only lasted for a short period of 
time. The longer lasting effects were the introduction of younger managers, 
recognition of farmers’ markets and the introduction of competition.  
 
ROK has made much of the fact that the people (DPRK) they are 
dealing with are new and younger. 
[Expert – UK] 
 
There have always been farmers’ markets. But that is pretty long 
way from a market economy. But on the other hand, you are finding 
newer approaches, taking a new interest in western/capitalist 
management techniques. There is an element of changes in a small 
way. More organisations are running like restaurants and taking 
account of what the customers want.  
[Ex-government official – UK] 
 
Experts agreed that the impact of SEZs in DPRK has been a mixed one with 
the main objective to earn hard currency for the State. Rajin-Sonbong and 
Sinuiju experiments were considered unsuccessful due to a lack of budget and 
investment from the government. Kumgang-san and Kaesong Industrial 
Complex was an outflow of the ‘Sunshine Policy’ by Kim Dae Jung. According 
to one expert, it was likened to ‘drip-feeding’ DPRK’s economy. The possibilities 
of other zones springing up have been discussed with various experts. Three of 
them mentioned two possible sites – Nampo (on the East) and Wonsan (on the 
West).  
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I think DPRK are interested in accessing technology. But hard 
currency is the bottom line in a lot of this. In Kaesong, the wages 
which are paid by ROK are a source of hard currency. I think as I 
said that the concept of zones is also a political one. It’s not an 
economic one. For that reason, zones have been patchy in their 
success. 
[Government official – UK] 
 
Kaesong is an outpouring of the ‘Sunshine Policy’ and it is working 
for the ROK people. But it is only the ROK companies who can go in 
there. They repatriate all their money and their products. DPRK gets 
very little out of it. It gets no technology training. 
[Expert – Market researcher] 
 
Nampo is a port and they could get some investment in Wonsan as 
well. I know a lot of people would be interested in some of the 
mining around Wonsan. ROK are doing something about the coal 
mining there. They (NK) do not have a model on how to run an 
economic zone. They should go to Shenzhen, see how it’s done, go 
back and do that. 
[Expert – Academic] 
 
The issue of rebuilding costs under different scenarios was discussed at length 
with the experts. All of them commented that, under any scenarios, ROK should 
be taking the lead in bearing most of the costs with help from international 
financial institutions. However, the interests of other actors will determine the 
role each plays. China is interested in developing the areas around Jilin and 
Heilongjiang and will have substantial interest in developing trade with DRPK. 
Some aid will arrive from Japan due to the historical links between both 
countries. Russia will be able to aid in some infrastructure projects. 
 
6.2.1 Analysis 
 
The interviews revealed that experts viewed the political and economic issues 
as correlated. DPRK must resolve its political conundrums before dire economic 
conditions improve. Interviewees’ comments on the reliability of any published 
178 
 
statistics echoed those in Chapter 2, where in its absence, more qualitative 
rather than quantitative research has been conducted.  
 
Some interviewees commented that DPRK’s experiments with SEZs have been 
rather unsuccessful, notably Sinuiju and Rajin-Sonbong (Young 1999 and Kim 
2001). The purpose of creating SEZs is to earn hard currency and access 
technology. However its failure has been attributed to political and non-political 
factors. As mentioned in Chapter 2, political obstacles include leadership 
subjectivism, overindulgence in Juche ideology, insistence of economic self-
reliance, and fear of economic domination by Japan and ROK (Kim 2001). Non-
political impediments include inefficient transportation and telecommunications 
infrastructure and wrong location decisions. In view of these findings, the author 
proposes to ascertain the locations for future developments as special 
economic zones.  
 
The last issue which the interviewees mentioned is the rebuilding costs under 
different scenarios. They commented that ROK should be the one taking the 
lead in undertaking most of the costs. This mirrors the strategy of ROK which 
has been stealthily supporting DPRK through humanitarian aid and opening of 
Kaesong Industrial Complex to alleviate the economic situation in preparation 
for any potential collapse or reunification (Smith 2005). Estrada and Park (2008) 
evaluated the prospects of unification from a multi-dimensional perspective 
encompassing the political, social, economic and technological dimensions. 
They found that it is likely to be a costly and disruptive process. Park (2001) 
raised the possibilities of international financial institutions like the WB or ADB 
to contribute to the rebuilding process. In summary, the author proposes to 
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ascertain the methods to finance future development projects in DPRK for 
developing scenarios in DPRK. 
 
6.3 Infrastructure  
 
This section discusses the technical issues surrounding DPRK. Several issues 
were highlighted under this topic – cost of rebuilding infrastructure, main 
investment priorities, foreign technology, and business hub. The literature 
review has summarised the dire state of DPRK’s transport and 
telecommunications infrastructure and in urgent need of rebuilding.  
 
Experts were asked to comment on the parties responsible for rebuilding 
DPRK’s infrastructure. They agreed that DPRK alone will not have the means of 
financing the reconstruction and it will not be left to a single country or 
organisation (e.g. World Bank) to provide financing as the costs will be too 
exorbitant. However, it also hinges on the geopolitics as countries such as ROK, 
China, Russia and Japan are all vying for influence in the Peninsula. One 
expert pointed out that for DPRK to obtain funding from international financial 
institutions, the nuclear issue must be resolved and the USA must remove its 
sanctions.  While another suggested that private sector investors might be 
interested in some of the port and rail projects up North. 
 
They [Russians] can do many things but they cannot pay for it. So I 
think Russia will be willing to help, particularly with some of the rail 
work.  
[Ex-government official – UK] 
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It [rebuilding] could be multi-lateral for both economic and political 
reasons. Economic, because the task is so large. Politically, it 
depends on the type of scenarios. If it was a German-type scenario, 
some part of ROK would want to ‘own’ it, however on the other hand, 
no way could they afford it by themselves. 
     [Government official – UK] 
 
Under the scenario of collapse and absorption by ROK, restructuring 
will be predominately led by the ROK, with some sector roles for 
Russia in energy and transport, and potentially for Japan, depending 
on whether ROK can manage their political relationship and for 
China also to develop the infrastructure links – expanding bridges, 
roads that would give access to mines, coal, iron and precious 
metals.  
[Expert – Market researcher] 
 
Depending on the results of efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis. If 
this is resolved satisfactorily and peacefully, and if the USA removes 
them from the list of states sponsoring terrorism, then they will be 
eligible for WB and ADB membership, from which they would have 
the chance to qualify for infrastructural investment. 
[Expert – Academic] 
 
Experts were asked about the main investment priorities for transport and 
logistics infrastructure. Experts differ on their opinions as some thinks that rail is 
crucial to mining resources, while others advocates for ports and roads to lead 
the economic revival. 
 
I think for developing mining infrastructure, rail is the key. I think for 
DPRK to be self-sustaining, then getting infrastructure that will 
support mining exports in terms of rail linkages to the ports and for 
the individual ports to be developed cross border to China across 
the Amok river and new roads. 
[Expert – Market researcher] 
 
Rail is inflexible and expensive. It very much needs upgrading. I 
would have thought if you are going to have any sort of a move 
towards a market economy, you want people to be able to move 
around on their own terms. In normal countries, there are roads and 
buses and lorries travel.  
[Expert – UK] 
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Nampo is important in its access to Pyongyang. It has a new 
container terminal. Rajin-Sonbong port up north around the Tumen 
River area has a lot of potential with transit traffic to and from China 
and Japan. 
[Ex-government official – UK] 
 
The experts were also asked for their opinions on the potential for DPRK to be 
a transit hub. The opinions were divided as some believed that it’s not possible 
as it will face intense competition from the Northeast provinces such as 
Liaoning and Jilin which China aggressively wants to develop. Others believed 
that DPRK is the missing jigsaw in Northeast Asia. With a unified Korea and 
improving transport infrastructure in the region, there are plans for trains to 
travel from Busan in the South, cutting through to the east coast of DPRK all the 
way to Europe. Academics support the idea that it will reduce the transport 
costs and voyage times as compared to using sea transport.   
 
6.3.1 Analysis 
 
The interviews revealed differing opinions with regards to the cost of rebuilding 
infrastructure, main investment priorities, foreign technology and DPRK as a 
business hub. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the debate on the rebuilding costs under 
different scenarios covers the costs of rebuilding infrastructure. The main 
problem is estimating the cost of rebuilding railways and roads. Railways posed 
a greater problem as most of them are single-tracked which has not been 
upgraded after the 1970s. According to Kim et al. (2001), pave roads only 
account for 6.7% of the total length. Distribution in DPRK is hampered by the 
lack of these modern infrastructures. Kim (2001) suggested setting up a 
Northeast Asia Developmental Fund for the purposes of infrastructure building. 
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One expert suggested using the BOT (Build Operate Transfer) or BLT (Build 
Lease Transfer) model which is popular in transition economies, e.g. Vietnam. 
However, due to its autarkic nature, DPRK is not likely to be willing to adopt any 
foreign model except resembling China’s or Russia’s. The DPRK government 
can decide which infrastructure projects to distribute to according to their 
political relations.  
 
The interviews revealed differing opinions on the investment priorities. Some 
believed that railways are important to connect the main arteries and it is the 
main form of transport in the country. Others view roads as more crucial due to 
the heavy investment costs in railways and the inaccessibility due to the 
geographical nature of the country. In 2007, the inter-Korean railroad plan was 
announced focusing on the Kyongui Line from Seoul to Sinuiju to serve 
Kaesong. The ROK government supports the construction of the TKR with 
supposedly savings of US$520 per TEU when using Gyeongui Line over marine 
transport between Incheon and Nampo. Up north, since 2008, berths in Rajin-
Sonbong SEZ have been leased to Chinese and Russian investors. Petrov 
(2008) reckons the investments are more politically motivated rather than 
economic sensibility which has led to both countries vying for territorial 
advantage close to their own bothers. Oh (2001) suggested that the DPRK 
government should prepare for rapid motorisation by building expressway 
networks to support truck movements and intercity passenger travel. Therefore, 
the author proposes to establish transport infrastructure priorities for DPRK. 
 
With regards to DPRK being a business hub in the Northeast Asia region, some 
experts feel that it will take many years before DPRK can achieve that while 
some believe that DPRK is the missing piece in the region. Much research has 
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been conducted into the cost savings when using rail transport from Busan, 
through the east coast of DPRK all the way to Europe in comparison with using 
water transport (Ahn 2002 and Kim et al 2002). The interview results revealed 
opinions which think that China would want to aggressively develop their 
northern region which includes Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces which 
will rival DPRK. One point which was raised up by the interviewees but found in 
the literature is the huge availability of raw materials such as gold, silver, iron 
ore, zinc, tungsten, magnetite and limestone which countries such as China, 
Japan and ROK have their sights on. China views DPRK as a viable mining as 
transport costs is less expensive in comparison to buying from Australia or 
Brazil. Kim (2007) estimated that DPRK’s known mineral deposits to be nearly 
thirty times that of ROK as of 2005. DPRK has allowed foreign investors to 
participate in selected mining projects. Yoon (2011) provides a comprehensive 
summary of the types of mines and transport infrastructure. Therefore the 
author proposes to ascertain the types of industries in DPRK that will attract 
potential investors.  
 
Chapter 3 introduced the the factors influencing the location choices of 
business enterprises. Earlier, we established that ROK enterprises will continue 
to be one of the largest investors in DPRK. Hence, the author proposes to 
determine the factors that influence the location choices of ROK SMEs and 
logistics companies to ascertain the transport and logistics strategies in DPRK. 
 
6.4 Managerial 
 
With the introduction of the Kaesong Economic Zone, ROK companies brought 
along with them technical expertise and managerial skills. Experts were asked 
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on the possibility of DPRK assuming managerial positions in the near future. 
Majority of the experts commented ROK companies were unlikely to relinquish 
control to DPRK as they feel that the local mangers are not up to the job as they 
do not have any awareness of quality control or deadlines, which does not exist 
in DPRK at present.  
 
One ex-government official commented that DPRK have sent people for 
overseas to study various disciplines. However, an expert commented that 
DPRK should not only focus on the technology but instead gain experience of 
dealing in joint ventures and businesses with foreign companies.  
 
6.4.1 Analysis 
 
The interviews reveal that the experts did not possess much knowledge of 
managers in DPRK except for those in Kaesong Industrial Complex. ROK 
managers are the still the ones with the authority in the complex as local 
managers do not have any awareness of quality control or deadlines. This is in 
contrast with the literature where since 2002 July reforms, DPRK have made 
several changes to its economic management system with younger managers 
named in major enterprises; greater autonomy to make decisions; and 
introduction of courses to emphasise on financial and monetary economies 
(Lee and Deok 2004). In view of the observations, the author proposes to 
ascertain the managerial skills that DPRK managers should acquire. 
 
6.5 Spatial 
 
This section discussed about the main export markets for DPRK products. All of 
the experts commented that ROK is most likely the main market to absorb 
DPRK products as it is part of the potential reunification costs, followed by 
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China owing to its vast potential market and favourable bilateral ties. Another 
region which might import products would be Europe which has some ties with 
DPRK.  
 
A wide variety of finished products have been suggested from ginseng to 
textiles and handicrafts. Some experts suggest that DPRK should concentrate 
on the light industries as a way to make use of its cheap labour and also as its 
neighbouring countries (China and Japan) progressively focuses on high-end 
manufacturing. DPRK has abundance of raw minerals (e.g. magnesium) which 
are coveted by many countries. However, due to poor transport infrastructure to 
the mines, it remains beneath the ground.  
 
6.5.1 Analysis 
 
Without a doubt, DPRK-made products would find it hard to find any buyers. 
ROK, as part of the reunification costs, has been mentioned by a majority of the 
experts while China, with more than one billion people, has a vast potential 
market and favourable bilateral ties. DPRK is still under the black list of the USA 
hence any DPRK made products would not be allowed into the country. Some 
countries in Europe, e.g. Switzerland and the Netherlands, have establish ties 
with DPRK and it is a potential market. Companies in Kaesong are involving in 
processing-on-commission where raw materials are being transported into 
Kaesong. The raw materials are being transformed into finished products to be 
sent back to ROK for export to other countries. In view of the findings, the 
author proposes to ascertain the main markets for DPRK -made products. 
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6.6 Social 
 
In this section, the experts were asked to comment, with the potential 
reunification, the main difficulties encountered when training and introducing 
new business concepts to DPRK and also the social difficulties of integrating 
both Koreas. Most experts commented that it will be difficult for DPRK to 
embrace new concepts as they have been embedded in their customary ways 
of conducting businesses. Similar to the German unification, even with the 
common language and history, it will take a long time to integrate the two 
Koreas.  
 
6.6.1 Analysis 
 
The interviewees commented that cultural affinity will not be able to solve the 
problem of integrating both Koreas socially as both countries have their own 
methods of conducting business. It will take a long period of time to integrate 
both Koreas. Experts gave the example of the German unification scenario 
where differences still exists even though the country has been reunified for 
more than 20 years.  
 
6.7 Legal and Organisational 
 
Two further themes, legal and organisational emerged after further analysis of 
the literature after the exploratory analysis.  
 
Legal refers to the absence of formal institutions governing regulatory laws to 
safeguard the interests of foreign companies in DPRK. News reports that 
companies in Kaesong have avenues to redress the grievances when the 
complex was shut or when DPRK suddenly raised the wages of the employees 
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(Korea Times 2011). The rules surrounding foreign enterprises have not been 
changed since 1984. Personal contacts working in DPRK have mentioned that 
they are no clear rules governing contracts and it frequently changes.  
 
Organisational refers to the logistics linkages and accessibility as well as 
logistics distribution system. Availability of logistics service providers at 
reasonable costs is important to companies seeking to invest in foreign 
countries (Dong 2001). As the level of investment in DPRK grows with more 
areas opening up, companies would require basic logistical services. Hence, 
the author proposes to ascertain the types of logistics services/concepts to be 
introduced in DPRK. 
 
6.8 Summary 
 
This chapter presented and analysed the results of the exploratory studies. 
Eight themes were derived from the analysis linking them to the research 
questions. They will be investigated in the next stage of qualitative interviews 
and quantitative surveys to answer the research questions generated.  
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CHAPTER 7 – THE RESULTS OF THE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
 
This chapter presents the results of the qualitative research phase based on 38 
electronic mail interviews. As already explained in Chapter 5, the qualitative 
data were analysed using a three-step approach. After analysing the results 
from the exploratory interviews, questions were added and deleted from the 
final copy which was sent to the experts who responded positively to the 
qualitative questionnaire. The presentation of the qualitative data includes some 
direct quotes from the interviewees in order to support views and to illustrate 
the results. The quotations are stated anonymously, but with a specific 
reference to the group of interviewees. The results of the exploratory study 
supported the development of the qualitative research.  
 
7.1 Politics 
 
What are the main political issues currently surrounding DPRK? 
 
Collectively, the experts think that, from the standpoint of the international 
community, the threat of nuclear weapons is the main issue which needs to be 
resolved. DPRK is concerned about its survival and thus using the nuclear 
threat would prevent an invasion from ROK and the USA as well as acquiring 
more economic concessions from different stakeholders.  
 
Other issues mentioned by experts including the economic problems in DPRK 
which has been well documented in the literature that the situation inside the 
country is dire and many citizens are facing starvation. DPRK often relies on 
humanitarian aid from China and ROK. The economy is not able to sustain itself 
due several reasons: dilapidated transport infrastructure which affects 
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distribution system; flooded mines; lack of raw materials; poor efficiency and no 
markets for DPRK -made products.  
 
The succession issue was mentioned by several experts. The death of Kim 
Jong-il might lead to in fighting between different factions in the party – those 
supporting the eldest or youngest son.  
 
The paragraphs below gives more detailed insights into the interests of different 
stakeholders in DPRK.  
 
What are the interests/strategies of the respective countries towards 
DPRK? (i.e. USA, China, ROK, Japan and Russia) 
 
The experts agree that the interest of the USA is three fold: (i) nuclear 
proliferation (ii) eventual reunification on ROK terms (iii) containing China’s 
influence on DPRK. 
 
Containing nuclear proliferation; stability in the region; containing 
Chinese approach to NK. 
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
The USA is interested primarily in eliminating DPRKs ability to 
threaten the USA with nuclear weapons and missiles, and, 
secondarily, in ensuring that when unification eventually occurs, it 
will take place largely on ROK terms. Current USA policy is 
incoherent. 
[Expert – Academic, ROK] 
 
The experts agree that China do not wish for DPRK to collapse and to maintain 
status quo in the region. They are concerned with the sudden influx of migrants 
into its neighbouring regions should a collapse occur as well as the expanding 
influence of the USA into DPRK.  
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China is interested primarily in stability on the Korean Peninsula to 
allow [themselves] to continue to develop economically. China does 
not wish to risk the expansion of USA influence into the northern half 
of the Korean Peninsula. 
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
I think that China’s main goal in relation to DPRK is to prevent 
instability and collapse there and to prevent reunification with the 
South. China enjoys a communist buffer, I believe.  
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
The consensus is that ROK is in huge dilemma on how to engage DPRK with 
divided views with the country. ROK wants to maintain stability in the Peninsula 
while trying to maximise its influence in the event of unification.  
 
ROK is very divided and confused at the moment regarding DPRK. 
In the long run, ROK’s interest lies in maintaining peace and stability 
on the peninsula while maximizing the ROK’s influence in the event 
of unification. 
[Expert – Institute Researcher, USA] 
 
ROK wants to develop DPRK in order to lower the price of eventual 
reunification. 
[Expert – Journalist, USA] 
 
ROK wants “slow-motion” reunification (since it believes that it can’t 
afford sudden reunification). 
[Expert – Researcher, USA] 
 
Japan’s policy on DPRK resembles the USA, containing nuclear proliferation. 
The adduction issue is also foremost on the minds of the government. At the 
same time, they want to contain China’s influence on the region. 
 
Japan’s policy is incoherent and generally follows the USA, but the 
establishment’s real, long-term focus is less on DPRK than on China. 
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
Japan is worried about rising China, therefore wants to rearm, and 
therefore finds DPRK’s actions a convenient excuse. It also wants to 
prevent reunification, afraid that a unified Korea would side with 
China and present both strategic and economic problems. 
[Expert – Academic, ROK] 
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Russia’s standpoint is similar to China – to maintain stability in the Korean 
Peninsula and to steadily increase its influence for its own economic benefits, 
especially using TSR to link to European markets. 
 
Russia, like China, wants regional stability so that it can pursue its 
own economic growth in the Russian Far East. 
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
Russia does not want any of the other great powers to increase its 
influence on the Korean Peninsula. Its current engagement of DPRK 
is designed with this in mind. 
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
Russia would like more influence in DPRK as an economic bridge 
between Japan/ROK and the TSR to European markets. 
[Expert – Researcher, ROK] 
 
Several scenarios of DPRK have been suggested: (1) regime collapse 
from military coup (2) regime collapse from uprising of citizens (3) 
integration and peaceful unification and (4) status quo. Which scenario do 
you think is most likely to take place in the next 5-7 years?  
 
A majority of the experts viewed that status quo is the most plausible scenario 
for the next five to seven years with various views given for this assertion. The 
trump card in any eventual changes is the issue of succession of Kim Jong-il.  
 
Status quo is most likely. There are no indications of a likely military 
coup and certainly not of a citizen uprising, given the great 
suppression of the people. No outside power is seeking military 
conflict. Integration and peaceful unification are very remote, as 
DPRK is not willing to deal with ROK because the latter has 
outperformed the North in every area except nuclear weapons and 
missiles (and that only because the South did not pursue those 
because of USA pressures).  
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
Status quo and possibly cautious economic reforms; only this option 
would be in the interest of the DPRK elite. Authorities are still strong 
enough to maintain power. 
[Expert – Industry, China] 
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I feel that 5 [Status quo] is most likely. Regime collapse through 
military coup seems unlikely because the military is at present 
benefiting from the regime, as officers essentially run “businesses” 
in ways that others cannot.  Regime collapse via uprising is highly 
unlikely as long as such a strict hold on information is maintained by 
the government. Unification through military conflict is unlikely 
because Seoul (the city) would be so much at risk in any conflict, 
thus SK would not start a war, and will go to great lengths to present 
one.  Integration and peaceful unification is, I think, likely, but not in 
the 5 to 7 year time frame—there are too many issues to be dealt 
with before that can happen. 
[Expert – Researcher, UK] 
 
In your opinion, on a scale of one (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely), do you 
think that there will be a unified Korea within the next 30 years? If yes, 
how do you think the process of unification will take place? 
 
Experts were divided in their opinions on the likelihood of a unified Korea within 
the next 30 years. Sixty per cent of the experts think that it is very likely while 
the rest only think it is likely.  
 
5 (very likely). Eventually, DPRK’s economic reforms will generate a 
new economic class that will demand representation. Once there is 
a measure of political change in the North, both North and South will 
enter into discussions about a staged process of reunification. 
[Expert – Researcher, USA] 
 
I think a unified Korea is very likely, but it may take most of 30 years 
to come about. Investment in DPRK by ROK, plus humanitarian 
assistance, social exchange, and gradual 
replacement/refurbishment of DPRK infrastructure, will gradually 
spur economic integration. Political reunification may only come 
upon the death of Kim Jong-Il, if he does not leave a strong heir. 
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
I would have to take the middle ground, at number 3. Four 
conditions would have to be met: 1) death of Kim Jong Il; 2) regional 
security mechanism in place involving the 6 parties; 3) sufficient 
economic development in ROK to prevent economic collapse of 
DPRK; 4) agreement between China and the USA on the status of a 
unified Korea. 
[Expert – Industry] 
 
193 
 
4. I would have chosen a lower number except for what happened in 
Germany.  In 1960, reunification seemed most unlikely in anyone’s 
lifetime, but it did happen within 30 years. I believe that, first, DPRK 
needs to reform.  On this front, I think the most viable path is the one 
that China and Vietnam are taking: economic reform using SEZs, 
while maintaining a communist state.  This, I think, would lead to 
political opening which would make reunification possible.  It’s quite 
possible, again, that none of this happens in our lifetime; on the 
other hand, change could happen quite quickly. 
[Expert – Academic, ROK] 
 
7.2 Economics 
 
In a status quo scenario, what sort of economic aid/incentives can DPRK 
expect from various countries (i.e. USA, China, ROK, Japan and Russia)? 
 
In this scenario, DPRK is likely to face continued sanctions from the USA and 
Japan. The only countries who will contribute are China and ROK; both want to 
preserve stability in the region. China is likely to provide food, oil and energy 
while ROK will provide investment and humanitarian aid. Russia, to a lesser 
extent, will provide some energy.  
 
No USA administration is likely to provide much aid, if any, to DPRK 
as long as it maintains nuclear weapons. China will continue to 
provide life support but little more. ROK will likely scale back aid as 
the years pass, especially if a conservative wins the next presidency. 
Japan will probably provide no aid for the foreseeable future. Russia 
may provide assistance, but it will be very minimal. 
[Expert – Academic, ROK] 
 
In a regime collapse scenario, what are the main economic priorities for 
DPRK in the short, medium and long term?  
 
Experts agree that in the short term, the most important need is to ensure that 
humanitarian aid is provided and to ensure internal stability. The next priority in 
the medium term is to begin economic reforms and to re-build infrastructure and 
agriculture. During this period, it should be agreed among regional powers on 
who should run DPRK. In the long term, experts reckon that it is important to 
make DPRK feel equal to ROK, economically and politically. At the same time, 
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special economic districts/zones should be identified to attract foreign 
investment.  
 
Short: humanitarian assistance (food, basic medicines, shelter). 
Medium: employment. Long term: making DPRK feel equal to ROK, 
economically and politically. 
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
Short: eat and not to get killed by sickness or internal chaos. Mid: 
get along with regional powers. Long: get along with ROK and 
merge into one nation Short: sometimes economic incentives, 
sometimes strong sanction needed. Medium: Requiring very strong 
transparent process for economic incentives is mandatory. Long: 
Two Korean parties develop certain business district/city such as 
Kaesong. 
[Expert – Journalist, USA] 
 
In a peaceful reunification scenario, what are the economic strategies 
needed to help DPRK? 
 
Experts have a variety of views on the type of economic strategies needed to 
help DPRK in the event of a peaceful reunification. The consensus is that the 
South should not help the North without laying down terms and conditions.  
 
Governance-oriented gradual transition and integration strategy 
which is in the interest of all stakeholders incl. the interests of the 
DPRK elite and leadership (incl. military). 
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
The best (though not in an economic theory sense “optimal”) 
strategy is a fast take-over by ROK, since ROK offers much more 
skills than DPRK ever can have. an important decision is the 
question, how to prevent mass migration (e.g. by holding low labour 
costs in the DPRK region and offering massive regional/ structural 
investment in the North). 
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
Don’t give free goods: fertilizers and rice are strategic goods: when 
you give, request reciprocity. Only give humanitarian aid: disposable 
food (not rice) and medicine. Use market economic principle 
vigorously: work hard and earn hard. 
[Expert – Academic, ROK] 
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Capacity building to prepare leaders and technicians for life after 
integration, technology transfer and creation of employment 
opportunities in DPRK, assistance with planning and creating 
markets and market regulation, as well as redeveloping 
infrastructure with a long-term focus. 
[Expert – Industry] 
 
What are the potential sources of financing for economic development 
projects in DPRK? 
 
Experts gave a variety of opinions regarding the potential financial sources for 
future economic development projects in DPRK depending on different 
scenarios. Under the status quo scenario with the nuclear issue unresolved, 
economic projects will be limited. The USA and international financial 
institutions (IFIs) would not be able to offer any financial help. Only ROK or 
China would be willing to offer economic incentives in exchange for stability or 
entry into DPRK. Under the collapse scenario, IFIs and the USA will begin to 
contribute to the economic projects while other countries such as Japan, Russia 
and some European countries will be interested in mines around the country. 
Under the reunification scenario, ROK will take the lead in rebuilding the 
country with help from IFIs and other countries.  
 
In a status quo scenario, unless the nuclear issue makes any 
progress, otherwise no major economic projects will be successful. 
The USA will continue with the economic sanctions.  
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
ROK and China will continue to be the main players under the status 
quo scenario. China is focusing on the Rajin-Sonbong Development 
Zone to create a transit for its goods to move to Japan. 
[Expert – Industry] 
 
If DPRK collapses through a military coup or citizen uprising, 
financial institutions like the WB will begin to contribute to the 
rebuilding process. The USA will contribute some money as well.  
[Expert – Journalist, USA] 
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If reunification does take place, we can look towards ROK to play a 
major role. They have been preparing for reunification ever since 
Kim Dae Jung came up with the Sunshine Policy to pay millions of 
dollars each year to DPRK for the use of Kumgang-san and 
Kaesong.  
[Expert – Academic, ROK] 
 
7.3 Infrastructure 
 
In a status quo, regime or peaceful reunification scenario, who would 
finance the cost of rebuilding DPRK’s infrastructure? 
 
Experts think that public investment, if any, would be small with investment 
coming from China and ROK. Some experts think there will be some private 
investment.   
 
In a status quo scenario, by definition only modest rebuilding of 
infrastructure would occur, financed by a combination of DPRK 
public sources, some DPRK private sources, ROK investments, and, 
perhaps mostly, investment from Chinese firms. 
[Expert – Defector, DPRK] 
 
To a small extent ROK and China, mostly there will be no rebuilding, 
but further decay. 
[Expert – Report, ROK] 
 
 
In a regime collapse scenario, who would finance the cost of rebuilding 
DPRK’s infrastructure? (public, private) 
 
In this scenario, experts agree that both public and private sector will play an 
important role in rebuilding DPRK’s infrastructure. If unification is on ROK’s 
terms, then majority of the funding will come from a combination of public and 
private funds. China will also be interested to provide funding to ensure that its 
position in DPRK is maintained. International financial institutions like the WB 
and the ADB will also contribute some funding.  
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Assuming unification follows on ROK terms, the largest source 
would be ROK, a combination of public and private funds. Most of 
the rest would be private FDI, with some IFI support. 
[Expert – Academic, ROK] 
 
Combination of sources, led by the ROK public sector, 
WB/IBRD/ADB, Japanese reparation funds, private investments 
from the USA, EU, Japan, China. 
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
In a peaceful unification scenario, who would finance the cost of 
rebuilding DPRK’s infrastructure? (public, private) 
 
Experts all agree that ROK will be taking the lead in this scenario with 
international financial institutions providing support.  
 
ROK (or, better: unified Korea) plus IFI plus foreign investors, as far 
as they are allowed to participate in the process. 
[Expert – Industry] 
 
International organizations and ROK government; partly private 
sector. 
[Expert – Academic, USA] 
 
Please rank, from one (highest priority) to seven (lowest priority), the 
main investment priorities for transport logistics infrastructure in 
DPRK? 
 
Forty-four per cent of the experts regarded road access as the top 
investment priority in DPRK. Thirty-four per cent of the experts placed rail 
access as the second priority while access to maritime ports was viewed as 
the third priority by 31.5 per cent of the experts. Access to airports was 
regarded as the last priority by the experts.  
 
7.4 Managerial 
 
What are the three main areas/disciplines which DPRK can send their 
delegates overseas to gain essential knowledge? 
 
198 
 
Experts suggested a variety of disciplines and areas, such as economics, 
finance, law, commercial practices, and engineering, which DPRK managers 
can acquire further skills. A majority of the experts suggested the area of 
economics and finance where managers can learn the principles of market 
economy and management of foreign direct investments. Experts commented 
that DPRK has been learning from many different countries, including China, 
Singapore and Vietnam, in terms of FTZs. Experts believe that managers need 
to acquire skills in understanding the global financial system to aid in currency 
exchange controls and improve its own banking system. Commercial practice is 
another area which has been highlighted by the experts. International trade 
skills such as business law and customs will become more important gradually 
when DPRK increases its trades with foreign countries. 
 
Engineering is another area as DPRK would require managers with civil 
engineering knowledge in view of rebuilding of infrastructure and mining sites, 
especially railway tracks and gravel roads. Information technology was 
mentioned several times by experts. They think that DPRK can specialise in this 
area to take advantage of the internet and communications infrastructure.  
 
7.5 Spatial 
 
Where are the main markets for DPRK-made products? 
 
All experts listed China, ROK, Japan and Russia as the main export markets for 
DPRK-made products. A few experts mentioned European countries and 
Singapore as possible locations.  
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ROK (light manufacturing), China (raw materials), Japan (seafood, 
agriculture). 
[Expert – Researcher, USA] 
 
The raw materials and marine products below find markets 
worldwide, but particularly in China, Japan, and ROK. DPRK 
manufactured products, with the exception of those from factories 
recently set up for export, have few markets in other countries, and 
are being displaced domestically by products from China.  
[Expert – Industry] 
 
What are the main DPRK products suitable for export? 
 
Experts suggested some core products which DPRK can export. These include: 
minerals (iron ore, gold, and manganese), marine products (fishery), agricultural 
and light industry (produced in Kaesong Industrial Complex).  Some experts 
urged the development of assembly industry to enable it to participate in the 
global supply chain. 
 
DPRK has to build up a viable light industry/ assembly industry for 
export as part of a supply chain. 
[Expert – Industry] 
 
Minerals, agricultural specialties (e.g. mushrooms), low-tech 
manufactured goods. 
[Expert – Researcher, ROK] 
 
7.6 Summary 
 
This chapter presented the findings of the qualitative interviews with experts. 
The interpretation and analysis will be discussed in Chapter 9 together with the 
quantitative survey. The next chapter presents the findings of the quantitative 
survey with ROK SMEs and logistics companies. 
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CHAPTER 8 – THE RESULTS OF THE QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the quantitative research phase. The data 
analysis process was carried out in various steps. First, the data was 
transferred from the questionnaire to SPSS (version 16), the computer software 
package used for the data analysis. Saunders et al. (2009), emphasise the 
importance of data coding in the process while Diamantopoulous and 
Schlegelmilch (1997) point out that coding should be carried out thoroughly, as 
mistakes made at this stage are difficult to correct later. After the initial data 
have been entered, questionnaires were double checked to ensure no errors.   
 
8.1 Characteristics of Respondents 
 
This section provides an overview of the characteristics of the ROK SMEs and 
logistics companies which took part in the questionnaires. Some 503 and 250 
questionnaires were sent out to SMEs and logistics companies respectively. A 
total of 130 completed questionnaires, comprising of 80 from SMEs and 50 from 
logistics companies, were returned with the response rate at 16% and 20% 
respectively.  
 
Table 8.1 and 8.2 presents the experience of managers in their own industry 
and current organisation. Sixty-eight per cent of the SMEs managers and 76% 
of the logistics managers have more than six years of managerial experience in 
their own respective industries while 66% of the SME managers and 76% of the 
logistics managers have been at their current organisation for more than six 
years.  It is reasonable to assume that the answers are given by managers with 
vast experience and knowledge of their industry and organisation.  
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Experience in 
Industry 
Valid 
Responses 
(SMEs) 
Percentage 
of Valid 
Responses 
Valid 
Responses 
(Logistics) 
Percentage 
of Valid 
Responses 
Less than 1 year 4 5.00% 0 0.00% 
1-3 years 10 12.50% 1 2.00% 
4-5 years 11 13.75% 11 22.00% 
6-10 years 17 21.25% 20 40.00% 
More than 10 years 38 47.50% 18 36.00% 
Total 80 100.00% 50 100.00% 
Table 8.1: Experience of managers in industry  
 
Experience in 
Organisation 
Valid 
Responses 
(SMEs) 
Percentage 
of Valid 
Responses 
Valid 
Responses 
(Logistics) 
Percentage 
of Valid 
Responses 
Less than 1 year 7 8.75% 0 0.00% 
1-3 years 11 13.75% 1 2.00% 
4-5 years 9 11.25% 11 22.00% 
6-10 years 18 22.50% 20 40.00% 
More than 10 years 35 43.75% 18 36.00% 
Total 80 100.00% 50 100.00% 
Table 8.2: Experience of managers in current company 
 
Regarding the number of employees in each organisation, Table 8.3 shows that 
53.8% of the SMEs and 88% of the logistics companies has less than 100 
employees in their organisations.  
 
Number of 
Employees 
Valid 
Responses 
(SMEs) 
Percentage 
of Valid 
Responses 
Valid 
Responses 
(Logistics) 
Percentage 
of Valid 
Responses 
1-19 6 7.50% 8 16.00% 
20-49 20 25.00% 16 32.00% 
50-99 17 21.25% 20 40.00% 
100-199 19 23.75% 5 10.00% 
200-299 17 21.25% 1 2.00% 
>300 1 1.25% 0 0.00% 
Total 80 100.00% 50 100% 
Table 8.3: Number of employees in SMEs and logistics companies 
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Table 8.4 shows that 77.5% of the SMEs and 70% of the logistics companies 
record revenues below US$9 million while only 5% and 6% of the respective 
SMEs and logistics companies earn more than US$20 million annually.  
 
Total revenue 
(USD) 
Valid 
Responses 
(SMEs) 
Percentage 
of Valid 
Responses 
Valid 
Responses 
(Logistics) 
Percentage 
of Valid 
Responses 
<$5m 24 30.00% 21 42.00% 
$5-9m 38 47.50% 14 28.00% 
$10-19m 13 16.25% 9 18.00% 
$20-39m 4 5.00% 6 12.00% 
>$40m 1 1.25% 0 0.00% 
Total 80 100.00% 50 100.00% 
Table 8.4: Total annual revenue of SMEs and logistics companies 
 
Table 8.5 presents an overview of the types of industries from the SMEs 
questionnaire. At present, ROK SMEs form the majority of the companies 
investing in the Kaesong Industrial Complex and other parts of DPRK. The 
sample was created from those SMEs who have expressed an interest in 
investing in DPRK. The main reason being they are more likely to invest in 
DPRK and their decision/opinions will have an effect on the policies surrounding 
DPRK. 
 
Electronics and textile industries form a majority of the enterprises who 
responded. Out of a total of 90 enterprises contacted, 32 companies from the 
electronics industry and 19 companies from the textile industry responded.  
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Types of industries 
Valid 
Responses 
Percentage of 
Valid 
Responses 
Number of 
Enterprises 
Contacted 
Electronics 32 40.00% 90 
Textile 19 23.75% 90 
Minerals/Ore 8 10.00% 20 
Food Processing 5 6.25% 30 
Machinery 4 5.00% 28 
Basic Metals 3 3.75% 25 
Petroleum/Chemical 2 2.50% 25 
Non-Metal Products 2 2.50% 20 
I.T. service 2 2.50% 23 
I.T. 1 1.25% 25 
Transportation Equipment 1 1.25% 18 
Agricultural 1 1.25% 25 
Paper/Pulp 0 0% 27 
Hotel 0 0% 10 
Leisure (tourism/golf) 0 0% 24 
Finance 0 0% 20 
Total 80 15.9% 503 
Table 8.5: Types of SMEs’ industries 
 
SMEs were asked to select three types of industries and their size of 
investment in DPRK. Mineral/ore and electronic industries accounted for 38.5% 
of the choices of the SMEs, with basic metals and textile industries accounting 
for further 14% and 10.8% respectively. Some 22.5% of the respondents would 
only invest less than US$1 million while 57.5% would invest between US$1-9 
million dollars. This implies that the initial investment would be relatively low 
with major investment in minerals/ore and electronics industry. Table 8.6 
presents an overview of the type of industries for potential investment in DPRK 
while Table 8.7 presents the size of potential investment in DPRK.  
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Industries for Potential 
Investment Count Percentage 
Minerals/Ore 37 20.11% 
Electronics 34 18.48% 
Basic Metals 26 14.13% 
Textile 20 10.87% 
I.T. 15 8.15% 
Machinery 14 7.61% 
Transportation Equipment 11 5.98% 
I.T. service 7 3.80% 
Food Processing 6 3.26% 
Agricultural 6 3.26% 
Non-Metal Products 5 2.72% 
Petroleum/Chemical 2 1.09% 
Paper/Pulp 1 0.54% 
Hotel 0 0.00% 
Leisure (tourism/golf) 0 0.00% 
Finance 0 0.00% 
Total 184 100.00% 
Table 8.6: Type of industries to be invested in DPRK 
 
Size of 
investment (USD) 
Valid 
Responses 
Percentage of Valid 
Responses 
<$1m 18 22.50% 
$1-9m 46 57.50% 
$10-99m 15 18.75% 
$100-499m 1 1.25% 
Total 80 100% 
Table 8.7: Size of potential investment in DPRK 
 
Regarding the export destinations for DPRK made products, SMEs were asked 
to choose two potential markets. 39.5% and 28.7% of the respondents chose 
China and ROK respectively. This reflects the size of the export markets and 
geographical proximity of the destinations due to the decrepit infrastructure in 
DPRK. Regarding the transport arrangements, a high concentration of modal 
flow would be focused on road and water transport with 53.8% and 37.5% 
respectively. Figure 8.1 shows the potential export markets for DPRK made 
products and Table 8.8 presents the main modes of transportation used when 
exporting goods out of DPRK. 
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Figure 8.1: Potential Export Markets for DPRK-made Products 
 
Mode of transport 
Valid 
Responses 
Percentage of Valid 
Responses 
Water 30 37.50% 
Rail 7 8.75% 
Road 43 53.75% 
Air 0 0.00% 
Total 80 100.00% 
Table 8.8: Mode of transport when exporting out of DPRK 
 
Regarding the potential locations of future investment in DPRK, 37.5% of the 
respondents picked Nampo as the top location while 32.6% picked Sinuiju, 
which is located close to the Chinese border. Figure 8.2 shows the potential 
locations for future investment.  
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Figure 8.2: Potential investment locations in DPRK 
 
Regarding the logistics companies, 68% have more than 11 years of 
experience in the logistics industry. A majority of the logistics services provided 
concentrates on freight forwarding (24.2%), warehousing (19.5%), consulting 
services (14.1%) and customs clearance (13.3%) Table 8.9 and 8.10 provides 
an overview. 
 
No. of Years in Logistics 
Industry 
Valid 
Responses 
Percentage of 
Valid Responses 
5 or less 7 14.00% 
6-10 9 18.00% 
11-15 14 28.00% 
16-20 14 28.00% 
Over 20 6 12.00% 
Total 50 100% 
Table 8.9: Organisation’s experience in logistics industry 
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Types of Logistics 
Services Provided Count Percentage 
Freight Forwarding 31 24.22% 
Warehousing 25 19.53% 
Consulting Services 18 14.06% 
Customs Clearance 17 13.28% 
Transport 15 11.72% 
Customer Service 8 6.25% 
Freight Consolidation 6 4.69% 
Packing/Storage 3 2.34% 
Physical Distribution 2 1.56% 
Multi-modal 2 1.56% 
Break-Bulk Operations 1 0.78% 
Freight Brokerage 0 0.00% 
Reverse Logistics 0 0.00% 
Purchasing 0 0.00% 
Order Processing 0 0.00% 
Total 128 100.00% 
Table 8.10: Type of logistics services provided 
 
Industries Served Count Percentage 
Electronics 21 25.61% 
Textile 13 15.85% 
Machinery 13 15.85% 
Transport Equipment 9 10.98% 
Food Processing 8 9.76% 
I.T. 6 7.32% 
Agricultural 5 6.10% 
Petroleum/Chemical 3 3.66% 
Non-metal products 3 3.66% 
Minerals/Ore 1 1.22% 
Paper/Pulp 0 0.00% 
Basic metals 0 0.00% 
Hotel 0 0.00% 
I.T. service 0 0.00% 
Leisure (tourism/golf) 0 0.00% 
Finance 0 0.00% 
Total 82 100.00% 
Table 8.11 Types of industries served 
 
Regarding the types of industries served, 21 logistics companies indicate that 
they serve the electronics sector while 13 companies serve the textile and 
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machinery industries. Other industries include transport equipment and food 
processing. Table 8.11 shows the types of industries served. 
 
Logistics companies were asked about their previous/current logistics 
operations in DPRK the places served and the volumes transported. Whilst 38 
companies indicated that they had no historical operations in DPRK, 12 
companies provided prior logistics services with Nampo as the top destination 
and only less than 5,000 tonnes of cargo were transported. Table 8.12-14 
provides an overview.  
 
Logistics Operations in DPRK Frequency Percentage 
Yes 0 0.00% 
Previously 12 24.00% 
No 38 76.00% 
Total 50 100.00% 
Table 8.12: Logistics operations in DPRK 
 
Operations in DPRK Frequency Percentage 
Nampo 8 16.00% 
Najin-Sonbong 2 4.00% 
Pyongyang 1 2.00% 
Sinuiju 1 2.00% 
Wonsan 0 0.00% 
Cheongjin 0 0.00% 
Haeju 0 0.00% 
Total 12 100.00% 
Table 8.13: Locations served in DPRK 
 
Volume Transported Frequency Percentage 
Less than 5000 tonnes 12 100.00% 
5000-10,000 tonnes 0 0.00% 
10,000-20,000 tonnes 0 0.00% 
20,000-40,000 tonnes 0 0.00% 
40,000-60,000 tonnes 0 0.00% 
More than 60,000 tonnes 0 0.00% 
Total 12 100.00% 
Table 8.14: Total volume transported annually 
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8.2 Further Findings 
 
Appendix IX shows the size of SMEs corresponding to the size and locations of 
investment. SMEs have been divided into small and large based on the number 
of employees in the companies. Small SMEs (43) have been reclassified with 
employees of less than 100 while large SMEs (37) are those with more than 
100 employees. The top two potential locations for investment are Nampo and 
Sinuiju. Nampo can potentially attract a total of 30 SMEs’ investment up to 
US$499 million dollars while 16 SMEs have indicated Sinuiju, with its close 
proximity to the North-East region of China, as a place of investment with 
majority of investment ranging US$1-9 million dollars. Large SMEs have 
indicated a willingness to invest ranging US$10-99 million dollars while a 
majority of the smaller SMEs’ are willing to invest up to US$9 million dollars. 
The Mann-Whitney U Test shows that large companies (mean rank = 50.70) will 
make a significantly higher difference than small companies (mean rank = 31.72) 
in terms of size of investment. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z-test (2-tailed - 0.036) 
confirms the above findings. The Mann-Whitney Test shows that there is no 
significance difference between both groups (large group, mean rank = 40.31, 
small group, mean rank = 40.66) regarding the investment locations. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z-test (2-tailed - 0.977) confirms the above findings.  
 
Appendix X presents the size of investment of industries in potential locations in 
DPRK. The electronics and minerals industry will most likely be spearheading 
the investment flow in Nampo with 56 SMEs signifying investment ranging 
US$1-99 million dollars. Seven SMEs from the electronics industry will be 
willing to invest US$10-99 million dollars while ten SMEs have indicated an 
interest to invest US$1-9 million dollars in the minerals industry. In Sinuiju, the 
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majority of investment is also expected to come from the electronics and 
minerals industry with a total of 53 SMEs have indicated their willingness to 
invest with a majority investing up to US$9 million dollars in the city. The Mann-
Whitney U Test shows that SMEs with investment less than US$10 million 
dollars (mean rank = 44.16) will make significant difference compared to 
companies with investment of more than US$10 million dollars (mean rank = 
25.88). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z-test (2-tailed - 0.03) confirms the above 
findings that SMEs with smaller investment will have greater importance in the 
development of transport strategies in DPRK. 
 
Table 8.15 presents the mode of transport used when transporting goods out of 
DPRK with water and road transport as the main transport modes. In Nampo, 
15 SMEs each indicate water and road transport as their preferred mode. In 
Pyongyang, Wonsan and Sinuiju, road transport is the preferred mode of 
transport to be used while water transport is preferred in Najin-Sonbong. 
 
Mode of 
transport 
Future investment 
Total Nampo Pyongyang Wonsan Sinuiju 
Najin-
Sonbong 
Water 15 2 1 8 4 30 
Rail 0 2 0 4 1 7 
Road 15 8 3 14 3 43 
Total 30 12 4 26 8 80 
Table 8.15: Mode of transport when transporting goods out of DPRK 
 
Appendix XI shows SMEs’ size of investment and industries to invest in 
locations around DPRK corresponding to the mode of transport used when 
export to potential markets. China and ROK forms the major export destination 
for DPRK -made products. For export markets in China, majority of the 
investment by SMEs in the minerals/ore industry will use road transport from 
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Nampo to China, with likely routes through Sinuiju as it is the closest border. 
Goods from textile industry from Nampo to China concentrates on using water 
transport while road transport is the main mode when transport out of Sinuiju. It 
is important to develop road infrastructure from Nampo to Sinuiju. Export 
markets in ROK attract investment from textile, electronics and minerals 
industry. From Nampo, majority of the textile products is through water transport. 
From Sinuiju, road transport is the preferred mode. For electronics products, 
road is the preferred mode from Nampo while SMEs indicate the use of all three 
main transport modes when exporting out of Sinuiju to ROK. For the minerals 
industry, road transport is the preferred mode when exporting out of Nampo and 
Sinuiju.  
 
Appendix XII shows the types of services provided by logistics companies 
across the top eight industries. The top four logistics services, which make up 
64.7% of the total services provided, are freight forwarding, warehousing, 
consulting services and transport. Freight forwarding (22.0%) and warehousing 
(18.4%) are the most frequent services provided, with concentration in the 
machinery and electronics industries. Next, consulting services (12.8%) mainly 
focuses on the textile and electronics industries while the machinery industry 
requires a majority of the transport services (3.2%). 
 
Appendix XIII shows the scope of logistics companies’ operations in DPRK 
presenting the types of logistics services required by different industries in 
DPRK cities, mainly Nampo, Sinuiju and Rajin-Sonbong. Freight forwarding and 
warehousing are the top logistics services employed in various industries in 
DPRK.  Customs clearance, consulting services, customer service, freight 
consolidation and transport are the other services used.  
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8.3 Factors Influencing Location Decisions in DPRK 
 
This section presents the findings relating to the factors influencing SMEs’ and 
logistics companies’ decision to locate investment and/or services in DPRK. 
SMEs and logistics companies were provided with a list of eight potential areas 
with a total of 58 factors. The list was generated in the light of the findings of the 
exploratory study and previous studies by MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003), 
Oum and Park (2004), and Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) investigating factors 
determining location decisions. This section also presents the findings resulting 
from the analysis of the descriptive statistics. One main statistical method was 
chosen to analyse the data. A principal component analysis (also known as 
“factor analysis”) was carried out to reduce the data and identify underlying 
dimensions of the variables in question.  
 
8.3.1 Analysis of the Descriptive Statistics 
 
Before starting the initial data analysis, it is widely recommended to check for 
violations of statistical conventions. SPSS generated-frequencies were used in 
order to identify any omission errors and to confirm sample validity. Thus the 
number of valid cases and maximum and minimum values were checked for 
errors. All values of the continuous variables fell within the possible minimum 
and maximum range. Thus the sample validity of 130 cases was confirmed. 
Following suggestions by Pallant (2005) and Field (2005), various statistical 
tests were carried out in order to test for the distribution of the values and to 
detect any outliers. The results of the tests and their interpretation can be found 
in Appendix XIV. The following paragraphs describe the tests and the 
interpretations of their outcomes. 
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• Comparisons between the mean and 5%-trimmed mean were carried out in 
order to assess the influence of outlying values. The trimmed mean 
calculates the mean for data between the 5th and 95th percentiles. A 
significant difference indicates that there are some outliers and manipulation 
of the data set might have to be considered. 
• The measure of skewness provides an indication of the symmetry of the 
distribution. A skewed distribution can be either negatively skewed (scores 
clustering towards high values) or positively skewed (tail points towards 
higher and more positive scores). 
• Kurtosis describes the ‘peakedness’ or ‘flatness’ of the distribution. In a 
normal distribution the value of kurtosis is zero and any values away from 
zero indicate deviation from the normal.  
• The Kolgomogorov-Smirnov Z-test is a test of normality, where values in the 
sample are compared to a normally distributed set of values with the same 
mean and standard deviation. Non-significant results (p>0.5) indicate 
normality, whereas significant results (p<0.5) indicate a distribution which is 
significantly different from a normal distribution. Pallant (2004) points out 
that breaches of assumed normality are not unusual.  
 
From Appendix XIV, most of the variables are not normally distributed. Field 
(2005) points out that it is quite rare to obtain normal distributions for all items 
tested. 
 
8.3.2 Scale Reliability 
 
The reliability of scales in quantitative surveys and subsequent analysis is an 
important consideration. Field (2005, 667) notes that ‘in statistical terms, the 
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usual way to look at reliability is based on the idea that individual items (or sets 
of items) should produce results consistent with the overall questionnaire.’ 
Sekeran (2000) explained several measures which have been established in 
order to test internal consistency: “item-total-correlation” and Cronbach’s alpha”. 
The figures generated by the two measures provide an indication of the degree 
to which each item correlates with the total score. Pallant (2005), explains that if 
the ‘item-total-correlation’ is lower than 0.3, it indicates that the item is 
measuring something different from the scale as a whole. The author also 
recommends an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.7. However, if scores 
fall below 0.7, items might have to be pruned in order to increase the reliability 
of the scale. The reliability tests were conducted through SPSS producing a 
Cronbach alpha coefficient of 0.949. For all the factors except economic, 
infrastructure and spatial, the Cronbach alpha coefficient was 0.949 indicating a 
good reliability of this scale.  
 
• Economic factor: the Cronbach alpha coefficient was 0.880. Two factors ‘an 
open market economy’ and ‘few restrictions on trade’ fell below the 
recommended 0.3 value in the ‘item-to-correlation’. Another round of tests 
was conducted without the two sub-factors and the Cronbach alpa 
coefficient fell to 0.860. Hence, for the purposes of subsequent analysis, all 
items in the scale were therefore retained.  
• Infrastructure factor: the Cronbach alpha coefficient was 0.770. Three sub-
factors ‘maritime port access’, ‘road access’ and ‘rail access’ fell below the 
recommended 0.3 value in the ‘item-to-correlation’. Another round of testing 
was conducted without the two sub-factors and the Cronbach alpha 
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coefficient fell to 0.737. Hence, for the purposes of subsequent analysis, all 
items in the scale were therefore retained.  
• Spatial factor: the Cronbach alpha coefficient was 0.850. One factor ‘a good 
supply of plentiful and cheap land’ fell below the recommended 0.3 value in 
the ‘item-to-correlation’. Another round of test was conducted without the 
sub-factor and the Cronbach alpha coefficient fell to 0.808. Hence, for the 
purposes of subsequent analysis, all items in the scale were therefore 
retained.  
 
After conducting subsequent tests of the items above, 8 factors involving 58 
variables qualified for subsequent analysis.  
 
8.3.3 Further Findings 
 
8.3.3.1 RQ7 – Relative Importance of Location Factors 
 
Table 8.16 shows the mean and standard deviation of the top sub-factors. Road 
access is regarded as the most important (mean = 4.68). SEZs is the second 
most important factor (mean = 4.58). Good supply of plentiful and cheap land 
(mean 4.55), rail access (mean = 4.45), telephone and internet infrastructure 
(mean = 4.42), supplies of energy and electricity (mean = 4.42), availability of 
raw materials (mean = 4.21), availability of natural resources (mean = 4.21) and 
government and officials support business (mean = 4.21) are the next important 
factors. From the list of factors, it can be determine that ‘economic’, 
‘infrastructure’ and ‘spatial’ factors are regarded as important by ROK SMEs 
and logistics companies’ when determining their location decisions.  
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Factors  Grouping Meana St. Dev 
Road access Infrastructure 4.677 0.546 
Special Economic Zones Economic 4.585 0.656 
Good supply of plentiful and cheap land Spatial 4.554 0.636 
Rail access Infrastructure 4.454 0.624 
Telephone and internet infrastructure Infrastructure 4.423 0.555 
Supplies of energy/electricity Infrastructure 4.415 0.594 
Availability of raw materials Spatial 4.331 0.675 
Availability of natural resources Spatial 4.208 0.723 
Government and officials support business Political 4.208 0.733 
Good supply of low labour cost Social 4.138 0.607 
Low costs of relocation Economic 4.108 0.662 
Proximity to major suppliers Spatial 4.092 0.616 
An open market economy Economic 4.077 0.537 
Good access to markets in China and Japan Spatial 4.069 0.661 
Few restrictions on trade Economic 4.069 0.485 
Good logistics linkages and accessibility Organisational 4.062 0.632 
Reforms encouraging a market economy Economic 4.023 0.577 
Clear rules governing regulation and 
contracts Legal 3.992 0.604 
Maritime port access Infrastructure 3.977 0.742 
Good logistics distribution system Organisational 3.969 0.634 
Supplies  of water and sewage disposal Infrastructure 3.954 0.657 
Labour/tax laws do not change suddenly Legal 3.915 0.635 
Availability of industrial estates Spatial 3.900 0.608 
Proximity to regional markets Spatial 3.892 0.900 
Potential for unification Political 3.869 0.811 
New regulations are not suddenly imposed Legal 3.838 0.680 
Local/Regional development Economic 3.831 0.684 
Educated labour pool with requisite skills Social 3.823 0.919 
Flexible payment methods Legal 3.808 0.672 
Low set-up costs for new local 
establishments Economic 3.731 0.775 
Few currency restrictions Economic 3.723 0.737 
Low levels of exchange rate risk Economic 3.708 0.664 
Logistics facilities Infrastructure 3.692 0.756 
Table 8.16: Relative importance of location factors 
 
8.3.3.2 SMEs and Logistics Companies 
 
Out of the 58 variables under the 8 factors, a Mann-Whitney U test indicated 
that the central tendency of the opinions of SMEs and logistics companies were 
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significantly different except for three sub-factors, ‘few trade restrictions’ (p = 
0.621), ‘logistics facilities’ (p = 0.603) and ‘road access’ (p = 0.712). For the rest 
of other factors, SMEs’ mean ranks were higher than logistics companies 
except for four sub-factors – ‘maritime port access’, ‘road access’, ‘rail access’ 
and ‘inexpensive land’. It shows that logistics companies view these four sub-
factors as more important than SMEs.    
 
8.3.3.3 Small and Large Companies 
 
Eighty-seven small companies and 43 large companies were subjected to a 
Mann-Whitney U test to observe any significant differences between both 
groups. The results showed that 21 sub-factors were significantly different 
under all headings except, political factor.  
 
Under the economic factor, large companies view four sub-factors as more 
important than small companies. These include ‘presence of a clustering of 
common industries’ (p = 0.000), ‘low costs of relocation’ (p = 0.019), ‘a culture 
which encourages earning high profits’ (p = 0.033) and ‘low set up costs for new 
establishments’ (p = 0.006).  
 
Under the infrastructure factor, two sub-factors were indicated as significantly 
different. Large companies (mean rank = 80.03) viewed ‘access to domestic 
markets’ (p = 0.001) as more important than small companies (mean rank = 
58.32). On the contrary, small companies (mean rank = 70.44) indicate the 
importance of ‘rail access’ (p = 0.016) higher than large companies (mean rank 
= 55.50).  
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Under the legal factor, large companies view three sub-factors as more 
important than small companies. These sub-factors include, ‘flexible 
immigration policies’ (p = 0.000), ‘low personal income taxes for foreign 
employees’ (p = 0.000) and ‘clear laws governing logistical practices’ (p = 
0.041).  
 
Under the managerial factor, large companies view four sub-factors that 
managers in DPRK should possess as more important than small companies. 
These sub-factors include, ‘good knowledge of logistics concepts’ (p = 0.002), 
‘good management experience’ (p = 0.000) and ‘good knowledge of 
management concepts’ (p = 0.001). 
 
Under the spatial factor, large companies view four sub-factors as more 
important than small companies. These sub-factors include ‘gaining a 
bridgehead into the DPRK market’ (p = 0.000), ‘the promise of new markets for 
DPRK products’ (p = 0.012), ‘a lack of sizable markets’ (p = 0.001), and ‘the 
limited purchasing power of local markets (p = 0.000). 
 
Under the social factor, large companies view four sub-factors as more 
important than small companies. These include, ‘good housing, schools and 
environmental amenities’ (p = 0.000), ‘a pool of educated labour’ (p = 0.021), 
‘cultural affinity with other Koreans’ (p = 0.015), and ‘common culture and 
language’ (p = 0.001). 
 
Under the organisational factor, large companies (mean rank = 75.49) view 
‘availability of plentiful of modern logistics service providers and low costs’ (p = 
0.028) more importantly than small companies (mean rank = 60.56).  
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8.3.3.4 SMEs’ Size of Investment 
 
Responses of 80 SMEs were subjected to the Mann-Whitney U test based on 
their size of investment, those investing less than US$10 million and those 
investing more than US$10 million, to observe any significant differences 
between both groups. The results showed that 12 sub-factors were significantly 
different under all factors, except political factor and organisational factor. 
 
On the economic factor, companies investing more than US$10million (mean 
rank = 43.00) indicated that having ‘few currency restrictions’ (p = 0.047) as 
more important than those companies investing less than US$10 million (mean 
rank = 39.88).  
 
Under infrastructure, companies investing more than $10 million viewed the 
‘access to domestic markets’ (p = 0.004) and ‘availability of logistics facilities’ (p 
= 0.038) as significantly more important than those investing less than $10 
million.  
 
On the legal factor, companies investing more than US$10 million viewed six 
sub-factors as significantly different from those investing less than US$10 
million. These include, ‘flexible immigration policies’ (p = 0.007), ‘personal 
income taxes for foreign employees are low’ (p = 0.012), ‘clear laws governing 
logistical policies’ (p = 0.038), ‘clear rules governing regulation and contracts’ (p 
= 0.008), ‘labour and tax laws do not change suddenly’ (p = 0.037), and ‘new 
regulations are not suddenly imposed’ (p = 0.042). 
 
On the managerial factor, companies investing more than US$10 million (mean 
rank = 54.19) viewed that managers in DPRK having ‘good knowledge of 
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logistics concepts’ (p = 0.006) more importantly than those investing less than 
$10 million (mean rank = 37.08). 
 
On the social factor, companies investing more than US$10 million rated two 
factors as significantly different from those investing less than US$10 million. 
These factors include, ‘good housing, schools and environmental amenities’ (p 
= 0.012) and ‘good supply of low labour cost’ (p = 0.014). 
 
8.3.3.5 Logistics Companies 
 
Responses of 50 logistics companies were subjected to the Mann-Whitney U 
test based on their involvement in DPRK. 12 companies indicated that they 
have had previous operations in DPRK while 38 companies did not have prior 
operations in DPRK. The results showed that companies with no previous 
operations (mean rank = 27.63) rated ‘political stability’ (p = 0.039) more 
importantly than those who have had previous involvement in DPRK. Similarly, 
companies without prior involvement (mean rank = 27.63) view ‘profit making 
culture’ (p = 0.039) more importantly than those with previous involvement 
(mean rank = 18.75). 
 
8.4 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
Factor analysis has been used in determining location factors (Westerbeek and 
Smith, 2002; and Alcorta et al., 2009). It is defined as a method for simplifying 
complex sets of data (Kline, 1994) by addressing the structure of 
interrelationships or correlations among a large number of variables by defining 
a set of common underlying dimensions (Hair et al., 1992). Pallant (2005, 172) 
explains that ‘factor analysis, essentially a data reduction technique, takes a 
221 
 
large set of variables and looks for a way that the data may be ‘reduced’ or 
summarised using a smaller set of factors or components’. There are two main 
approaches to factor analysis – exploratory and confirmatory. The former is 
often used in early stages of research to gather information about the 
interrelationships among a set of variables while the former is used later in the 
research process to confirm specific hypotheses concerning the structure 
underlying a set of variables.  
 
Factor analysis consists of a variety of different, yet related techniques – 
principal component analysis (PCA) and factor analysis (FA). In principal 
component analysis the variables are transformed into a smaller set of linear 
combinations, with all of the variance in the variables being used. In factor 
analysis, factors are estimated using a mathematical model where only the 
shared variance is analysed (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). Pallant (2005, 172) 
mentions that ‘these two set of techniques are similar in many ways and often 
used interchangeably by researchers’. Stevens (1996) prefers principal 
component analysis by suggesting that it avoids some of the potential problems 
with ‘factor indeterminacy’ associated with factor analysis. Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2001, 611) further explain that ‘if an empirical summary of the data set is 
required, PCA is the better choice’. 
 
George and Mallery (2001) recommend four basic steps of conducting a 
principal component analysis, while Pallant (2005) suggest a three-stage 
approach: First, assessment of the suitability of the data for factor analysis. 
Second, factor extraction and third, factor rotation and interpretation. These 
steps and the findings generated will be presented in the following sections. 
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The variables were subjected to a principal component analysis (PCA) using 
SPSS Version 16. 
 
8.4.1 Assessment of the Suitability of Data for Principal Component 
Analysis 
 
There are two main issues when assessing the suitability of the data: sample 
size and the strength of the relationship among variables.  
 
The sample size determines the reliability of factor analysis as correlation 
coefficients fluctuate from smaller to larger samples. Pallant (2005) 
recommends that the larger the sample, the better. Field (2005) becomes 
precise by listing 100 cases as a poor sample to 1000 cases as being excellent. 
In addition, Kline (1994) recommends a minimum of 100 as a sample size 
suitable for factor analysis, whereas Hair et al. (1992) emphasise that the 
sample size should be 100 or larger. Stevens (1996, 372) suggest that the 
sample size requirements advocated by researchers have been reducing over 
the years as more research had been done on the topic. 
 
The second important issue relating to the assessment of data suitability is the 
appropriate strength among variables. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) 
recommend an inspection of the correlation matrix for evident of coefficients 
greater than 0.3. Factor analysis may not be appropriate if only few correlations 
above this level are found. The inspection of the correlation matrix produced for 
all 58 variables under eight headings revealed the presence of many 
coefficients greater than 0.3. Pallant (2005) mentions two other measures for 
testing the strengths of correlation between items is: (i) Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity (1954) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
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adequacy (1974). The Bartlett’s test of sphericity should be significant (p<0.5) 
for factor analysis to be considered appropriate while the KMO index ranges 
from 0 to 1, with 0.6 suggest as the minimum value for a good factor analysis 
and values greater than 0.8 is considered very good.  In this study, the Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity reached statistical significance with p = 0.000 and therefore 
rejecting the notion that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix. The KMO 
measure of sampling adequacy is 0.805, indicating a very good value, therefore 
supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix.  
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .805 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 5905.247 
Df 1653.000 
Sig. .000 
Table 8.17: Assessment of factorability of data 
 
8.4.2 Extraction of Factors 
 
According to Pallant (2005), factor extraction seeks to identify the smallest 
number of factors that can be used to best represent the interrelations among 
the set of variables. The principal component analysis identifies those factors 
which mainly account for the variance by analysing all the variance in the 
observed variables.  
 
Pallant (2005) recommends three techniques to assist in deciding the number 
of factors to retain. The Kaiser’s criterion or eigenvalue (i.e. amount of the total 
variance explained by a factor) rule retains those factors with eigenvalue of 1.0 
or above. However, the Kaiser’s criterion has been widely criticised for retaining 
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too many factors and that findings are likely to be inaccurate when the number 
of variables is larger than 30 or the sample size is fewer than 250 (Field 2005).  
 
The next technique is Catell’s scree test (Catell 1966), which involves plotting 
each of the eigenvalues of the factors and inspecting the plot to find a point at 
which the shape of the curve changes direction and becomes horizontal. Catell 
(1966) recommends retaining all factors above this cut-off point.  
 
The third technique is Horn’s parallel analysis (Horn 1965) which is increasingly 
used in social science research. It involves comparing the size of the 
eigenvalues with those obtained from a generated data set of the same size. 
Only those eigenvalues that exceed the corresponding values from the random 
data set are retained (Pallant 2005). This approach to identifying the correct 
number of components to retain has been shown to be the most accurate, with 
both Kaiser’s criterion and Catell’s scree test tending to overestimate the 
number of components (Hubbard and Allen, 1987 and Zwick and Velicer, 1986). 
In order to conduct this parallel analysis, another statistical program ‘Monte 
Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis’ was used (Watkins 2000). The program 
requires three pieces of information: the number of variables, the number of 
subjects in the sample and the number of replications. This program will 
calculate the average eigenvalues for these 100 randomly generated samples.  
 
The variables were subjected to a principal component analysis. Analysis was 
conducted to identify variables with eigenvalues of 1 or more. Screeplot tests 
were analysis to detect the cut-off points. Lastly, parallel analysis was 
conducted for further investigation to compare the eigenvalues generated by 
the principal component analysis in SPSS and the Monte Carlo PCA. After 
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comparison of the three guidelines, it was decided to retain four components for 
further investigation. 
 
Component Actual eigenvalue from PCA 
Criterion Value 
from parallel 
analysis 
Decision 
1 16.072 2.482 Accept 
2 5.509 2.214 Accept 
3 3.642 2.118 Accept 
4 3.273 2.042 Accept 
Table 8.18: Comparison of eigenvalues from PCA and Parallel Analysis 
 
8.4.3 Rotation and Interpretation of Factors 
 
The extracted sub-factors need to be interpreted in order to make sense. To 
assist in this process, the factors are ‘rotated’ (Pallant 2005). Rotation can 
improve the interpretability of factors as it maximises the loading of each 
variable on one of the extracted factors and minimises the loadings on all other 
factors (Field 2005, 634). There are two main approaches to rotation – 
orthogonal (uncorrelated) or oblique (correlated) factor solutions. The 
recommendation of Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) to select orthogonal varimax 
rotation results in solutions that are easier to interpret and to report. It also 
minimises the number of variables that have high loadings on each factor 
(Pallant 2005).  
 
Kline (1994, 52) emphasises that ‘it is necessary to know whether a factor 
loading is significant or not’ regardless of the rotation method used. Pallant 
(2005) supports Kline’s (1994) proposition of using factors loadings over 0.3 as 
a reasonable criterion when sample size is at least 100 subjects. Comrey (1973) 
and Miller et al. (2002) recommend that anything above 0.44 can be considered 
significant. It is fair to conclude that the higher the loadings the more the 
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variable is a pure measure of the factor (Buuhler 2006). Therefore it has been 
decided to retain factor loadings of above 0.44. The rotated solution revealed 
four factors explaining 49.131% of total variance in the proposed model.  
 
Comp 
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of  
Variance Cum % Total 
% of  
Variance Cum % 
1 16.072 27.710 27.710 16.072 27.710 27.710 
2 5.509 9.498 37.209 5.509 9.498 37.209 
3 3.642 6.279 43.488 3.642 6.279 43.488 
4 3.273 5.644 49.131 3.273 5.644 49.131 
Table 8.19: Total variance explained 
 
In the component rotated matrix (Appendix XV), the loadings of each of the 
selected variables are shown. Pallant (2005) notes that SPSS does not interpret 
or label the components and it is up to the researcher to propose possible 
interpretations based on underlying theory and understanding of the content of 
the variables. It is recommended to identify the highest loading variables of 
each of the component which can be used to help identify the nature of the 
underlying latent variable represented by each component. Therefore the 
author of this thesis interpreted and labelled the components by comparing the 
various items and their wordings respectively. After that the results are 
compared and discussed with each other.  
 
• Component 1: ‘legal factor’ 
 
Twenty variables load significantly on the first factor explaining 27.71% of the 
variance. The three strongest loadings relate to the legal factor which indicates 
that the investors are concerned about the legal environment of conducting 
businesses in DPRK. ‘New regulations are not imposed suddenly’ (.861) and 
‘labour and tax laws do not change suddenly’ (.850) indicate that potential 
investors are concerned about sudden changes in laws which have occurred to 
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ROK companies in Kaesong Industrial Complex. ‘Low income tax for foreign 
employees’ (.828) demonstrates that investors are concerned about the income 
tax structure which might be related to sudden changes in labour and tax laws.  
 
• Component 2: ‘political economy factor’ 
 
Twelve variables load on the second component explaining 9.49% of the 
variance. Comparison of the wordings shows that the highest loadings involve 
sub-factors in the political and economic grouping. The loadings of the top four 
economic factors as well as the two political factors indicate that potential 
investors are concerned about the business environment in DPRK. They rate 
the importance of having ‘good levels of local and regional development’ (.744) 
complemented with ‘special economic zones’ (.638) and ‘low levels of currency 
exchange rate risk’ (.614). Investors also rate the importance of ‘potential 
unification’ (.672) that will eventually lead to reforms encouraging a market 
economy (.604). In conducting business in DPRK, other concerns include the 
level of bureaucracy (.583) and risk of corruption (.537), which is prevalent in 
transition economies.  
 
• Component 3: ‘spatial factor’ 
 
Twelve variables load on the third component explaining 6.27% of the variance. 
The five strongest loadings relate to the spatial scale and it is clear from the 
wordings that the investors are concerned about the supply chain of their 
products. ‘Availability of raw materials’ (.705), ‘availability of natural resources’ 
(.660), ‘proximity of major suppliers’ (.641) and ‘inexpensive land’ (.625) 
indicates the upstream in the supply chain where investors seek for the inputs 
of products. ‘Access to China and Japan’ (.600), ‘access to domestic markets’ 
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(.598), and ‘proximity to regional markets’ (.541) refer to the downstream in the 
supply chain where investors seek for export markets for their products.  
 
• Component 4: ‘infrastructure factor’ 
 
Eight variables load on the fourth component explaining 5.64% of the variance. 
The six strongest loadings relate to the infrastructure scale and it becomes 
clear that investors are concerned about the state of the infrastructure in DPRK. 
‘Access to road’ (.796) and ‘access to rail’ (.657) indicate the level of 
importance attached to DPRK rehabilitating railroads to provide access to raw 
materials and natural resources as well as improving the distribution system for 
exports.  
 
8.5 Summary 
 
The next chapter will connect the above findings in the context of this research 
by linking the results of the qualitative and quantitative research with the 
exploratory study to complete the triangulation process. 
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CHAPTER 9 – ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
This chapter presents the analysis of both the qualitative and quantitative 
research to draw together the key points for further discussion of the research 
questions. It will also triangulate the main findings of the qualitative interviews 
(Chapter 7) and the quantitative surveys (Chapter 8) with the exploratory study 
(Chapter 6) as illustrated in Figure 9.1 to answer the research questions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: triangulation of findings. 
 
9.1 Analysis of Qualitative Findings 
 
This section will discuss the findings of the qualitative interviews under several 
themes and highlight the key points made by experts which will aid in 
developing scenarios for DPRK.  
 
The main political and economic issues surrounding DPRK are similar to those 
raised during the exploratory interviews – nuclear issue, economic problems 
and succession. These problems have been well-documented in the literature. 
It is imperative that when taking into account the scenarios for DPRK, these two 
factors are included. In the development of scenarios, often wildcards are used 
to account for any sudden events occurring. In this case, the wildcard would be 
the death of Kim Jong-il. His death would pose stability issues not only to DPRK 
 
Findings of the 
qualitative interviews 
Findings of the 
quantitative surveys 
Findings exploratory 
study 
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but to the whole of Northeast Asia as it might trigger a collapse or uprising. 
However, history has shown that DPRK has continued to be resilient even after 
the death of Kim Ji-sung. 
 
DPRK presents its stakeholders with many political and economic interests. To 
its immediate neighbours – China and ROK, long term stability is imperative as 
a collapse will bring about a sudden influx of immigrants across its borders. This 
will result in instability in the region which will require huge humanitarian aid. 
Economically, a collapse-DPRK will also pose huge reunification costs for ROK, 
which it cannot afford. The status quo scenario will allow both countries, 
especially China, to contribute in keeping DPRK sustainable through economic 
projects such as infrastructure and minerals. The USA is more concerned with 
the nuclear proliferation as its influence in the region is marginal given that 
DPRK has been on its blacklist for many years. Japan’s interest is similar to 
USA, to maintain stability in the Peninsula and also to solve the long-standing 
adduction issue. Russia has benefitted from DPRK’s debt to the country, where 
it is able to invest in several infrastructure projects in the Rajin-Sonbong area. 
Like other countries, Russia would want regional stability and to increase its 
influence gradually. In building scenarios for DPRK, the interests of different 
stakeholders need to be factored in as they will have influence the eventual 
future of the country.  
 
In 2008, experts were asked the most likely scenario that will occur in DPRK 
within a 5-7 time period. It is not surprising that most experts favour a status 
quo scenario as any other scenario will bring about regional instability and also 
huge economic ramifications which no country is willing to put up with. Under 
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this scenario, most of the economic aid/investment would only come from ROK 
and China while USA and Japan continues to maintain an arm’s length 
approach. However, the experts were more optimistic when asked about the 
possibility of a reunification within the next 30 years. As China and ROK 
continues to bring about gradual investment in DPRK to bring up the level of 
infrastructure in the country, the possibility of economic integration will be in the 
pipeline. ROK would have learnt the lessons from the German reunification that 
it is costly to develop the infrastructure in the East to bring it up to the level in 
the West. Hence, neither ROK nor China would want a similar occurrence.  
 
Experts regard road transport as the top investment priority in any scenario. 
However, the transport strategies in each scenario will differ as political and 
economic conditions vary. In the status quo scenario, transport developments 
would be piecemeal as DPRK would be selective in allowing foreign investment 
as transport infrastructure has never been regarded as a key component in its 
economic plan as established in Chapter 2. In the event of a collapse, electricity 
supply will be a priority to provide energy to the country. Ports would play an 
important role to ensure that humanitarian aid enters into the country. Tourism 
is expected to play gradual importance to the economy while in order to 
stabilise the economy, SEZs could be designated to induce foreign investment. 
In the peaceful reunification scenario, international financial institutions will be 
able to provide funding and investment to the rebuild infrastructure.  
 
Experts’ suggestions on the areas/disciplines which DPRK managers can 
acquire further knowledge yielded different responses. This is not surprising 
given that DPRK managers lack the motivation to acquire further skills as it 
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seldom interacts on a global scale. However, it is worth noting that DPRK 
managers should begin to acquire more knowledge of the global trade and 
financial system to aid in its currency control and banking system. As 
infrastructure projects increases, DPRK managers could acquire further skills in 
transport infrastructure and engineering fields.  
 
Experts suggested that DPRK focus on primary and light industry for export 
markets targeting China, ROK and Russia. DPRK-made products do not 
possess international recognition due to the unresolved nuclear issue. Hence, 
the only reasonable markets that will buy DPRK-made products would be its 
neighbouring countries. Alternatively, ROK companies might engage in the 
processing on commission trade where the initial assembly is being done in 
DPRK and the final stage of the supply chain process (i.e. packaging/labelling) 
will be sent back to ROK. DPRK also possesses a wealth of minerals, which 
have been largely untapped due to flooded mines (Yoon 2011). If DPRK is able 
to generate and assure investors that their investment will be protected, then it 
will be able to generate significant revenue from the mining industry. This in turn 
will have implications on the transport infrastructure as roads and railways need 
to be constructed to facilitate the transportation of the minerals across the 
borders to China and ROK or through ports to farther countries.  
 
9.2 Analysis of Quantitative Findings 
 
This section analyses the quantitative findings derived from both SMEs and 
logistics companies survey. The findings were subjected to non-parametric 
tests and principal component analysis to reduce the data for further analysis. 
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These data analyses and findings aided in answering the sub-research 
questions. 
 
All but three of the managers who have had more than 10 years experience in 
their industry have also worked in the same company for a similar duration. This 
shows that the top-level managers are more than qualified to comment on the 
policy of their company. The majority of the SMEs are likely to be cautious with 
their investments ranging from US$1-9 million.  
 
SMEs were divided into small and large SMEs to infer any differences in their 
choice of location factors. A total of 21 factors were found to differ significantly 
which provides insights into the factors that are important to large SMEs. The 
only group of factors where both large and small SMEs do not have any 
significant difference were the ‘political’ factors. This could imply that all 
companies view resolution of political factors as of equal importance for any 
level of economic activity to increase.  
 
The presence of common clusters of industries was important to large 
companies as supply chains are viewed as networks rather than as 
independent entities. The presence of common industries would lower 
operational costs in the form of transport and carrying costs. In addition, low 
relocation costs and setup costs offers greater motivation for large SMEs to 
relocate due to their size of personnel and operations. It would not be 
economically viable if relocation costs are too huge. This is confirmed in their 
view that there should be low personal income taxes for foreign employees. 
Large companies also viewed access to domestic markets as a potential for 
extending their scope of business as they look out for new opportunities. This is 
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confirmed in their view that gaining a bridgehead into the DPRK market – a first 
mover advantage, is important.   
 
Logistics companies with no prior experience in DPRK are more concerned 
about the political risk in the country. This is perhaps due to the instability 
around the region and the fact that the Korean Peninsula is still officially at war. 
In addition, a profit making culture is also more important to these companies. 
This is predictiable if companies with prior involvement understand the risks and 
level of logistics activity available in DPRK and that any profit making is only 
marginal.   
 
9.3 RQ 1 – Impacts of DPRK Scenarios on Transport and Logistics 
Developments in DPRK 
 
This section discusses the analysis of the scenarios generated in the qualitative 
interviews to provide recommendations for potential transport and logistics 
developments under each scenario. After analysing the qualitative findings, 
three scenarios were further developed: (a) status quo/muddling through (b) 
collapse arising from military coup, social uprising or complete disintegration 
resulting in absorption and (c) peaceful unification. This study focuses on these 
three scenarios analysing the interests of various actors, including internal and 
external developments to evaluate its effects on transport developments. 
 
This analysis proceeds under a number of assumptions to generate the 
recommendations. Firstly, the DPRK regime is most concerned with regime 
survival. Secondly, maintenance of political stability in DPRK is paramount for 
all concerned stakeholders. Thirdly, transport infrastructure development is a 
precondition for economic development in DPRK. Lastly, any change in 
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president in ROK might signal a change in policies towards DPRK. There are 
several wildcards involved. The death of Kim Jong-il would trigger a greater 
uncertainty in the region even though a successor has already been named. It 
could spark an internal conflict amongst the different factions. Another wildcard 
is the weather as DPRK is susceptible to famine and flooding.  
 
9.3.1 Status Quo 
 
In spite of the nuclear crisis, the status quo is one of the two scenarios that 
most experts agree is most likely to occur in the near future. They anticipate 
that the surrounding countries would not want a collapsed-DPRK as it poses 
extreme difficulties. For China and ROK, there would be a sudden influx of 
asylum seekers from DPRK, which is undesirable for both countries. DPRK will 
continue with its existing policy, government institutions and ruling regime as 
regime survival is paramount to Kim Jong-il and his eventual successor. He 
continues to consolidate his power base among the military. Outside pressures 
from the USA and Japan can contribute to sustaining the present regime, at 
least in the short run, by strengthening the position of the military and 
enhancing internal cohesion.  
 
In this scenario, DPRK is likely to announce that it will stop testing nuclear 
weapons but stop short of complete dismantlement. China and ROK will 
resume supply of oil and food aid to DPRK to keep it as a buffer state. ROK 
continues with the Kaesong Industrial Park complex and Mt. Kumgang tourism 
project. The USA is unlikely to change its hard-line stance unless DPRK gives 
up its nuclear weapons. Japan is likely to continue its economic sanctions on 
DPRK. International financial institutions and organisations will play an 
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insignificant role at this stage except for some food aid. DPRK might attempt to 
carry out some piecemeal reforms to improve productivity and liberalise its 
economy (e.g. currency reforms in 2009) but China and ROK are most likely to 
be the only countries responding.  
 
In the area of transport and logistics, developments are likely to be slow and 
tedious with minimal developments around the country. Only ROK and China 
will show some serious interest, although there are some reported interests 
from Russia. ROK will continue to place the restoration of the TKR construction 
projects as priority with port and road-related projects to be considered at a 
later stage. China’s trade with DPRK is likely to pick up near the border areas 
along the Yalu River. Chinese companies have secure berths in Rajin Port with 
road construction projects from Hunchun to Rajin. It is likely that there will be 
investments from China into the new Dandong-Sinuiju Bridge to facilitate further 
trade. According to two experts, Russia has proposed to construct the Khasan-
Rajin railway line which will facilitate delivery of oil to Sonbong refinery. Some of 
the refined oil will be sent back to Russia while the rest will be used by DPRK 
for energy purposes. This proposed deal will benefit both countries in the long 
term. 
 
9.3.2 Collapse 
 
This is the next scenario which experts think is most likely to occur. This is due 
partly to the dire state of the DPRK economy coupled with UN sanctions. It has 
been reported by the World Food Programme that it is facing a shortfall in food 
aid for 2011. Such economic hardships might result in severe social unrest. 
Social control and political intimidation can ensure the regime’s short term 
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survival but in the medium term there is great danger of sudden implosion in the 
form of mass riots (Moon, 2004). Collapse in DPRK could take one of the three 
paths (i) Romanian (ii) Iraqi or (iii) Lebanese. The Romanian path results in the 
collapse of the present regime with the successor regime retaining political and 
military control. This will create severe social, economic and political unrest 
leading to the population fighting for limited resources and migrating north 
across the Tumen and Yalu rivers and South across the DMZ. As mentioned 
earlier, this scenario is not desired by China and ROK. For the latter, it imposes 
a significant burden on support structures, military and security apparatus. The 
Iraqi path results in DPRK waging war against ROK and ultimately collapse and 
absorption through external intervention. The Lebanese path results in severe 
civil war and a successor regime inviting foreign intervention. Most experts 
agree that this scenario is unlikely to happen in the short term period of 5 to 10 
years. DPRK has demonstrated a resolute ability to survive in the harshest 
circumstances, e.g. the death of Kim Il-Sung and natural disasters in the 1990s.  
 
In the event of collapse and absorption, infrastructure conditions are likely to 
deteriorate as a result, leading to huge investments and reconstruction needed 
in the transport and logistics sector. The countries involved will have to play a 
joint role in DPRK with either ROK or the UN leading. In this scenario, 
stakeholders will jostle for territorial advantage as each looks to gain a foothold 
in the country. However, no country will be able to single-handedly afford the 
cost of rebuilding DPRK hence it is mostly like a joint effort. ROK and China will 
most likely spearhead most of the investment required. Russia will be able to 
provide some aid in terms energy and financing. Japan will provide 
compensation payments as a result of WWII. The USA will look to provide a 
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greater security role to ensure that there is continued stability in the region. In 
addition, some economic assistance in the form of aid and energy can be 
expected to be supplied. The UN will provide humanitarian and developmental 
assistance to rebuild the country. IFIs like the WB and ADB will provide 
expertise to work together with other countries to develop a timeline for 
developmental projects and also provide the necessary financing loans. 
 
Transport strategies will occur in several phases. In the initial six to seven years, 
as suggested by Van Hippel and Hayes (1997), a Light Water Reactor (LWR) 
should be constructed to supply energy to the whole country. DPRK could begin 
to build up its economy by learning from China through focusing on its border 
areas by adding one or two SEZs (e.g. Sinuiju) to the existing ones in Kaesong 
and Rajin-Sonbong, engaging in primary and light industries as suggested by 
experts and SMEs through the qualitative interviews and surveys respectively. 
Some ports (e.g. Haeju, Nampo and Wonsan) could be upgraded to enable the 
supply of international humanitarian aid and to facilitate future trade movements. 
At the same time, road connection to these ports should be improved to ensure 
smooth transport flow. With the rebuilding of the country, one sector which can 
help DPRK to grow economically will be the tourism industry (Jo and Adler 
2002). Roads connections to Mt. Gumgang and Mt. Paektu tourist sites should 
be improved. In the second stage between eight to fifteen years, with the 
stability of the economy, more SEZs (e.g. Nampo and Wonsan) can be 
designated to induce foreign investment focusing on export oriented light 
industries plus some heavy industries. At the same time, the UN ‘Tumen River 
Development Programme’ can be revitalised with the agreement of China, 
Russia and DPRK. Other projects include the renovation of Pyongyang-Sinuiju 
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and Seoul-Wonsan rail projects. More power plants could be completed and the 
communication system improved in major cities. In the third stage after more 
than 20 years, strategies include enhancing the value of export industries by 
including some information industries. Other projects include the double 
tracking of arterial railways and road expansion between major cities to facilitate 
the movement of goods and services. As travel movement becomes 
widespread together with an upsurge in tourism industry, the author suggests 
that airports could be constructed in major cities.   
 
9.3.3 Peaceful Reunification 
 
Experts interviewed say that this is an unlikely course of action in the near 
future of at least 10 years by the present regime due to the acute ideological, 
political and security animosities of the last half century. In this scenario, Kim 
Jong-il (or the leader-in-charge) seeks reconciliation with ROK to maintain 
peace and stability. This scenario requires both countries to accept each other 
as full negotiating partners and to sign the armistice to officially end the war. 
Reunification will occur after a period of at least 15 years (Pollack and Lee, 
1999). The initial three to four years would focus on dialogues and economic 
reforms for DPRK and disarmament of nuclear arms. After six to seven years, 
there could a political integration either through a confederation with joint 
governments engaging in political and economic integration. Within 10-15 years, 
it is likely that there will be a formal unification with unified defence forces. Both 
countries will be cautious to hasten the reunification process as they would 
have learnt from the lessons of the German unification.  
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In this scenario, ROK will most likely play a leading role in investment projects 
encouraging FDI into DPRK. The USA will begin withdrawal of troops provided 
that DPRK gives genuine assurance of its intention to reunification. The USA 
could begin to supply energy sources in stages and also provide some 
financing for investment projects after removing DPRK from its ‘blacklist’. At the 
same time, DPRK will be able to improve its opportunities for investment and 
loans from IFIs. China will continue to provide investments along the border 
areas albeit taking a cautious approach, preferring to let ROK take the lead. 
However, as China will not want to lose a foothold in DPRK, the author thinks it 
might seek to invest in key areas such as minerals and transport infrastructure. 
Japan will provide compensation payments and would be interested in transport 
projects on the east side of DPRK, e.g. Rajin and Chongjin to enable access to 
China and Wonsan for the tourism industry. Russia will be interested in 
reconnecting railway lines on the east side to create an overland route from 
Busan to Europe.  
 
Rehabilitation of infrastructure in this scenario is less complex compared to the 
collapse scenario as the infrastructure will likely be in a better condition. The 
transport network in DPRK will be integrated with the South. Kim (2006), 
proposed an H-design construction composed of four corners (6 corners in the 
second stage) and three axes to lift the DPRK economy and connect to the 
regional economy of Northeast Asia. In the first stage of three to four years, four 
corners namely, Sinuiju, Nampo, Wonsan and Rajin are suggested. These 
corners are located near the borders with Sinuiju bordering China, Nampo 
within proximity of China and ROK, Wonsan with access to Japan and ROK and, 
Rajin located closely to Russia and China. Suggested projects include 
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reconstruction of the railway lines along the east and west coast, designating 
SEZs, providing electricity to Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. Kumgan 
tourist zone, Rajin port renovation, construction of Dandong-Sinuiju Bridge and 
integrating communication facilities. It is expected that ROK will provide most of 
the finance supported by international multilateral organisations. After six to 
seven years, as DPRK moves further into its reform path, public and private 
investment can flow into the country. Major arterial railways and roads begin 
construction to connect them country-wide. The UNESCAP can play an 
important role in providing expertise and resources as they already have plans 
for the TAR and Asian Highway of which DPRK is directly involved in two of the 
routes. Other projects could include port expansion and reconstruction of roads 
in border areas, new power plants and distribution networks, and mobile 
communication and data transmission facilities. In the third stage after 10 to 15 
years, infrastructure requirements could be met by internal and external 
financial sources and the remaining minor roads and railways will be 
constructed to raise the efficiency of the economy. At the same time, the author 
thinks that selected airports around the country could be constructed to meet 
the expected rising demand of the tourism industry and high-value exports. 
 
9.3.4 Summary 
 
The transport and logistics developmental projects listed under each scenario 
are purely speculative due to data shortage. However, the suggestions provided 
have been analysed and developed through the interviews and available 
information through literature. In the short term of five to ten years, DPRK is 
most likely to continue with the status quo scenario as it has continued to show 
reliance on the military-first policy and resilience in times of difficulties. In 
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addition, surrounding countries like ROK and China would also prefer this 
scenario as it provides the most ideal political and economic stability. In the 
event of a collapse, there will be political instability with influx of immigrants and 
the costs of rebuilding the country would be enormous (Noland 2006). A 
reunification would also present strong resistance and barriers to a political 
union and incur huge reunification costs to ROK, which it can ill-afford at the 
moment.  
 
9.4 RQ2 – Future SEZ Locations in DPRK  
 
Chapter 2 introduced the concept of SEZs in DPRK, which are physically and 
legally separated from the rest of the country, with special economic incentives 
given to foreign companies. Examples of SEZs in DPRK include Rajin-Sonbong 
FTZ, Sinuiju Administrative Zone (SAZ) and Kaesong. The first two ended in 
failure due to a lack of investment and poor planning.  
 
In the SMEs’ questionnaire, companies were asked about the potential 
locations for future investment. The results show that investors favour locations 
located on the west coast with 37.5% choosing Nampo as their top destination 
for future investment. French (2004) deems Nampo as the most important port 
in DPRK. It has frequent sailings with Shanghai and Dalian as well as irregular 
services to the Middle East and Europe. There are also regular routes between 
Incheon and Nampo. It is seen as an ideal place because of the newly 
constructed container terminal a few years ago. Its favourable geographical 
position allows it to take advantage of any exports from Kaesong to China 
and/or ROK. In addition, there are several gold (Suan) and iron (Eun-yul) mines 
located nearby, which can be exported out of Nampo. During the 2nd Inter-
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Korean summit, Nampo was one of the two places earmarked for future 
shipbuilding hub. According to the results of the quantitative findings, 
investment from small and large SMEs is likely to be similar with the majority of 
small SME investing between US$1-9 million while large SMEs will invest 
between US$10-99 million. Nampo is likely to comprise of investors from the 
electronics industry investing between US$1-99 million and the minerals 
industry investing between US$1-9 million.  
 
Some 32.6% of the respondents picked Sinuiju as the next potential location 
with investment a majority of investment between US$1-9 million. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, Sinuiju is an active cross-border trade city with Dandong in China. 
Chinese traders sell a range of goods from electronic equipment to stainless 
steel goods while DPRK merchant trade agricultural, textile and clothing. 
According to Marquand (2005), Sinuiju possesses relatively good infrastructure 
for ocean, railway and road transportation. There are gold, silver and coal 
mines near Sinuiju which provides the city with an advantage for outsourcing of 
raw materials to nearby Chinese cities in the Liaoning province. In Sinuiju, 
smaller SMEs will play a greater role with investment between US$1-9 million. 
The main industries interested will be companies from the electronics, minerals 
and basic metals sector.   
 
The other potential locations are Pyongyang, Wonsan and Rajin-Sonbong. 
Pyongyang and Wonsan are likely to attract small SMEs who are willing to 
invest less than US$1million while large SMEs will form the majority of investors 
in Rajin-Sonbong. These cities could be integrated into the developmental plans 
under different scenarios discussed in RQ1, especially in the peaceful 
reunification scenario. 
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9.5 RQ3 – Transport Infrastructure Priorities for DPRK 
 
The major objective in this study was to ascertain the transport infrastructure 
and logistics development priorities for DPRK from the perspectives of experts 
and investors.  
 
Experts and investors share the same view that road access should be the top 
priority for investment in infrastructure. DPRK’s road network consists of four 
main routes. The first major route connects Kaesong-Pyongyang-Sinuiju. This 
provides added incentives to investors who wish to invest in Sinuiju to transport 
their products back to the South via this route. Similarly, companies in the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex are able to rely on suppliers based in Sinuiju or 
Pyongyang. The second arterial road links Nampo to Wonsan. Exports to Japan 
are able to use this route to transport their goods through the port of Wonsan. 
Nampo is the most important port in DPRK, and road accessibility to the ports 
should be a major priority.  
 
Experts and investors differ in their opinions regarding the next infrastructure 
priority. Experts view railways as the next priority while investors choose 
maritime mode, with 37.5 per cent of them planning to use maritime modes to 
transport their goods out of Nampo. This could be explained through theoretical 
and practical aspects of transport planning. Railways have been frequently 
advocated in the literature and in the ROK government as the main focus of 
infrastructure due to historical links. This is supported through the view of 
Bulychev (2006) who emphasised the importance of rail projects to DPRK 
which will gradually help establish the state to be an important connecting 
transport hub. Experts view the connection of the TKR as an important missing 
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link that will translate into costs savings for cargoes originating from Busan to 
Europe (Ahn 2002). However, this idea might be too simplistic as it requires 
enormous investment into the upgrading and double-tracking of railway lines in 
DPRK. In addition, the different gauges used in countries will also complicate 
the transport process. In contrast, the views of investors seem to differ because 
besides using road transport for shipping to ROK and China, their export-
oriented goods would be destined for destinations in Europe, USA and Japan 
which are mostly accessible only by maritime transport. Hence, maritime ports 
will be expected to play crucial roles in the transportation of goods.  
 
9.6 RQ4 - Managerial skills for DPRK managers 
 
Analysing the results of the qualitative questionnaire, experts’ opinions on the 
need for acquiring knowledge and skills in economics, finance and commercial 
practices are in agreement with the literature and exploratory study. In Chapter 
2, several changes to DPRK’s economic management system were discussed. 
Part of the changes include enhanced autonomy of factories and enterprises, 
the introduction of competition and other economic notions include financial and 
monetary economies, price control mechanism as well as intellectual market 
goods. The results of the exploratory study also suggested that DPRK 
managers should gain experience in dealing in joint ventures and businesses 
with foreign companies.  
 
New areas suggested by experts include engineering and information 
technology.  DPRK will require managers with skills in civil engineering in the 
future as the country needs to rebuild its dilapidated infrastructure such as 
roads, railways and mines. According to one expert in the exploratory study, 
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DPRK has regularly sent managers overseas to countries in the former Russian 
bloc and China to learn and acquire more skills. Information technology is one 
area which DPRK has expertise in, especially in the area of animation. There is 
a huge computer centre dedicated to movie and cartoon animation and it 
regularly receives requests from film companies all over the world.  
 
Some experts commented on the need for English language training. However, 
based on conversations with other experts who have been in DPRK, the locals 
possess very good linguistics ability. University students are required to 
undertake two major foreign languages such as Russian, English, Chinese and 
German.  
 
9.7 RQ5 - Main markets for DPRK-made products 
 
In the exploratory results, ROK, China and Europe were mentioned as possible 
destinations for DPRK-made products. The qualitative and quantitative surveys 
were used to ascertain the opinions of experts and potential investors. Both 
surveys confirmed the exploratory findings and literature that China and ROK 
would be the largest potential export destinations. In Chapter 2, it was 
mentioned that trade figures show that China and ROK are DPRK’s largest 
trading partner. The findings of the quantitative survey also support the experts’ 
opinions. Some 39.5 per cent and 28.7 per cent of the respondents choose 
China and ROK respectively as potential markets. Another 14.7 per cent of the 
respondents indicated Europe while 8.3 per cent choose Russia. Of products in 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex, it has been reported that all the products are 
shipped to ROK for sale or export to destinations in the EU, Russia and China 
(Nanto and Manyin 2011) 
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Some experts cited close proximity to export markets, large market size and 
economic concerns over the possible collapse of DPRK as possible reasons. 
China and ROK borders DPRK and exports are accessible through rail, road 
and water transport. Similarly, both countries have large populations which are 
able to support any exports from DPRK. Chinese merchants have been trading 
along the Chinese border cities of Liaoning and Jilin province for many years. 
As analysed and discussed earlier in RQ1, China and ROK are concerned 
about the economic impact of a collapsed-DPRK. Hence, in order to lower any 
potential unification costs and to prevent the economy from collapse, China and 
ROK have to continue to import DPRK-made products. This can be seen 
through the numerous economic projects (e.g. Kaesong Industrial Complex and 
Rajin transport projects) initiated by both countries. Companies exporting to 
China and ROK will most likely use road transport to export products from 
Nampo and Sinuiju.   
 
9.8 RQ6 – Industries which DPRK can focus in 
 
Experts and potential investors were asked about the type of products suitable 
for exports in order to ascertain the type of industries DPRK can focus in. At 
present, companies in the Kaesong Industrial Complex focus on textile, 
electronics, watch and clocks, cosmetics, and electrical parts (Nanto and 
Manyin 2011). 
Experts expressed several opinions on the types of products suitable for export. 
They agree that DPRK should focus on light industry, such as apparel/textile, 
kitchenware, watch and bags, similar to those commission-on-process products 
in the KIC. DPRK has the potential to build up a viable assembly industry so 
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that it can feed its population by providing jobs for its people. This can be seen 
in the SEZs along the coastal regions in China where many factories are 
located focusing on labour intensive industries. Raw materials such as minerals, 
gold, iron ore, coal, and manganese are also potential products mentioned by 
experts. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, DPRK possesses many natural 
resources which are currently untapped due to its poor infrastructure. Seafood 
products will also potentially attract buyers in ROK and Japan.  
 
SMEs indicated ‘minerals/ore’, ‘electronics’, and ‘basic metals’ as the top three 
industries that they will invest in. As mentioned in previous sections, 
minerals/ores and electronics form the core industries for potential investment. 
DPRK can also focus on basic metal products such as aluminium which has 
been processed from minerals/ores. Appendix X provides a table showing the 
size of investment corresponding to the potential industries and locations. A 
majority of the investors who indicated interest in investing in the above three 
industries is likely to commit US$1-9 million dollars to set up factories in either 
Nampo or Sinuiju.  
 
9.9 RQ 7 - Factors which influence location choices of ROK SMEs and 
logistics companies 
 
Chapter 4 introduced the concept of location theory and factors which are linked 
to international location decisions. One of the objectives of this study was to 
ascertain the factors which determine the location decisions of potential ROK 
investors. In the SMEs’ questionnaire, respondents were asked to ascertain the 
relative importance of the 58 factors. From the descriptive statistics of the 
results, potential investors view economic, infrastructure and spatial factors as 
crucial in determining their location factors. Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) also 
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found infrastructure to be most crucial factor. However, their findings on spatial 
factors show that it is not an important consideration for companies. ‘Road 
access’ (mean = 4.67) was the highest factor with ‘SEZs’ (mean = 4.58) and 
‘good supply of cheap land’ (mean = 4.55) as the next most crucial factors.  
 
In order to reduce the data and enhance the effectiveness of the results, a 
decision was made to conduct a factor analysis. The principal component 
analysis revealed four factors which have been named as ‘legal’, ‘political 
economy’, ‘spatial’ and ‘infrastructure’. As there are no previous studies that 
can be compared with, these factors will be explained by their composition. The 
next chapter will propose policy guidelines for governments and companies on 
how to apply these factors when investing in DPRK. 
 
‘Legal’ refers to the regulatory environment in DPRK which is susceptible to 
frequent and sudden changes. Investors are concerned that new regulations as 
well as labour and tax laws are not implemented suddenly. They were 
concerned that income taxes for foreign employees should be low. It is 
important for the ROK government and companies to ensure that DPRK gives 
assurances that sudden changes do not occur.  
 
‘Political economy’ has implications for the business environment in DPRK. 
Potential investors view the importance of potential reunification as having an 
impact on DPRK embarking on reforms leading to a market economy which will 
lead to local and regional development. Having witnessed several SEZs such 
as Kaesong and Kumgangsan, the investors view the importance of having 
SEZs in place in Nampo and Sinuiju in DPRK which are not laden with 
excessive bureaucracy and corruption. Another issue which concerns investors 
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is the currency exchange risk depending on the status of the country and also 
the level of currency restrictions which control the amount of money which 
investors can take out of the country.  
 
‘Spatial’ refers to the supply chain network of both upstream and downstream 
activities. Investors are concerned about the availability of raw materials, which 
is either sourced locally or in nearby countries to keep total costs low. The 
availability of natural resources is important to investors in industries such as 
basic metals and electronics. However, the infrastructure in most of the DPRK 
mines is primitive in nature which requires extensive investment. Another area 
of importance is the availability of major suppliers in the first and second tier 
which provides immediate parts for the final assembly or production. 
Downstream activities refer to the export destinations. Investors are concerned 
about the access to domestic markets as well as access to neighbouring 
markets in China and Japan.  
 
‘Infrastructure’ issues include the accessibility of different types of transportation 
modes. Analysis confirmed that road and rail access are the two most important 
transport modes that need to be rehabilitated to provide a smooth distribution 
system for factories located in areas such as Nampo and Sinuiju. As mentioned 
in the literature, an H-shaped transport network has been suggested for road 
and rail access with four corners with Nampo and Sinuiju located in the east 
coast and Rajin-Sonbong and Wonsan located in the west (Kim et al 2006). As 
discussed in RQ3, investors regard maritime ports as an important transport 
mode which will be used for exports to countries such as Thailand and 
Singapore, both of whom have foreign trade with DPRK (Ahn 2002). Nampo on 
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the east coast has been redeveloped with modern container terminal berths 
while Wonsan on the west coast is a potential port for exports to Japan.  
 
9.10 RQ 8 - Types of logistics services/concepts to be introduced in 
DPRK 
 
In the logistics companies’ questionnaire, respondents were asked about their 
logistics operations in DPRK. From the results, this study is able to determine 
previous logistics service requirements and ascertain future services required. 
However, only 24 per cent of the respondents indicated that they had operated 
‘previously’ in NK while the rest had not operated in DPRK before. Although this 
analysis is insufficient to reveal any conclusive results of the type of services 
needed, it is indicative. Appendix XIII shows the results of the scope of logistics 
companies’ in DPRK. From the analysis of the results, the most likely services 
will be freight forwarding and warehousing with areas of concentration in 
Nampo and Sinuiju.   
 
9.11 Summary of Findings 
 
This chapter discussed and analysed the main findings of this research by 
triangulating the results of the qualitative research, the quantitative survey with 
the results of the exploratory study.  
 
Three scenarios – status quo, collapse and reunification, were developed with 
each depicting the likely transport strategies and developments. The status quo 
scenario will most likely continue for the next five to eight years unless one of 
the wildcard situations, such as the death of Kim Jong-il occurs, which might 
result in uncertainty and instability in the region. Further research is necessary 
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to continue the scenario analysis dependent on the political and economic 
climate in DPRK and the interests of stakeholders.  
 
Nampo and Sinuiju have been identified as the top two potential investments. 
Nampo is an important maritime gateway for DPRK where a majority of the 
imports and exports passes through the port. The place can be further 
developed with a cluster of agglomerated industries concentrated on electronic 
and minerals. SMEs have indicated a willingness to invest between US$1-99 
million in Nampo. Sinuiju was previously earmarked as a SEZ by the DPRK 
government but the plans were soon abandoned after the appointment of the 
administrative minister did not please the Chinese government. Sinuiju is an 
active trading hub between merchants in DPRK and China. The city can further 
develop its minerals industry as there are many mines around the region. This 
will tie in with China’s plans to develop the North-east region around Liaoning 
and Jilin provinces.   
 
Road transport was identified as the top priority for transport development in 
DPRK. Road networks can be developed around the Nampo and Sinuiju 
transport network to take advantage of the potential investment in the electronic 
and mineral industries. Rail transport is the next investment priority. Due to the 
difficulties in reconstructing the rail tracks, huge investments are needed to 
convert the tracks from single-line to double-line. However, it has been reported 
that railway tracks around some of the mines are already double-track.  
 
DPRK managers can begin to acquire skills and knowledge in the areas of 
economic and finance. Countries such as the UK, China, Singapore and 
Switzerland have regularly invited the DPRK government to send students and 
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officials abroad to study in their universities. DPRK has seen a change in its 
economic policy with younger managers given more authority and autonomy to 
make productive decisions.  
 
It was concluded that the main export markets will still be China and ROK with 
some exports to Russia and Europe. China and ROK have a strong interest to 
sustain DPRK to prevent a sudden collapse which would create chaos along 
the border regions. The main industries to focus on will be electronics and 
minerals. DPRK can take advantage of the extensive labour pool to create light 
industry assembly plants or mining sites. 
 
Four factors influence the location choices of potential ROK investors. They are 
concerned about the legal risk in DPRK. As laws are susceptible to sudden 
changes, they would like more protection of their assets. The investors also 
view the political and economic environment as important, particularly the 
potential for reunification resulting in local and regional development and 
market economy. The level of bureaucracy and risk of corruption will also affect 
their investment decisions. The availability of raw materials and suppliers also 
concern potential investors. As mentioned earlier, the investors view access to 
road and railways as important.    
 
Warehousing and freight forwarding are the top two logistics services requested 
by companies who have prior investment in DPRK. Further research could be 
conducted into case studies of different companies and mapping out their 
supply chains to gain further insights into the types of logistics services and 
skills required in DPRK. 
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The next and final chapter provides theoretical and practical advice for 
governments and companies on how to make use of the above findings in order 
to implement policies. It also discusses theoretical implications for the literature 
on DPRK as well as further research. 
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CHAPTER 10 - CONCLUSION 
 
The previous chapter contextualised the findings of this study by triangulating 
the results of the exploratory study with the qualitative interviews and the 
quantitative survey to answer the eight sub-research questions. This concluding 
chapter will provide a summary to this study by evaluating the main research 
objectives and question. It will also summarise the theoretical implications for 
academia and policy implications for government and business organisations 
through emphasising the contributions this research has made to the literature 
on DPRK, in particular transport and logistics. Lastly, this chapter will seek to 
address the main limitations of this study and provide suggestions for future 
research.  
 
10.1 Evaluation of Research Objectives and Main Research Question 
 
The primary aim of this study was to gain new insights into the development of 
DPRK in the context of the political and economic impacts on the potential 
scenarios of DPRK, which will affect potential investors’ decision to invest in 
DPRK. This in turn, will have implications on the types of transport and logistics 
strategies within the country. Table 10.1 presents an overview of how this 
research dealt with the respective research objectives.  
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Research objective Addressed as follows 
To analyse the political and 
economic factors affecting 
DPRK. 
Chapter 2 examined the political economy of 
North Korea, with focus on the Juche 
ideology and efforts to reform the country 
with SEZs and currency controls. In addition, 
the present political and economic factors 
surrounding DPRK were analysed in the 
exploratory and qualitative research phase.  
To appraise the present 
conditions of transport and 
logistics infrastructure in DPRK  
Chapter 3 described the current conditions 
of transport and logistics infrastructure in 
DPRK. The results of the primary research 
emphasise the importance of access to road 
and rail.  
To propose scenarios 
surrounding development in 
DPRK 
Chapter 4 proposed several scenarios of 
DPRK which were extended during the 
qualitative research phase where experts 
were asked to comment on three scenarios. 
The primary research identified ‘status quo’ 
as the most likely scenario for the next five 
to eight years.  
To evaluate the factors 
affecting potential investors’ 
location choices to develop 
transport and logistics 
strategies 
Chapter 4 identified several location theories 
and factors which affect international 
location decisions and ranked their 
importance following the results of the 
quantitative survey. The primary research 
also evaluated transport and logistics 
strategies. 
Table 10.1: Main research objectives and how they were addressed by this 
study 
 
The central research question to this research was to ascertain the implications 
of ROK SMEs’ and logistics companies’ location decisions and their impact on 
developing potential transport and logistics policies and strategies in DPRK. 
Due to the DPRK’s unique and reclusive nature, this study had to first establish 
the most probable scenarios that will occur in DPRK through qualitative 
interviews with experts as any data published by DPRK or even ROK is not 
deemed reliable. Quantitative surveys were conducted concurrently on SMEs 
and logistics companies to ascertain the potential location decisions, level of 
investment, types of industries to focus and factors that will determine location 
decisions.  
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Several implications can be inferred from the analysis of this study. Firstly, 
companies are most likely to invest $1-9 million dollars in DPRK, which implies 
that investment is likely to be small in the initial stages. Next, two potential 
locations for investments – Nampo and Sinuiju, were identified. Nampo would 
potentially attract 30 SMEs while 16 SMEs indicated preference for Sinuiju. 
Thirdly, the electronics and minerals industry would potentially spearhead 
investment into DPRK. Fourthly, China and ROK would form the main export 
markets for DPRK-made products. Lastly, road transport is the most preferred 
transport mode when exporting goods out of DPRK, with water transport 
coming next.  
 
In the process of planning for transport and logistics strategies in DPRK, it 
would be useful to take into account the findings of this study. Strategies could 
possibly focus on developing the road transport network around Nampo and 
Sinuiju to support the development of cluster industries around the area. In 
addition, the transport network leading to the mines would also have to be 
upgraded to take advantage of the underdeveloped mining industry.  
 
10.2 Theoretical Implications 
 
This thesis provides various theoretical implications relating to the study into 
DPRK. 
 
All published research into DPRK is either qualitative (Harvie, 1992; Herold, 
1996; Lee, 2000) or quantitative (Meade, 1997; and Lee and Deok, 2004) in 
nature. Moreover typically only secondary data is used due to the lack of 
reliable data. This study overcame the limitations by collecting primary data 
through a triangulation of qualitative and quantitative approaches on the views 
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of potential SMEs and logistics companies who have expressed interest in 
investing and have had previous logistical operations in DPRK. This new 
approach provides useful references for future research into DPRK to use a 
triangulation approach comparing the views of DPRK experts and practitioners.   
 
A vast majority of the literature on DPRK tends to focus only on the political and 
economic aspects of the country (Lee, 1996; Noland, 2000; Park 2005). There 
is limited literature focusing on transport and logistics – Kim et al (2001) and 
Ducruet (2008) being exceptions. This study collected primary data through 
qualitative and quantitative research on the opinions of DPRK experts, SMEs 
and logistics companies on the types of industries to invest in, the main export 
markets for DPRK-made products and the types of transport mode used in 
transporting the finished products. Further research can be conducted into other 
SMEs and possible multinational companies.  
 
Many research studies into the scenarios of DPRK limited their focus to political 
and/or economics issues (Nautilus Institute, 2003; Park, 2003; Lankov, 2008; 
and Stares and Wit, 2009). This study is the first to incorporate transport and 
logistics strategies into the scenarios of DPRK. The exploratory study confirms 
the existence of three basic scenarios – status quo, collapse and reunification. 
Under each strategy, various transport and logistics strategies were 
recommended. 
 
Location theory has been applied in research on emerging economies such as 
China and Vietnam (Liu et al, 1999; Zhou et al. 2002; and Kawai, 2009). 
However, limited research has been conducted into ROK FDI – only two 
research papers were found (Kimura and Lee, 1998 and Kang and Lee, 2004), 
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of which both used secondary data. This study is the first study to use primary 
research to investigate ROK FDI location choices. It also developed a set of 
location factors, which are unique to a country like DPRK.  
 
10.3 Policy Implications for Governments and Business Organisations 
 
The previous section discussed some theoretical implications and described the 
main contribution of this study to existing literature. This section adds value to 
the practical aspects of this research by presenting the policy implications for 
governments and business organisations.  
 
This study revealed that road transport should be given priority over rail 
transport. Historically, the ROK government has placed importance on rail 
transport, preferring to connect the TKR. However, the results of the findings 
showed that investors place a higher importance on road access over rail 
access. The UN has conducted several studies into the feasibility of 
rehabilitating road transport. The ROK government should understand the 
perspective of potential investors to use road transport to export their products 
and place a priority on this mode when conducting talks with DPRK. 
 
This study also revealed that potential investors regard Nampo and Sinuiju as 
places for investment. In the status quo scenario, it is unlikely that Nampo will 
be allowed to be developed into a SEZ as it is located near Pyongyang. SEZs 
are normally located a distance away from Pyongyang, e.g. Kaesong and Rajin-
Sobong. However, there are investment opportunities for transport and logistics 
companies in Nampo as DPRK looks to expand the container port. On the 
contrary, there is a great potential to once again develop Sinuiju as SEZ. The 
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Chinese government wants to develop its North-east regions and will see it as 
an excellent opportunity to use Sinuiju just as it is using Rajin-Sobong in the 
north.  
 
This study also revealed that companies in the electronics and minerals/ore 
industry will provide the majority of investment in DPRK. Governments and 
companies can be encouraged to form joint ventures with local DPRK 
companies to provide funding and technological expertise, especially in the 
area of mining. Companies in the electronics industry can set up assembly 
plants in light industries to take advantage of the inexpensive labour and land, 
similar to what is happening in the Kaesong Industrial Complex.  
 
DPRK managers need to be more exposed to various skills and knowledge, 
especially in engineering and transport. The findings of the exploratory study 
revealed that DPRK students and managers have traditionally gone overseas to 
study finance and economics in Universities in China, Singapore and parts of 
Eastern Europe. Further knowledge and skills can be developed into 
engineering, agriculture, commercial practices and public policy.      
 
10.4 Limitations of the Study 
 
Although the findings of this thesis contribute to the existing knowledge on 
DPRK and provide managerial implications for companies, caution should be 
taken in applying the suggested proposals because of the limitations of the 
study. 
 
This study employed a cross-sectional research design. Therefore, the findings 
of the qualitative and quantitative research relates to the 2007 time period. 
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Unfortunately, this study did not employ a longitudinal approach (i.e. 
investigating any changes in the importance of location choices by studying the 
phenomenon over a couple of years). As a consequence, the cross-sectional 
nature of the data may not reflect the changes in any opinions of the experts or 
potential investors. However, a longitudinal study presents practical difficulties 
as managers in companies might not be contactable over prolonged time 
periods and the system environment may change fundamentally to deny 
comparability.  
 
The decision to use only ROK SMEs in the quantitative survey was based on 
the fact that the Kaesong Industrial Complex has been established since 2004 
and there are many SMEs who have indicated their interests to invest in DPRK. 
However, the focus on only ROK SMEs limits the generalizability of the findings.  
 
Another limitation of this research stems from the small sample size in the 
qualitative research and the low response rates in the quantitative surveys. The 
small sample size can be attributed to the number of experts who specialise in 
DPRK, and even smaller number with expertise in transport and logistics. The 
reasons for the low response rates were the lack of time of CEOs/managers, 
corporate policy of not filling in any questionnaires and lack of interest in the 
research project. This resulted in limited use of statistical techniques. Therefore, 
only descriptive and less powerful non-parametric tests were appropriate. 
However, statistically significant findings did emerge. 
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10.5 Implications for Further Research 
 
In view of the above implications and limitations of this study, the following 
suggestions for further research are proposed: 
 
• Examining the factors which influence the location choices of Chinese and 
non-Korean SMEs: This study revealed the factors which influence ROK 
SMEs and logistics companies’ location choices. In order to deepen our 
understanding and provide a comparison, further research could 
concentrate on Chinese and foreign SMEs. Given the increased statistical 
population, such work would benefit from an increase in sample size. 
 
• Using other research designs (e.g. case studies/Delphi method): This study 
used a qualitative and quantitative approach which only revealed the 
existence of certain phenomena but cannot fully explain them. Therefore 
prospective researchers might use case studies or the Delphi method to 
overcome some of the limitations of this research. Case studies into 
industries and companies will reveal the supply chains of their products 
which provide in-depth information on the types of transport and logistics 
services required. The Delphi method allows for in-depth fact finding and 
this could be applicable to developing future scenarios of DPRK. 
 
• Applying more advanced statistical techniques: By extending the research 
into other non-Korean SMEs, the generalizability of findings and sample size 
will increase. Hence more advanced statistical techniques could be used to 
understand the relationship between location factors.  
 
263 
 
• Re-examining social and organisational factors: This study did not find high 
importance attached to a common culture and language on the location 
factors of SMEs and logistics companies. Organisational factors such as 
modern logistics providers and good logistics linkages did not rate highly. 
Further research could be conducted in the form of personal interviews with 
managers to explore their perceptions further.  
 
10.6 Summary 
 
This study sought to study DPRK from a transport and logistics perspective. 
The current transport and logistics infrastructure was appraised. The 
development of scenarios of DPRK incorporated transport and logistics 
strategies based on each scenario type. The findings also used a mixed-
methods approach to contribute to the existing literature on DPRK, which has 
been either qualitative or quantitative in nature. This study also applied a multi-
disciplinary approach using location theory to understand ROK enterprises’ 
choices regarding location factors.  
 
Besides contributing theoretically to the existing literature on DPRK, this thesis 
provides practical implications for governments and companies identifying 
areas of investment opportunities and policies to adopt when dealing with 
DPRK.  
 
In summary the major contributions of this thesis are that it offers a novel study 
to: 
 
• incorporate transport and logistics aspects into developing scenarios of 
DPRK. 
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• incorporate a triangulation approach to studying DPRK. 
• examine the factors which affect the location choices of ROK enterprises.   
 
This study is an initial step in the study of DPRK. Further research is needed to 
understand more fully the transport and logistics strategies needed to develop 
DPRK into a potential transit hub in Northeast Asia, connecting Asia to Europe.  
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Appendix I: Summary of Factors Influencing Location Choices 
 
Factors Authors 
Access to distribution channels Karakaya and Stahl (1989) 
Administrative efficiency and transparency Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Agglomeration economies Herrin and Pernia (1987); 
Urata and Kawai (2000); Zhang (2001); 
Cheng and Stough (2006) 
Li and Park (2006);  
Hong and Chin(2007); Kawai (2009) 
Attractive living environment for managers Herrin and Pernia (1987); 
Availability of energy Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Availability of Free Trade Zones Zhang (2001); Oum and Park (2004); 
Kawai (2009) 
Availability of industrial sites MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003); 
Availability of land Oum and Park (2004); 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Availability of raw materials Blair and Premus (1987); 
Karakaya and Stahl (1989); 
Jungthirapanich and Benjaming (1995) 
Availability of skilled labour Herrin and Pernia (1987); 
Zhang (2001);  
MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003); 
Oum and Park (2004); 
Urata and Kawai (2000); 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005): 
Cheng and Stough (2006);  
Hong (2007); 
Hong and Chin(2007) 
Availability of suppliers MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003); 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Availability of transport and 
telecommunications 
Herrin and Pernia (1987); 
Jungthirapanich and Benjaming (1995); 
Urata and Kawai (2000); 
Zhang (2001); Asiedu (2002); 
MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003); 
Oum and Park (2004); 
Cheng and Stough (2006); 
Li and Park (2006); 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005); 
Hong (2007); 
Hong and Chin(2007); Kawai (2009) 
Competitive financial sector Oum and Park (2004); 
Cost of business services Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Cost of energy Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005); 
Cheng and Stough (2006) 
Cost of labour Herrin and Pernia (1987); 
Urata and Kawai (2000); 
Zhang (2001); Asiedu (2002); 
Oum and Park (2004); 
Cheng and Stough (2006) 
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Kawai (2009) 
Cost of land Herrin and Pernia (1987); 
Jungthirapanich and Benjaming (1995); 
MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003); 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005); 
Cheng and Stough (2006) 
Cost of transport infrastructure Blair and Premus (1987); 
De Noble and Galbraith (1992); 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Cultural, norms, language Zhang (2001); 
MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003) 
Exchange rate volatility  Urata and Kawai (2000) 
Flexible immigration Oum and Park (2004) 
Housing, schools, quality of life Herrin and Pernia (1987); 
Jungthirapanich and Benjaming (1995); 
MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003); 
Oum and Park (2004) 
Key competitors’ location Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Legal system MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003); 
Li and Park (2006) 
Level of corruption Aidis (2005) 
Level of government support Zhang (2001); 
Oum and Park (2004); 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Modern logistics providers Oum and Park (2004) 
Openness of host country Asiedu (2002); Zhang (2001) 
Personal income taxes for foreign 
employees 
Oum and Park (2004) 
Political stability Asiedu (2002); 
MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003); 
Oum and Park (2004) 
Presence of supporting government 
agencies 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Protection of foreign investment Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Proximity to market Jungthirapanich and Benjaming (1995); 
MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003); 
Oum and Park (2004); 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Proximity to suppliers Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Purchasing power of local markets Jungthirapanich and Benjaming (1995) 
Purchasing power of locals Aidis (2005) 
Reliable electrical power and water supply Herrin and Pernia (1987); 
Jungthirapanich and Benjaming (1995); 
MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003) 
Size of market Zhang (2001); 
MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003); 
Oum and Park (2004); 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005); 
Cheng and Stough (2006); 
Hong (2007);  
Hong and Chin(2007); 
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Kawai (2009) 
Stability of fiscal policies Herrin and Pernia (1987); 
MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003); 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Stability of government policies Urata and Kawai (2000); 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005): 
Cheng and Stough (2006); 
Li and Park (2006); 
Hong (2007) 
Stability of market conditions MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003); 
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
Stability of tax policies Herrin and Pernia (1987); 
Jungthirapanich and Benjaming (1995); 
Asiedu (2002); 
MacCarthy and Atthirawong (2003); 
Oum and Park (2004); 
Aidis (2005);  
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005) 
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Appendix II: Overview of Scenario Approach 
 
Scenario planning has its origins in the military in the 1950s where Herman 
Kahn developed war-planning scenarios at the RAND Corporation and later 
around the 1960s in an institute which he founded, The Hudson Institute. His 
work is well documented (Pearman 1988 and Zentner 1982)) and his book “The 
Year 2000” published in 1967 is often quoted (Kahn and Wiener 1967). In that 
publication, scenarios were defined ((1967, 24) as  
 
“A hypothetical sequence of events constructed for the purpose of 
focusing attention on causal processes and decision points.” 
 
After Herman Kahn, scenarios have been used as a business planning tool 
since the early 1970s. Scenarios became popular as a strategic methodology 
through Pierre Wack’s description of the Shell scenarios used during the 1970s 
and 1980s (Wack 1985 and Cornelius et al. 2005). Since then, many schools of 
thoughts and methods of scenario planning have been developed (Godet 1987; 
Postma and Liebl 2005; Ringland 1998; Schwartz 1991 and van der Heijden 
1996) and their history has been well documented (Bradfield et al. 2005 and 
Stead and Banister 2003). Figure II.a depicts the history of business scenarios.   
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Figure II.a: The History of Business Scenarios 
 
Source: Millett (2003, 17)  
 
This section will provide definitions of scenarios and scenario planning. 
Thereafter it will examine the different approaches and methods to classify the 
different scenario types. It will discuss the processes of scenario construction 
before concluding. 
 
II.i Scenario Definitions 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary provides a number of definitions that point to the 
use of the word toward the ‘story’ end of the spectrum: 
 
“Scenario is a description of an imagined situation or a postulated 
sequence of events; an outline of intended course of action; a scientific 
description or speculative model intended to account for observable 
facts.” 
 
According to Ayers (1969), scenarios are logical and plausible set of events, 
both serial and simultaneous which means that the scenario building process 
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involves more than one picture of what might happen. Stead and Banister 
(2003), define a scenario as a tool that describes pictures of the future world 
within a specific framework and under specified assumptions. Millett (2003) 
further describes scenarios as a tool to emphasise the uncertainty surrounding 
the business environment and the different ways it could evolve. Ringland 
(2006, 4) defined scenario planning as dealing with future events/situations 
which are uncertain: 
 
“That part of strategic planning that relates to the tools and technologies 
for managing the uncertainties of the future” 
 
Scenarios and forecasting are not alike. Porter (1985, 17) defines a scenario as:  
 
“An internally consistent view of what the future might turn out to be – not 
a forecast, but one possible future outcome.”  
 
Pearman (1988, 74) further differentiates scenarios from forecasting and 
enlarges its role beyond corporate planning to include transport planning: 
 
“Scenarios do not constitute a forecast, either collectively or individually. 
Rather, as a set their aim is in some sense to span the range of futures 
which might reasonably be expected to occur, and hence to provide a 
broad-ranging background against which policy assessment can be 
undertaken.” 
 
Schnaars (1987) depicts scenario analysis to be a highly qualitative procedure 
using Delphi technique and Cross-Impact analysis. Ratcliffe’s (2002) work 
seems to be in agreement as he analysed the historical context where the 
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popularity of qualitative methods such as structure and unstructured 
interviewing emerged. However, Jenkins (1997), points out the use of 
quantitative methods through mathematical programmes to select plausible 
alternate futures for scenario development. Berkhout and Hertin (2002, 40) 
balance both viewpoints by advocating the use of both methods in scenario 
planning: 
 
“Quantitative information was used as a way of synthesising and 
illustrating the qualitative content of the scenarios.” 
 
Policy scenarios allow the role and effect of different policies and proposals to 
be studied across a range of possible futures. May (1982) identifies a number of 
potential benefits of policy scenarios to decision-making, including: 
 
• Providing useful frameworks for decision-making – scenarios allow 
decision-making issues to be explored using a range of alternative 
scenarios, reflecting different assumptions about the future; 
• Identifying dangers and opportunities – considering a range alternative 
futures increases the likelihood of identifying possible problems and 
opportunities in policy-making; 
• Suggesting a variety of possible approaches – the use of scenarios may 
generate a range of approaches to tackle issues or problems whereas 
the use of forecasts, based on single theories or simple extrapolations, 
often lead to the pursuit of singular solutions; 
• Helping to assess alternative policies and actions – scenarios may for 
example be used to identify the usefulness of different policies under 
alternative future conditions; 
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• Increasing creativity and choice in decision-making – identifying possible 
future developments and avoiding the acceptance of current trends as 
inevitable opens up new possibilities for policy development. 
 
Rotmans et al. (2000) concluded that many of the definitions of scenarios share 
some of the following characteristics: 
 
• Scenarios are hypothetical, describing possible future pathways; 
• Scenarios describe dynamic processes, representing sequences of 
events over a period of time; 
• Scenarios consists of states, driving forces, events, consequences and 
actions which are causally related; and 
• Scenarios start from an initial state (usually the present), depicting a final 
state at a fixed time horizon. 
 
Nijkamp and Blass (1994, 82) differentiated the role of scenario and other 
techniques in transport planning: 
 
“It is one of the methods and techniques of perspective policy research 
that have become very popular since the late sixties. Especially in the 
case of unstructured decision problems with uncertain outcomes, 
scenario analysis may be an appropriate instrument. It does not only 
contain a description of one or more future situations, but also a 
description of a consistent series of events that may connect the present 
situation with a described future situation (s).” 
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There are several advantages in using scenarios. Zwier et al. (1994) provides a 
summary below.  
 
Table II.a: Advantages of Using Scenarios 
From: To: 
- Focus on quantified variables - Focus on qualitative pictures 
- More emphasis on details - More emphasis on trends 
- Results determined by status quo - Results based on future images 
- From present to future - From future to present 
- Deterministic analysis - Creative thinking 
- Closed future - Open future 
- Statistical-econometric tests - Plausible reasoning 
- From simple to complex - From complex to simple 
- From quantitative to qualitative - From qualitative to quantitative 
- Single track thinking - Multi-track thinking 
- Reactive problem driven - Proactive vision driven 
- Multiple implicit assumptions - Transparent simple assumptions 
- Limited set of options - Open range of options 
- Model-determined mind - Alertness to signals of uncertainty 
Source: Zwier et al. (1994) 
 
Through researching the future by recognising the warning signs and the drama 
that is unfolding, one can avoid surprises, adapt and act effectively. Ultimately, 
the end result of scenario planning is not a more accurate picture of tomorrow 
but better decisions about the future (Schwartz 1991).  
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II.ii Historical Perspective 
 
Since Kahn and Wiener developed scenario writing about 50-60 years ago, 
different schools of thoughts and approaches on scenario analysis have 
emerged and drive scenario planning techniques among academics and 
practitioners today. Ringland (2006) describes the following set of organisations 
dealing with scenarios:  
 
• STRATX – MARKSTRAT3 (computer simulation); 
• Battelle Institute (BASICS/IFS); 
• The European Commission – “Shaping Factors – Shaping Actors”; 
• The French School (Godet approach: MICMAC); 
• The Futures Group (Fundamental Planning Method); 
• Generon Consulting;  
• Global Business Network (Schwartz’s approach – scenario checklist); 
• International Futures’ (Terra computer model); 
• SAMI Consulting; 
• SCMI (Systems thinking, Future-open thinking and Strategic Thinking); 
• Stanford Research Institute (SRI); and 
• The Arlington Institute (Wildcards and Trends); 
 
Stead and Banister (2003) identified three approaches in scenario planning – 
American, French and Swedish approach while Bradfied et al. (2005) provided 
a comprehensive review of the two main geographical centres in the 
development of scenario techniques - American and French.  
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The American approach follows on Kahn and Wiener and is practice in many 
business organisations such as SRI (Mandel and Wilson 1993 and Ralston and 
Wilson 2006), Global Business Network (Schwartz 1991) and Shell (Cornelius 
et al. 2005 and Schoemaker and van der Heijden 1992), which is known as the 
‘Intuitive Logics’ school. According to Gausemeier et al. (1998), the scenarios, 
which are qualitative in nature, are based on scenario logics, where are 
organised themes, principles, or assumptions that provide each scenario with a 
coherent, consistent, and plausible logical underpinning. The intuitive approach 
assumes that business decisions are based on a complex set of relationships 
among economic, political, technological, social, resource and environmental 
factors. These factors provide insights and help improve decision making in all 
business areas. Huss and Honton (1987) mentioned two other methodologies 
within this school of scenario planning – Trend-Impact Analysis (TIA) and 
Cross-Impact Analysis (CIA), which was developed by Olaf Helmer and Ted 
Gorden at the Rand Corporation. Both techniques are highly quantitative 
involving “probabilistic modified trends”. The TIA model was developed in the 
1970s by the Futures group, evolving as a result of the inability of traditional 
forecasting techniques to consider the effects of unprecedented future events. 
The CIA model which was first developed as a forecasting game has been 
further developed and used elsewhere including Battelle Memorial Institute (IFS 
– Interactive Future Simulations), Centre for Futures Research (INTERAX – 
Interactive Cross-Impact Simulation) and SMIC (French acronym for Cross 
Impact Systems and Matrices).  
 
The French school, La Prospective, was first developed by Gaston Berger in 
the 1950s at the same time when Khan was developing war-planning scenarios. 
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Bradfield et al. (2005) provides a comprehensive background. At that time, 
Berger was concerned with the long-term political and social future of France. 
The primary objective was to (Bradfield et al. 2005, 802): 
 
“Formulate an acceptable scenario-based methodology for developing 
positive images or ‘normative scenarios’ of the future and to lead these 
images into the political aread where they could serve, as a guiding 
vision to policy makers and the nation, providing a basis for action” 
  
In 1970s, Michel Godet, then head of the Department of Future Studies at 
SEMA Consulting Group, began to use scenario planning for several French 
national institutions. He developed several computer programme tools based on 
mathematics to build scenarios. Some of his tools include – morphological 
analysis for scenario building; MICMAC for identifying key variables; MACTOR 
to analyse actor’s strategies and SMIC-Prob-Expert to determine the feasibility 
of scenarios. Although Godet (2001) argues that his methods stand apart 
because of its use of mixed systems analysis tools and procedures, it is largely 
an amalgamation of the intuitive logics and probabilistic modified trend 
methodologies.  
 
Bradfield et al. (2005) points out that the main difference lies in the intended 
target audience. The early USA approach tended to be of a global nature 
whereas in France it was narrowly focused on a national level. However, as 
scenario planning evolved, it is now widely used in business as a strategy tool 
(Ringland 2006 and Schwartz 1991).  
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The last school of thought – the Swedish approach, mainly discussed and used 
by Stead and Banister (2003) has been little mentioned in other literature 
although it has been used twice for policy analysis in Sweden (Johansson et al. 
1983 and Olson 1994). Based on a variant of the French approach, this 
approach is normative in structure and uses a backcasting approach (discussed 
in more detailed in the next section) based on a selection of desirable futures or 
choices.  
 
II.iii Scenario Types and Techniques 
 
It appears from literature that there is little common consensus on the types of 
scenarios present today as seen from McDowall and Eames’s (2006) 
classification which is dissimilar with Nijkamp et al. (1998) and Rotman’s et al. 
(2000) and that of Masini and Vasquez (2000). McDowall and Eames’s include 
forecasting and backcasting under descriptive scenarios while both Rotman’s et 
al. and Nijkamp’s et al work listed forecasting and backcasting as separate 
categories. However, there are some general categories which scenarios are 
broadly classified. Based on a majority of the literature (Nijkamp et al. 1998 and 
Rotmans et al. 2000), scenarios can be classified into the following categories: 
 
• Descriptive vs. Normative scenarios; 
• Projective vs. Prospective scenarios; 
• Quantitative vs. Qualitative scenarios; 
• Common-sense oriented/Participatory vs. Expert-based scenarios; and 
• Trend, Reference or Knowledge-based scenarios 
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Descriptive or exploratory scenarios start from past and present trends and lead 
to likely futures irrespective of their (un)desirability. Exploratory scenarios 
emphasise drivers and do not specify a predetermined desirable end state 
towards which storylines must progress (McDowall and Eames 2006). 
Normative or anticipatory scenarios are built on alternative visions of the future 
that are desired. According to Nijkamp et al. (1998), normative scenarios may 
be constructed by applying norms and values of the authors and also by means 
of surveying and asking people to provide normative information.  
 
Projective or forecasting scenarios are forward directed where future pictures 
are based on current situation and exploring future consequences (Schwartz 
1991). McDowall and Eames (2006) explain forecasting as using quantitative 
extrapolation and modelling to predict likely futures from current trends. 
Prospective scenarios based on backcasting starts with pre-determined targets 
and objectives constructed through external opinions, then pathways leading 
from the current trends to the ‘end point’s are investigated.  
 
Quantitative scenarios involve the use of computer programs and mathematical 
modelling, similar to the ‘La Prospective’ French approach while qualitative 
scenarios are based on narratives, used in SRI and GBN. Narrative scenarios 
are useful in situations where data is weak or missing.  
 
Common-sense oriented or participatory scenarios build on the opinions of 
various stakeholders like decision makers, business people and public to 
generate new futures from such views and opinions. Participatory scenarios are 
getting more popular as it provides richness to the scenarios from stakeholders 
with different knowledge and expertise. Expert-based scenarios are constructed 
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through the opinions of experts in a certain field, i.e. transport or climate, who 
are assumed to be able to assess realistic and creative pictures of the future 
without being constrained by current wisdom (Nijkamp et al. 1998).  
 
Scenarios may be classified as trend, reference and knowledge scenarios. 
Trend scenarios may describe the impacts and the final picture of current 
policies and tends (Nijkamp et al 1998). It uses intuitive analysis by surveying 
experts. Reference scenarios provide extreme pictures of the future by 
analysing extreme developments and policies. It serves as a guide reference 
framework for less extreme scenarios to guide policy choices. Knowledge 
scenarios have higher credibility as it gathers opinions using scientific insights 
since it may be assumed that scientists may have the best insights into future 
developments (Nijkamp et al. 1998). Some of the common methods used 
include surveying, organising workshops and Delphi methods.  
 
There exist two other types of classification explained by van Notten et al. (2003) 
and Börjeson et al. (2006). Van Notten et al. (2003) divided their scenario 
typology into three themes (Table II.b) – “why” (project goal), “how” (process 
design) and “what” (scenario content). The first theme addresses the project’s 
goals and objectives – either exploration or decision-support. Under decision-
support, scenarios propose strategic options for policy makers. “Process 
design” deals with the scenario techniques such as the use of quantitative (La 
Prospective school) or qualitative data (Intuitive Logic school). “Scenario 
content” looks at the details of the developed scenarios describing the variables 
and dynamics inside each scenario. The variables refer to actors, factors and 
sectors (Rotmans et al. 2000) and dynamics are events and processes that 
make up the story in each scenario.  
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Table II.b: The Scenario Typology  
 
Source: van Notten et al. (2003, 426) 
 
Börjeson et al. (2006) developed their classification based on several principal 
questions – ‘What will happen?’, ‘What can happen?’ and ‘How can a specific 
target be reached?’ (Figure II.b). The first question is dealt with by ‘Predictive 
scenarios’ which consists of two different types – Forecasts and ‘What if’ 
scenarios. Forecasts deals with what will happen when the most likely 
development unfolds while ‘What if’ scenarios responds to what will happen on 
the condition of some specified events?. The second category – explorative 
scenarios aims to explore from different perspectives, situations that are 
regarded as possible to happen. External factors focus on factors beyond the 
control of relevant actors while strategic scenarios focus on internal factors. The 
last category – normative scenarios focuses on how future targets or objectives 
can be met. Preserving scenarios can be done either quantitatively (modelling) 
or qualitatively (surveys) to find out how certain targets can be efficiently met. 
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Transforming scenarios, which essentially uses backcasting, works from a high-
level and highly prioritised starting point.  
 
Figure II.b: Scenario Typology with Three Categories and Six Types 
 
Source: Börjeson et al. (2006, 725) 
 
Based on their scenario classification, Börjeson et al. (2006) identified various 
methods for each scenario type under three main headings – ‘generating’, 
‘integrating’ and ‘consistency’ (Table II.c). As a way of generating ideas and 
gather data, surveys, workshops and Delphi technique are the most common 
methods. The next step in ‘integrating’ all the data together, the authors suggest 
using mathematical modelling methods such as time series analysis, 
explanatory modelling and optimising modelling. This is possible where data is 
available and can be quantifiable. However, in the case of DPRK where the 
accuracy of the data cannot be verified, modelling methods is not appropriate. 
Lastly, to check the consistency of the scenarios, morphological field analysis or 
cross-impact analysis methods have been suggested. Morphological analysis is 
applicable to exploratory scenario-building, areas of innovation and R&D. It is 
used to check the internal consistency of qualitatively determined scenarios.   
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Table II.c: Contribution of Techniques in Scenario Development 
 
Source: Börjeson et al. (2006, 731) 
 
Van’t Klooster and van Asselt (2006) advocate the use of a qualitative scenario-
axes technique, which has been widely used by Schwartz (1991) and Van der 
Heijden (1996) as it is a useful and straightforward tool to construct images of 
the future in a coherent and systematic way. This technique, applicable to long 
term national planning, selects two most important driving forces after using the 
Delphi method to reach a consensus. One of the drawbacks of this method is 
the restriction of driving forces as there might be more than two driving forces 
available.  
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Bishop et al. (2007) identified eight general categories of scenario techniques 
with two to three variations of each type, resulting in more than twenty 
techniques overall.  
1. Judgement (genius forecasting, visualisation, role playing, Coates and 
Jarratt); 
2. Baseline (trend extrapolation, Manoa, systems scenarios, trend impact 
analysis); 
3. Elaboration of fixed scenarios (incasting, SRI); 
4. Event sequences (probability trees, sociovision, divergence mapping); 
5. Backcasting (horizon mission methodology, impact of Future 
Technologies, future mapping); 
6. Dimensions of uncertainty (morphological analysis, field anomaly 
relaxation, GBN, MORPHOL, OS/SE; 
7. Cross-Impact Analysis (SMIC-Prob-Expert, IFS); and 
8. Modelling (trend-impact analysis, sensitivity analysis, dynamic scenarios) 
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Appendix III: Research Methods for Business Researchers 
 
III.i Introduction 
 
Reviewing the literature on business and social research methods may lead to 
confusion when one faces key terms such as philosophies, paradigms, 
methodologies and research designs. Very often terms are used 
interchangeably without any clear direction and definition to their meanings 
while classifications differ from one source to another. Bryman (2007) uses the 
term ‘research strategy’ in order to describe ‘qualitative and ‘quantitative’ 
research while Saunders et al. (2007) describes ‘experiment’, ‘case study’, 
‘action research’ or ‘grounded theory’ using the same term. Confusion arises 
when one compares different classifications of ‘epistemological’ and 
‘ontological’ consideration. Saunders et al. (2007) lists ‘positivism’, ‘realism’ and 
‘phenomenology’ under ‘epistemology of science’ and ‘objectivism’, ‘social 
constructionism’ under ‘ontology of science’. In contrast, Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2008) lists ‘social constructionism’ under ‘social sciences epistemologies’. 
Amongst literature, there is general consensus on two most commonly known 
paradigms – ‘positivistic or quantitative’ and ‘phenomenological or qualitative’ 
(Collis and Hussey 2003 and Remenyi et al. 1998). In light of the circumstance 
where various authors focus on a number of issues when describing the 
research methodologies, one preferred source has been adopted without 
ignoring the insights of others. For the purpose of this research, the illustration 
by Saunders et al. (2007) was adopted as it provides a comprehensive model 
which reflects the various issues of the research process as layers of an onion 
(Figure 6.1). They argue that there are five important layers of research. One 
has to understand the research philosophy and the various approaches to 
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research before dealing with the selection of appropriate data collection 
methods. 
 
III.ii Research Philosophies 
 
A research philosophy reflects the way one thinks about the development of 
knowledge and is usually associated with the term ‘paradigm’ which in turn 
‘refers to the progress of scientific practice based on people’s philosophies and 
assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge; in this context, about 
how research should be conducted’ (Collis and Hussey 2003, 46).  
 
Figure III.a: The Research Onion 
 
Source: Saunders et al. (2007, 102) 
 
In Figure III.a, Saunders et al. (2007) classified the philosophies into three main 
headings – epistemology, ontology and axiology. Epistemology concerns the 
question of what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a 
discipline and asks about the relationship between the researcher and subject 
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of research (Bryman and Bell, 2007). There are three positions under this 
knowledge of science – positivism, realism and interpretivism (or 
phenomenology). Positivists see the researcher as independent from that being 
researched whereas phenomenologists consider that the research interacts 
with what is being research (Collis and Hussey 2003).  
 
Ontological philosophy is concerned with the nature of social entities and reality 
and the question as to whether the world is socially constructed and can only be 
understood by examining the perceptions of the human actors, or whether the 
world is objective and external to the researcher. There are three aspects of 
ontology – objectivism, subjectivism and pragmatism. Objectivism portrays the 
position that social entities exists in reality external to social actors. 
Subjectivism or constructionism asserts that social phenomena are continually 
created from the perceptions and consequent actions of social actors. 
Pragmatism argues that the most important determinant of the research 
philosophy adopted is the research question. If the research questions do not 
suggest that a positivist or interpretivist philosophy is adopted, pragmatists take 
the view that mixed methods, both quantitative and qualitative, can be 
employed.  
 
Axiological philosophy studies judgments about values. It's the researcher’s 
own values which play an important role in all stages of the research process 
that is crucial for the research results to be credible. Heron (1996) argues that 
our values are the guiding reason of all human action. He furthers argues that 
researchers demonstrate axiological skill by being able to articulate their values 
as a basis for making judgements about what research they are conducting and 
how they go about doing it. 
288 
 
 
III.iii Research Approaches 
 
The second layer of the research process onion deals with two different 
research approaches - the deductive and inductive approach. The former 
approach tends to develop theory and hypotheses and designs research 
strategies to test the hypotheses while the latter is guided by collecting data and 
developing theory. Although both approaches are each linked to the different 
research philosophies, labelling them would not add any practical value but may 
be potentially misleading (Saunders et al. 2007).  
 
Saunders et al. (2007) list various characteristics of the deductive approach 
which may be relevant to work in DPRK: 
 
• The search to explain causal relationships between variables; 
• Controls to allow the testing of hypotheses; 
• The need for a highly structured methodology in order to ensure 
reliability; 
• The need to operationalise concepts to measure facts quantitatively; 
• The need to reduce problems to the simplest possible elements in order 
to understand better as a whole; and 
• Adhere to the principle of generalisation 
 
The inductive approach is often regarded as building theory. The most famous 
inductive example is known as ‘grounded theory’ developed by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) in the medical field and expanded by other researchers in many 
other disciplines. Grounded theory enters the fieldwork phase without a 
hypothesis and therefore gives preference to the subject, data, and field under 
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study rather than theoretical assumptions. The inductive approach is less rigid 
than the deductive approach and is able to provide new insights and 
explanations in the areas researched. However, it is more time consuming and 
poses the risks that no useful data patterns and theory emerges.  
 
The question arises as to which approach should be adopted for work in DPRK. 
Saunders et al. (2007) advocates the combination of deduction and induction 
approaches within the same research as it is often advantageous to do so.  
 
III.iv Research Strategies 
 
A research strategy is a general plan of how the researcher is going to answer 
the research questions. Before deciding on the strategies, it is important to 
establish the purpose(s) of the research. There are three categories – (a) 
exploratory studies (b) descriptive studies and (c) explanatory studies. 
Exploratory studies are conducted to clarify and define the nature of a problem. 
It is useful when finding out ‘what is happening; to seek new insights; to ask 
questions and to assess phenomena in a new light’ (Robson, 2002, p. 59). 
There are four principal ways of conducting exploratory research – literature 
search; interviewing ‘experts’ in the subject; focus groups and delphi technique. 
Descriptive studies seek to describe the characteristics of a population or a 
phenomenon (Zikmund, 2003). They are an extension of previous exploratory 
research, using a type of structured interview such as questionnaire surveys. 
Explanatory research, also known as causal research, is conducted to ‘identify 
cause-and-effect relationships among variables’ (Zikmund, 2003, p. 56). The 
emphasis is to study a situation or a problem in order to explain the 
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relationships between variables. Quantitatively, variables will be subjected to 
statistical tests such as correlation.  
 
Saunders et al. (2007) list the following seven strategies in the research ‘onion’:  
 
• Experiment: it is a form of research that is traditionally linked to natural 
sciences, although it is widely use in social sciences such as psychology. 
The purpose of experiment is to study causal links, similar to explanatory 
research. The use of experiment allows investigation of changes in one 
variable, while manipulating one or two other variables. It is linked to a 
positivist paradigm and a deductive approach which may be inappropriate 
working in DPRK.  
 
• Survey: a popular and common strategy in business and management 
research owing to the advantage of collecting a large number of data from a 
sizable population in a highly economical way and to have control over the 
research process. It is normally used in exploratory and descriptive research. 
Questionnaires, structured observations and structure interviews are most 
common data collection techniques in this category. Surveys are often 
linked to a positivist paradigm and a deductive approach, and may be suited 
to explore stakeholder attitudes to development in DPRK.  
 
• Case study: involves in-depth investigation of a phenomenon to test theories, 
explore the ‘ground’, offer new insights or suggest new variables (Tan, 
2007). It is valuable in answering ‘who’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions to gain a 
rich understanding of the context of the research. A variety of data collection 
methods include interviews, observations, documentary analysis and 
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questionnaires. It is useful in generating theories thus it can be seen as an 
inductive approach.  
 
• Action research: involves evaluating and collecting data on an ongoing 
situation/problem, formulating hypotheses based on the data collected, 
taking action by altering selecting variables and evaluating the results of the 
actions by collecting more data. The purpose of action research is to find an 
effective way of bringing about a conscious change in a partly controlled 
environment, which may not exist in DPRK.  
 
• Ethnography: is classified under the inductive approach. The purpose is to 
describe and explain the social worlds the research subject inhabits in the 
way in which they would describe and explain it (Saunders et al. 2007, p. 
142). However this research is not commonly used in business research and 
access issues may be prohibitive in DPRK.  
 
• Archival research: makes use of administrative records and documents as 
the principal source of data. This strategy can be applied to exploratory, 
descriptive or explanatory research and allows research questions which 
focus upon the past and changes over time to be answered (Saunders et al., 
2007, 143). It is important to determine the type of data available and to 
design research to make the most of it, as this may be useful in DPRK. 
  
Remenyi et al. (1998) suggested three further techniques which are applicable 
to business and management research. 
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• Forecasting: associated with mathematical and statistical techniques of 
regression and time-series analysis. This technique allows projections to be 
made on past or historical data. It is highly quantitative in nature and aims to 
establish relationships between different sets of historical data. This 
technique is positivist in nature but the research results can be interpreted in 
an interpretivist way so that it is able to be integrated into business and 
management research, although data availability in DPRK may be an issue.  
 
• Futures research: provides a way of considering and developing predictions. 
This research is in forward looking using scenario projects and Delphi 
technique. It involves obtaining expert opinions towards a common group 
consensus. This research tactic would not generally be sufficient on its own 
as the main focus for a PhD, but it could be used to support other 
techniques in attempt to triangulate and validate conclusions (Remenyi et al., 
1998, 54).  
 
• Scenario research: involves collecting evidence from a group of experts who 
are asked to discuss the implications of one or several hypothetical situation 
occurring. The comments would be processed and stories/scenarios would 
be developed.  
 
III.v Triangulation/Mixed Methods 
 
Saunders et al. (2007) listed three choices when it comes to choosing data 
collection techniques and data analysis procedures. Mono-methods refer to 
using a single data collection technique and corresponding analysis procedures. 
E.g. using qualitative procedure to analyse in-depth interviews. Multiple-
methods refers to the combinations where more than one data collection 
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technique is used with associated analysis techniques but restricted within 
either a quantitative or qualitative world view (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). 
E.g. multi-method quantitative study can be conducted through questionnaires 
and structured observations and using statistical procedures to analyse the data. 
Mixed methods studies are those that combine the qualitative and quantitative 
approaches into the research methodology of a single study or multi-phased 
study (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, 17). There are two strands of research 
under this method – mixed-methods research and mixed-model research. 
Mixed-methods research can be conducted at the same time (parallel) or one 
after another (sequential). Mixed-model research takes quantitative data and 
qualitises it and vice-versa. Another commonly used term for mixed methods is 
‘triangulation’ which is derived from the process used by surveyors and sailors 
measuring distances between objects by making observations from multiple 
locations to get a fix on its true location (Neuman, 2000). In terms of research, it 
refers to the use of multiple sources of data, different research methods and/or 
more than one researcher to investigate the same phenomenon in a study 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009, 85). Denzin’s (1978) concept of triangulation involved 
combining data sources to study the same social phenomenon. The assumption 
in triangulation is that its effectiveness rests on the premise that the 
weaknesses in each single method will be compensated by the counter-
balancing strengths of another (Amaratunga et al. 2002). According to Brewer 
and Hunter (1989), this multi-method strategy is simple, but powerful for each 
new set of data increases confidence that the research results reflect reality 
rather than methodological error. Mangan (2004) advocates the greater use of 
triangulation in logistics research as it provides multidimensional insights into 
many management research problems as is likely to be required working in 
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DPRK. Morse (2003, 198) provides eight combinations of triangulated designs 
(Table III.a) 
 
Table III.a: Notations and Designs for Mixed Methods Research 
Designs Notations Meanings 
QUAL + qual • qualitatively driven, qualitative simultaneous design 
QUAN + quan • quantitatively driven, quantitative simultaneous 
design 
QUAL + quan • qualitatively driven, qualitative and quantitative 
simultaneous design 
QUAN + qual • quantitatively driven, quantitative and qualitative 
simultaneous design 
QUAL → qual • qualitatively driven project, followed by a second 
qualitative project 
QUAN → quan • quantitatively driven project, followed by a second 
quantitative project  
QUAL → quan • qualitatively driven project, followed by a quantitative 
project 
QUAN → qual • quantitatively driven project, followed by a qualitative 
project 
Source: Morse (2003, 198) 
 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) and Creswell and Clark (2007) listed several 
benefits of mixed methods: 
 
• Provides strengths that offset the weaknesses of both quantitative and 
qualitative research; 
• Help answer questions and provides more comprehensive evidence for 
studying a research problem than either quantitative or qualitative 
research alone; 
• Encourages the use of multiple paradigms rather than the typical 
association of certain paradigms; 
• Mixed methods are ‘practical’ in the sense that the researcher is free to 
use all methods possible to address a research problem. 
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III.vi Time Horizons 
 
The time perspective to research design is an important issue. Research can be 
carried out using cross-sectional or longitudinal studies. The former takes a 
‘snapshot’ of an ongoing situation or a particular phenomenon at a particular 
time while the latter conducts research over a long period of time. Cross-
sectional studies are conducted when there are time constraints or limited 
resources. Quantitative methods (e.g. surveys) or qualitative strategies 
(unstructured interviews) can be used. Longitudinal research is appropriate 
when research questions and hypotheses are affected by how things vary over 
time (Hair Jr. et al., 2003). It investigates the dynamics of the problem by 
studying the same people or situation several times or continuously over a 
period of time. The choice between both time horizons lies in the sample size. 
Cross-sectional studies usually deal with a larger population while longitudinal 
research deals with only a few subjects. A mix of contemporary and future 
analysis will be required to analyse the potential for logistics development in 
DPRK.  
 
III.vii Data Collection Methods 
 
After deciding upon the research philosophy and research approach to the 
study, as well as setting an appropriate research strategy and time horizon, the 
last layer of the research ‘onion’, which is also the core of the research process 
(i.e. data collection methods) is reached. Collis and Hussey (2009) present an 
overview of the data collection process (Figure III.b). 
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Figure III.b Overview of the Data Collection Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Collis and Hussey (2009, 188) 
 
The most common primary data collection methods in social sciences are: 
 
• Observations: involve the systematic observation, recording, description, 
analysis and interpretation of people’s behaviour. The researcher can be 
involved as a participant or non-participant observer. Participant observation 
is qualitative and the researcher is fully involved in order to provide a 
detailed understanding of practices, values and motives of those being 
observed. Structured observation is quantitative in nature and is concerned 
with observing and recording the frequency of what people do in terms of 
their behaviour and actions. Observations can generate a lot of useful and 
valuable data. However, the problems of observation concerns ethics and 
observer bias. In DPRK access issues are prohibitive. 
 
Identify variables  
Choose data collection method (s) 
Select a sample 
Conduct pilot study or exploratory research 
Modify collection method (s) as necessary 
Collect research data 
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• Interviews: a method for collecting data in which selected participants are 
asked questions in order to find out what they feel, do, know or think. 
Interviews are classified into structure, semi-structure and unstructured or 
in-depth interviews. They can be carried out face-to-face, over telephone 
and increasingly over the internet. Using the internet is advantageous where 
the interviewees are geographically dispersed. In exploratory studies, in-
depth interviews are helpful to gain new insights to a situation. In descriptive 
studies, structure interviews are used to identify general patterns. Semi-
structure interviews are useful in causal studies to understand relationships 
between variables reveal in descriptive studies. Interviews can be 
challenging as it can be a time-consuming and expensive process. In 
addition, obtaining access to participants might pose potential problems. 
Data generated from interviewees are extensive but often invaluable.  This 
method is appropriate to gleaning attitudes to development in DPRK.  
 
• Questionnaires: a list of carefully structure questions, which have been 
chosen after considerable testing with a view to eliciting reliable responses 
from a particular group of people (Collis and Hussey, 2009, 191). The aim is 
to find out what they think, do, or feel because it will aid in answering our 
research questions. Questionnaires may be used in large-scale surveys as 
well as for studies with small sample sizes. Questionnaires are can be self-
administered or interviewer-administered. Self-administered questionnaires 
are completed by respondents. Such questionnaires are administered 
electronically using the Internet, posted to respondents who return them by 
post after completion or delivered by hand to each respondent and collected 
later. Interviewer-administered questionnaires are conducted through 
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telephone (e.g. market research) or structured interviews. One of the main 
problems associated with questionnaires is the non-response bias (either 
questionnaire non-response or item non-response), but overall this strategy 
is likely to be relevant to DPRK.  
 
III.viii Criteria in Business Research 
 
Saunders et al. (2007) emphasise that a sound research design is important in 
order to make the research findings as credible as possible. Bryman and Bell 
(2007, 40) stated that ‘three of the most prominent criteria for the evaluation of 
business and management research are reliability, replication and validity’. 
These three criteria will be explained further below: 
 
• Reliability is concerned with the question of whether the research findings 
can be repeated. In DPRK, this may be impossible as the external 
environment is changing so rapidly. Although reliability is usually linked with 
quantitative research, it applies for deductive approach (e.g. with the 
question, ‘Will the measure yield the same results on different occasions?’) 
as well as the inductive approach (‘Will different researchers on different 
occasions make similar observations?’). The major threats to reliability 
issues are bias concerning the subject or the observer.  
 
• Replication is close to the idea of reliability. At times, researchers might 
choose to replicate the process or findings of others. In order to make a 
study reliable, it has to be replicable. Therefore, a researcher must explain 
the research process in great detail in order to make the study replicable. 
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• Validity is concerned with the question of whether the research results 
accurately reflect what is really happening in the situation. It deals with the 
integrity of the results generated from the study. There are three main types 
of validity: measurement validity (‘Can the observations and research 
findings be explained by the construct under investigation?’), internal validity 
(‘How likely is it that the independent variable really influences the 
dependent variable to the extent the research findings suggest?’) and 
external validity (‘Can the results of the research be generalised beyond the 
specific research context?’) 
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Appendix IV Example of Covering Letter for Qualitative Survey 
 
Dear Prof. XXX, 
   
Please allow me to introduce myself. My name is Kelvin Pang and I am a 
Singaporean doctorate researcher with the University of Plymouth, UK. My 
research interests focuses on political and economical developments in North 
Korea and also the impact of Korean unification on Northeast Asia.  
  
I obtained your email address from AccessAsia website and understand that 
you have knowledge of North Korea. A crucial part of my research is conducting 
surveys with academics and industry experts in order to gain a wide spectrum 
of professional opinions, views and suggestions on issues pertaining to North 
Korea. These professional opinions, together with a future questionnaire survey, 
will be incorporated into a scenario planning model to develop 
composite strategies for North Korea. 
  
For this reason, I would like to invite you to participate in this email 
interview.  The names of all respondents and their organisations will remain 
confidential. If you are willing, I will send you the interview questions. If you 
would like a copy of the research findings, please let me know and I will send 
you a copy at the conclusion of the research.  
 
My principal supervisor, Dr John Dinwoodie, is happy to confirm that this is a 
genuine request. He can be contacted by email at 
john.dinwoodie@plymouth.ac.uk or by telephone on (44) 01752 232446. 
  
I look forward to hearing from you. 
  
Yours faithfully, 
  
Kelvin Pang 
Phd Researcher/Lecturer 
Centre for International Shipping and Logistics Group 
Plymouth Business School, University of Plymouth 
Cookworthy Building 
Drake Circus, Plymouth 
Devon, UK 
PL4 8AA 
Phone: +65 97611898 
Fax: +44(0) 1752 232249 
Email: kelvin.pang@plymouth.ac.uk 
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Appendix V Qualitative Questionnaire for DPRK Experts 
 
Dear Prof. XXX, 
 
Thank you for participating in this email interview.  
 
Your opinions and views on questions addressing the following contexts 
(political, economic, infrastructure, managerial, spatial) are very much 
appreciated. Please record your answers in the spaces provided. Please feel 
free to provide any additional comments with regards to the research or the 
questions asked. 
 
If you would like a copy of the research findings, please feel free to let me know 
and I will send you a copy at the conclusion of the research.  
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Kelvin Pang 
PhD Researcher/Lecturer 
Centre for International Shipping and Logistics Group 
Plymouth Business School, University of Plymouth 
Cookworthy Building 
Drake Circus, Plymouth 
Devon, UK 
PL4 8AA 
Phone: +44(0) 7729 922602 
Fax: +44(0) 1752 232249 
Email: kelvin.pang@plymouth.ac.uk 
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Politics 
 
1. What are the main political issues currently surrounding North Korea 
 
2. What are the interests/strategies of the respective countries towards North 
Korea? (i.e. USA, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia) 
 
3. Several scenarios of North Korea have been suggested: (1) regime 
collapse from military coup (2) regime collapse from uprising of citizens (3) 
integration and peaceful unification and (4) status quo. Which scenario do 
you think is most likely to take place in the next 5-7 years? Please state 
your reason(s).  
 
4. In your opinion, on a scale of one (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely), do you 
think that there will be a unified Korea within the next 30 years?  
 
Economic 
 
1. In a status quo scenario, what sort of economic aid/incentives can North 
Korea expect from various countries (i.e. USA, China, South Korea, Japan 
and Russia)? 
 
2. In a regime collapse scenario, what are the main economic priorities for 
North Korea in the short, medium and long term?  
 
3. In a peaceful reunification scenario, what are the economic strategies 
needed to help North Korea? 
 
4. What are the potential sources of financing for economic development 
projects in North Korea? 
 
Infrastructure 
 
1. In a status quo scenario, who would finance the cost of rebuilding North 
Korea’s infrastructure? (public, private) 
 
2. In a regime collapse scenario, who would finance the cost of rebuilding 
North Korea’s infrastructure? (public, private) 
 
3. In a peaceful unification scenario, who would finance the cost of rebuilding 
North Korea’s infrastructure? (public, private) 
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4. Please rank, from one (highest priority) to seven (lowest priority), the 
main investment priorities for transport logistics infrastructure in North 
Korea?  
 
(a) Access to airports    (        ) 
(b) Access to maritime ports   (        ) 
(c) Road access     (        ) 
(d) Rail access     (        ) 
(e) Supplies of energy and electricity  (        )  
(f) Telecommunications infrastructure (        ) 
(g) Logistics facilities e.g. warehouses (        ) 
 
Managerial 
 
1. What are the three main areas/disciplines which North Korea can send 
their delegates overseas to gain essential knowledge? 
 
Spatial 
 
1. Where are the main markets for North Korean-made products? 
 
2. What are the main North Korea products suitable for export? 
 
Miscellaneous 
  
 Are there any other important issues which you feel that has not 
mentioned? 
 
 
Thank you for your time! 
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Appendix VI Scope of ROK SMEs 
 
Sector  
SMEs 
Small  
Busines
s  
Micro- 
enterprise
s  
No of 
Workers 
Capital & 
Sales  No. of Workers  
Manufacturing 
 
Less 
than 300 
Capital worth  
$8M or less 
Less  
than 5
0 
Less  
than 10 
Mining, construction and 
transportation 
 
Less 
than 300 
Capital worth  
$3M or less 
Less  
than 50 
Less  
than 10 
Large general retail stores, 
hotel, recreational 
condominium operation, 
communications, information 
processing and other  
computer-related industries, 
engineering service, 
hospital and broadcasting 
 
Less 
than 300 
Sales worth 
$40M or less 
Less  
than 10 
Less  
than 5 
Seed and seedling production, 
fishing, electrical, gas and 
waterworks, medical and 
orthopedic products, 
wholesales, fuel and related 
products wholesales, mail order 
sale, door-to-door sale, tour 
agency, warehouses and 
transportation-related 
service, professional, science 
and technology service,  
business support service, movie, 
amusement and theme park 
operation 
 
Less 
than 200 
Sales worth  
$20M or less 
Less  
than 10 
Less  
than 5 
Wholesale and product  
intermediation, machinery 
equipment rent for industrial 
use, R&D for natural science, 
public performance, news 
provision, botanical garden, 
zoo and natural parks, waste 
water treatment, waste disposal 
and cleaning related service 
 
Less 
than 100 
Sales 
$10M or less 
Less  
than 10 
Less  
than 5 
Source: General Criteria (Article 2 of Framework Act on SMEs) 
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Appendix VII – ROK SMEs Quantitative Survey 
 
No.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INVESTMENT IN NORTH KOREA: A SURVEY OF LOCATION DECISIONS 
OF SOUTH KOREAN SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
 
As part of my doctoral research, I am conducting a survey about the potential 
investment decisions of South Korean small and medium enterprises in North 
Korea in order to derive strategic and operational recommendations for North 
Korea.  
 
Your reply will be treated in strict confidence and only be used for academic 
purposes. The names of individual respondents and their organisations will not 
be used in published materials or passed on to third parties. If you indicate, I 
will send you a summary of the survey results. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you within two weeks. If you require any further 
details please do not hesitate to contact me at the email address listed. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Kelvin Pang 
 
Kelvin Pang 
Researcher 
International Shipping and Logistics Group 
University of Plymouth School, CKY405 
Drake Circus, Plymouth, PL4 8AA 
Email: kelvin.pang@plymouth.ac.uk  
Tel: +44 (0) 1752 232 446 
Fax: +44 (0) 1752 232 406 
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Unless indicated otherwise, please tick one box to show your preferred 
response 
 
1. How many employees are there in your organisation? 
 □ <1-19    □ 20-49     □ 50-99     □ 100-199    □ 200-299     □ >300 
 
2. Which industries is your organisation associated with?  
 □ Food processing    □ Textile     □Paper/Pulp     □Petroleum/Chemical      
 □Machinery     □Transportation/Equipment     □Electrical/Electronics     
□I.T.          
 □Minerals/Ore     □Non-metal products    □Basic metals     □Agricultural    
 □Hotel     □I.T. service     □Leisure (tourism/golf)     □Finance      
 □Other _______ 
 
3. What is the total annual revenue of your organisation? 
□<US$5million   □US$5-10million   □US$10-20million   □US$20-
40million   □US$>40million 
 
4. List up to three main products which your organisation would produce in 
North Korea? 
 
 a. __________________________ 
 b. __________________________ 
 c. __________________________ 
 
5. Which type of industries will your organisation invest in North Korea? 
(Please select three) 
 □Food processing    □Textile     □Paper/Pulp     □Petroleum/Chemical      
□Machinery     □Transportation/Equipment     □Electrical/Electronics     
□I.T.          
□Minerals/Ore     □Non-metal products    □Basic metals     □Agricultural   
□Hotel     □I.T. service     □Leisure (tourism/golf)     □Finance     
□Others _______ 
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6. What would be the size of your organisation’s investment? 
 
□Up to US$1 million   □Between US$1-10 million    
□Between US$10-100 million     □Between US$100 and 500 million    
□Over US$500 million 
 
7. If your organisation plans to operate a factory in North Korea in the near 
future, where is the intended location to sell your products? (Please select 
up to two of the locations shown below) 
 
□South Korea   □China   □Japan   □Southeast Asia   □Southwest Asia   
□Russia   □Europe (except Russia)   □Oceania   □U.S.   □Central 
America  □Canada   □ South America 
 
8. Which main mode of transport would your organisation use when exporting 
your goods out of North Korea? 
 
□Water transport     □Rail     □Road     □Air      
 
9. If the North Korean government opens up other regions beside Gaesung, 
which location would your organisation consider the most promising for 
future investment? 
 
 □Nampo     □Pyongyang     □Wonsan     □Sinuiju     □Cheongjin      
 □Najin-Sonbong     □Haeju     □Other region ____________ 
 
10. Please rank the following factors, from one (most important) to eight 
(least important), which you think is most important for the development 
of logistics and transport in North Korea? 
 
 Political  (          ) 
 Economics (          ) 
 Infrastructure (          ) 
 Legal  (          ) 
 Managerial (          ) 
 Spatial/Markets (          ) 
 Social  (          ) 
 Organisational (          ) 
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11. Consider the factors which influence your organisation’s decision to locate 
investment in North Korea. Please rate the importance of each factor 
shown below in your location decision with (1) being least important to (5) 
great importance.  
 
Factors 1 2 3 4 5 
Political/Government. When considering locating in North Korea, how 
important is it that:  
government and officials support business       
there is political stability, with the nuclear issue 
resolved      
there is regional stability       
bureaucracy is not excessive      
the risk of corruption is low      
there is potential for unification      
 
Economic. When considering locating in North Korea, how important is the 
presence of: 
special economic zones      
a competitive financial sector      
a clustering of common industries      
good levels of local and regional development      
reforms encouraging a market economy      
low levels of exchange rate risk      
few currency restrictions      
low costs of relocation       
a culture which encourages earning high profits       
an open market economy      
few restrictions on trade      
low set-up costs for new local establishments      
state financial incentives (subsidies, loans, grants etc)      
 
Infrastructure. When considering locating in North Korea, how important is 
good: 
access to domestic markets      
telephone and internet infrastructure        
supplies of energy and electricity      
supplies of water and sewage disposal      
logistics facilities e.g. warehouses      
access to an airport      
access to a maritime port      
road access      
rail access      
 
Legal. When considering locating in North Korea how important is it that: 
immigration policies are flexible      
personal income taxes for foreign employees are low      
clear laws governing logistical practices      
payment methods are flexible      
clear rules governing regulation and contracts      
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labour and tax laws do not change suddenly      
new regulations are not suddenly imposed      
 
Managerial. When considering locating in North Korea how important is it 
that managers in North Korea 
have a good knowledge of logistics concepts      
have had sufficient management experience      
have a good knowledge of management concepts      
are keen to accept new technologies       
 
Spatial/Markets. When considering locating in North Korea how important 
is:  
gaining a bridgehead into the North Korean market      
a good supply of plentiful and cheap land      
close proximity to regional markets      
the promise of new markets for North Korean products      
good availability of raw materials      
a lack of sizable markets      
good availability of natural resources      
the limited purchasing power of local markets      
good access to markets in China and Japan      
proximity to major suppliers      
 
Social. When considering locating in North Korea how important is: 
good housing, schools, environmental amenities      
a pool of educated labour with requisite skills      
cultural affinity with other Koreans      
a common culture and language      
good availability of industrial estates      
a good supply of low labour cost      
 
Organisational. When considering locating in North Korea, how important 
are 
plentiful modern logistics service providers and costs      
good logistics linkages and accessibility      
good logistics distribution system      
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Your personal details 
 
Your position (or job): 
 
How many years have you worked in this industry?    
□<1   □1-3 □4-5   □6-10   □Over 10   
 
How many years you have worked in your present organisation?  
□<1 □1-3 □4-5 □6-10  □Over 10 
 
Location: 
 
Contact: 
 
I would like to receive an executive summary of the results of the survey:      
□Yes     □No 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time in completing this questionnaire! 
311 
 
Appendix VIII – ROK Logistics Companies Quantitative Survey 
 
No.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INVESTMENT IN NORTH KOREA: A SURVEY OF LOCATION DECISIONS 
OF  
SOUTH KOREAN LOGISTICS ENTERPRISES 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
As part of my doctoral research, I am performing a survey about the potential 
investment decisions of South Korean and Foreign Enterprises’ in North Korea 
in order to derive strategic and operational recommendations for North Korea.  
 
Your reply will be treated in strict confidence and only be used for academic 
purposes. The names of individual respondents and their organisations will not 
be used in published materials or passed on to third parties. If you like, I will 
send you a summary of the survey results with pleasure. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you within two weeks. If you require any further 
details please do not hesitate to contact me at the email address listed. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Kelvin Pang 
Kelvin Pang 
Researcher 
International Shipping and Logistics Group 
University of Plymouth School, CKY405 
Drake Circus, Plymouth, PL4 8AA 
Email: kelvin.pang@plymouth.ac.uk  
Tel: +44 (0) 1752 232 446 
Fax: +44 (0) 1752 232 406 
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Unless indicated otherwise, please tick one box to show your preferred 
response 
 
1. How many employees are there in your organisation? 
 □ 1-19    □ 20-49     □ 50-99     □ 100-199    □ 200-299     □ >300 
 
2. How many years has your company been in the logistics industry? 
 □ <5   □ 6-10   □ 11-15  □ 16-20  □ Over 20   
 
3. Which countries do you operate in other than South Korea? (Please list 
three) 
 
 a. _____________________________ 
  
 b. _____________________________ 
 
 c. _____________________________ 
 
4. What is your total annual revenue last year? 
 
 □<US$5million   □US$5-10million   □US$10-20million   □US$20-
40million    □US$>40million 
   
5. What type of logistics services does your company provide? (please tick 3 
only) 
 □ Warehousing   □ Freight forwarding   □ Customs clearance    
 □Consulting services   □ Freight consolidation   □ Physical distribution    
 □ Break-bulk operations   □ Freight brokerage   □ Packing/Storage    
 □ Reverse logistics   □ Multi-modal   □ Customer service   □ Purchasing    
 □ Transport   □ Order processing  
 
6. Which industries does your company serve? (Please tick as many as 
possible) 
 □ Food processing    □Textile     □Paper/Pulp     □Petroleum/Chemical      
 □Machinery     □Transportation Equipment     □/Electronics     □I.T.  
 □Minerals/Ore     □Non-metal products    □Basic metals     □Agricultural    
 □ Hotel     □ I.T. service     □ Leisure (tourism/golf)     □ Finance      
 □ Other _____________ 
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7. Presently, does your company have any logistics/transport operations in 
North Korea? 
 □ Yes   (Please answer Question 8 and 9) 
 □ Previously (Please answer Question 8 and 9) 
 □ No (Please proceed to question 10) 
 
8. Which part of North Korea did the logistics/transport operations cover? 
 □ Nampo   □ Pyongyang   □ Wonsan   □ Sinuiju   □ Cheongjin    
 □ Najin-Sonbong    □ Haeju     □ Other region _________________ 
 
9. What was the volume of cargo transported? (t = tonnes) 
 □< 5000t   □5000-10000t   □10000-20000t   □20000-40000t    
 □40000-60000t  □>60000t 
 
10. Please rank the following factors, from one (most important) to eight 
(least important), which you think is most important for the development 
of logistics and transport in North Korea? 
 
 Political  (          ) 
 Economics (          ) 
 Infrastructure (          ) 
 Legal  (          ) 
 Managerial (          ) 
 Spatial/Markets (          ) 
 Social  (          ) 
 Organisational (          ) 
 
11. Consider the factors which influence your organisation’s decision to locate 
investment in North Korea. Please rate the importance of each factor 
shown below in your location decision with (1) being least important to (5) 
great importance.  
 
Factors 1 2 3 4 5 
Political/Government. When considering locating in North Korea, how 
important is it that:  
government and officials support business       
there is political stability, with the nuclear issue 
resolved      
there is regional stability       
bureaucracy is not excessive      
the risk of corruption is low      
there is potential for unification      
 
Economic. When considering locating in North Korea, how important is the 
presence of: 
special economic zones      
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a competitive financial sector      
a clustering of common industries      
good levels of local and regional development      
reforms encouraging a market economy      
low levels of exchange rate risk      
few currency restrictions      
low costs of relocation       
a culture which encourages earning high profits       
an open market economy      
few restrictions on trade      
low set-up costs for new local establishments      
state financial incentives (subsidies, loans, grants etc)      
 
Infrastructure. When considering locating in North Korea, how important is 
good: 
access to domestic markets      
telephone and internet infrastructure        
supplies of energy and electricity      
supplies of water and sewage disposal      
logistics facilities e.g. warehouses      
access to an airport      
access to a maritime port      
road access      
rail access      
 
Legal. When considering locating in North Korea how important is it that: 
immigration policies are flexible      
personal income taxes for foreign employees are low      
clear laws governing logistical practices      
payment methods are flexible      
clear rules governing regulation and contracts      
labour and tax laws do not change suddenly      
new regulations are not suddenly imposed      
 
Managerial. When considering locating in North Korea how important is it 
that managers in North Korea 
have a good knowledge of logistics concepts      
have had sufficient management experience      
have a good knowledge of management concepts      
are keen to accept new technologies       
 
Spatial/Markets. When considering locating in North Korea how important 
is:  
gaining a bridgehead into the North Korean market      
a good supply of plentiful and cheap land      
close proximity to regional markets      
the promise of new markets for North Korean products      
good availability of raw materials      
a lack of sizable markets      
good availability of natural resources      
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the limited purchasing power of local markets      
good access to markets in China and Japan      
proximity to major suppliers      
 
Social. When considering locating in North Korea how important is: 
good housing, schools, environmental amenities      
a pool of educated labour with requisite skills      
cultural affinity with other Koreans      
a common culture and language      
good availability of industrial estates      
a good supply of low labour cost      
 
Organisational. When considering locating in North Korea, how important 
are 
plentiful modern logistics service providers and costs      
good logistics linkages and accessibility      
good logistics distribution system      
 
Your personal details 
 
Your position (or job): 
 
How many years have you worked in this industry?    
□<1   □1-3 □4-5   □6-10   □Over 10   
 
How many years you have worked in your present organisation?  
□<1 □1-3 □4-5 □6-10  □Over 10 
 
Location: 
 
Contact: 
 
I would like to receive an executive summary of the results of the survey:      
□Yes     □No 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time in completing this questionnaire! 
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Appendix IX – Size of SMEs’ Investment in DPRK 
 
Future 
investment 
Size of 
investment 
No. of employees 
Smalla Largeb Total 
Nampo <$1m 4 0 4 
$1-9m 7 6 13 
$10-99m 3 9 12 
$100-499m 0 1 1 
Total 14 16 30 
Pyongyang <$1m 6 0 6 
$1-9m 4 2 6 
$10-99m 0 0 0 
$100-499m 0 0 0 
Total 10 2 12 
Wonsan <$1m 1 3 4 
$1-9m 0 0 0 
$10-99m 0 0 0 
$100-499m 0 0 0 
Total 1 3 4 
Sinuiju <$1m 5 1 6 
$1-9m 10 9 19 
$10-99m 0 1 1 
$100-499m 0 0 0 
Total 15 11 26 
Najin-Sonbong <$1m 1 1 2 
$1-9m 2 2 4 
$10-99m 0 2 2 
$100-499m 0 0 0 
Total 3 5 8 
Number of employees in SMEs indicating the size and location of 
potential investment 
 
a – less than 100 employees 
b – more than 100 employees 
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Appendix X – Size of Investment of Industries in Potential Locations 
 
Future 
investment 
Size of 
Investment Textile Machinery 
Transportation 
Equipment Electronics I.T. Minerals 
Basic 
Metals Total 
Nampo 
<$1m 2 0 1 0 3 1 0 7 
$1-9m 3 4 2 6 1 10 5 31 
$10-99m 2 1 1 7 1 3 3 18 
Total 7 5 4 13 5 14 8 56 
Pyongyang 
<$1m 1 0 0 3 3 3 2 12 
$1-9m 4 1 1 1 1 3 1 12 
Total 5 1 1 4 4 6 3 24 
Wonsan 
<$1m 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 6 
$1-9m 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
Total 0 1 2 2 0 2 2 9 
Sinuiju 
<$1m 3 1 0 1 2 1 1 9 
$1-9m 4 5 0 10 4 11 9 43 
$10-99m 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 7 6 1 11 6 12 10 53 
Najin-
Sonbong 
<$1m 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
$1-9m 0 0 1 3 0 3 3 10 
$10-99m 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
Total 1 1 3 4 0 3 3 15 
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Appendix XI – Export Destinations  
 
Export Destination - China 
Investment 
Locations 
Mode of 
Transport 
Size of 
Investment 
Industries 
Textile Machinery 
Transport 
Equipment Electronics Minerals 
Basic 
metals I.T. 
Nampo 
Water  
<$1m 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 
$1-9m 2 1 1 1 2 0 0 
$10-99m 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 
Road 
<$1m 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
$1-9m 1 0 1 4 7 4 0 
$10-99m 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 
Total 5 3 4 10 11 6 1 
Pyongyang 
Water  <$1m 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 $1-9m 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rail <$1m 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Road $<1m 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 $1-9m 2 1 1 1 3 1 0 
Total 4 1 1 4 4 2 1 
Wonsan 
Rail <$1m 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Road $1-9m 0 2 1 1 2 1 0 
Total 0 2 1 2 2 1 0 
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Export Destination - China 
Investment 
Locations 
Mode of 
Transport 
Size of 
Investment 
Industries 
Textile Machinery 
Transport 
Equipment Electronics Minerals 
Basic 
metals I.T. 
Sinuiju 
Water  $1-9m 1 0 0 2 3 3 0 
Rail 
<$1m 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
$1-9m 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
$10-99m 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Road 
<$1m 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 
$1-9m 1 0 0 4 3 0 0 
$10-99m 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Total 5 1 1 7 8 8 1 
Najin-
Sonbong 
Water  
<$1m 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
$1-9m 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
$10-99m 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Rail $10-99m 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Road $1-9m 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Total 1 3 2 3 2 2 0 
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Export Destination - South Korea 
Investment 
Locations 
Mode of 
Transport 
Size of 
Investment 
Industries 
Textile Machinery 
Transport 
Equipment Electronics Minerals 
Basic 
metals I.T. 
Nampo 
Water  
<$1m 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 
$1-9m 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 
$10-99m 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Road 
<$1m 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
$1-9m 0 1 1 3 5 3 0 
$10-99m 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Total 5 2 2 6 7 4 2 
Pyongyang 
Water  <$1m  0 0 0 1 1 1 0 $1-9m 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rail <$1m 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Road $<1m 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 $1-9m 1 0 0 1 3 1 0 
Total 3 0 0 3 5 3 0 
Wonsan 
Water  $1-9m 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Road <$1m 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 $1-9m 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 
Total 0 1 2 2 2 1 0 
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Export Destination - South Korea 
Investment 
Locations 
Mode of 
Transport 
Size of 
Investment 
Industries 
Textile Machinery 
Transport 
Equipment Electronics Minerals 
Basic 
metals I.T. 
Sinuiju 
Water  $1-9m 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Rail <$1m 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 $1-9m 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 
Road 
<$1m 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 
$1-9m 1 2 0 3 4 4 0 
$10-99m 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Total 5 2 1 9 7 7 1 
Najin-
Sonbong 
Road $1-9m 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 
Total 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 
 
 
Export Destination - Japan 
Investment 
Locations 
Mode of 
Transport 
Size of 
Investment 
Industries 
Electronics Minerals 
Basic 
metals 
Nampo Water  $10-99m 1  0 0  
Pyongyang Water  <$1m  0 1 1 
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Export Destination - Russia 
Investment 
Locations 
Mode of 
Transport 
Size of 
Investment 
Industries 
Textile Machinery 
Transport 
Equipment Electronics Minerals 
Basic 
metals I.T. 
Nampo 
Water  $1-9m 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
$10-99m 0 0 0 0 1 1 0  
Road <$1m 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
Pyongyang 
Road $<1m 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
$10-99m 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Total 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Sinuiju 
Water  $1-9m 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Rail $1-9m 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Road $1-9m 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Total 1 1 0 3 3 1 1 
Najin-
Sonbong 
Water  
<$1m 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
$1-9m 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
$10-99m 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Rail $10-99m 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Total 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 
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Export Destination - Europe 
Investment 
Locations 
Mode of 
Transport 
Size of 
Investment 
Industries 
Textile Machinery 
Transport 
Equipment Electronics Minerals 
Basic 
metals I.T. 
Nampo 
Water  $1-9m 1 1 0 2 3 2  
$10-99m 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 
Total 2 2 1 4 4 4 1 
Pyongyang Water  $1-9m 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Total 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Wonsan Water  $1-9m 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Total 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Sinuiju 
Water  $1-9m 2 2 0 1 3 1 1 
Rail $1-9m 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 
Total 2 2 0 1 5 2 1 
Najin-
Sonbong Water  $1-9m 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 
Total 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 
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Export Destination - USA 
Investment 
Locations 
Mode of 
Transport 
Size of 
Investment 
Industries 
Textile Machinery Electronics Minerals 
Basic 
metals 
Nampo 
Water  $1-9m 0 0 1 1 1 
$10-99m 1 0 2 1 0 
Total 1 0 3 2 1 
Pyongyang Water  $1-9m 1 0 0 0 0 
Total 1 0 0 0 0 
Sinuiju Water  $1-9m 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 1 1 1 1 1 
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Appendix XII – Types of Logistics Services Provided in Industries 
 
Types of Logistics 
Services 
Provided/Industries 
Served 
Food 
Processing 
Textile Petroleum Machinery 
Transport 
Equipment 
Electronics I.T. Agricultural Total 
Freight Forwarding 3.21% 2.75% 0.46% 4.13% 1.83% 6.42% 1.83% 1.38% 22.02% 
Warehousing 2.29% 2.75% 0.46% 3.67% 1.38% 5.96% 1.38% 0.46% 18.35% 
Consulting Services 0.92% 3.21% 1.38% 0.46% 1.38% 3.67% 0.92% 0.92% 12.84% 
Transport 1.38% 1.38% 0.00% 3.21% 0.92% 2.29% 1.83% 0.46% 11.47% 
Customs Clearance 0.92% 0.92% 0.00% 1.83% 2.29% 2.29% 0.00% 1.38% 9.63% 
Order Processing 3.67% 5.96% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.63% 
Customer Service 0.92% 1.38% 0.00% 0.46% 0.46% 1.83% 0.92% 0.46% 6.42% 
Freight Consolidation 0.46% 0.46% 0.46% 1.38% 0.92% 0.92% 0.46% 0.00% 5.05% 
Packing/Storage 0.00% 0.46% 0.00% 0.46% 0.00% 0.46% 0.00% 0.00% 1.38% 
Multi-modal 0.00% 0.46% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.92% 0.00% 0.00% 1.38% 
Physical Distribution 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.92% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.92% 
Break-Bulk Operations 0.00% 0.46% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.46% 0.00% 0.00% 0.92% 
Total 13.76% 20.18% 2.75% 16.51% 9.17% 25.23% 7.34% 5.05% 100.00% 
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Appendix XIII – Scope of Logistics Companies’ Operations in DPRK 
 
  
Operations 
Location 
Food 
Processing Textile Petroleum Machinery 
Transport 
Equipment Electronics Minerals 
Non-
Metals Agriculture Total 
Warehousing 
Nampo 1 1 0 1 1 4 1 1 0 10 
Sinuiju 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Najin-
Sonbong 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 
Freight 
Forwarding 
Nampo 2 1 0 1 1 3 1 1 0 10 
Pyongyang 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Sinuiju 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Najin-
Sonbong 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Customs 
Clearance 
Nampo 1   1 2 1 1 1 0 7 
Sinuiju 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 1 
Najin-
Sonbong 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 4 
Consulting 
services 
Nampo 0 1  1 1 3 0 0 0 6 
Sinuiju 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Najin-
Sonbong 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Freight 
Consolidation 
Nampo 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Najin-
Sonbong 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Customer 
Service 
Nampo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pyongyang 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Najin- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
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Sonbong 
Transport 
Nampo 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
Pyongyang 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
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Appendix XIV Descriptive statistics relating to the continuous variables 
 
Political Factor 
 
  N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
5% 
Trimmed 
Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Govt support business 130 1 5 4.21 0.643 4.25 -0.946 1.986 
Political stability 130 1 5 3.45 0.854 3.45 0.157 -0.728 
Regional stability 130 1 5 3.28 0.787 3.26 0.139 -0.484 
Bureaucracy 130 2 5 3.45 0.609 3.45 0.238 -0.132 
Risk of corruption 130 1 5 3.56 0.664 3.58 -0.701 0.506 
Unification 130 1 5 3.87 0.711 3.91 -0.731 0.848 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic df Sig 
0.281 130 0.000 
 
• No significant difference between the mean and 5% trimmed mean, indicating that extreme scores do not have a strong influence on 
the mean. 
• Three factors (government supporting business, risk of corruption and unification) have negatively skewed distribution. Three factors 
(political stability, regional stability and bureaucracy) have positively skewed distribution. 
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is (0.000) is highly significant (<0.05), breaching the assumption of normality.  
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Economic Factor 
 
  N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
5% 
Trimmed 
Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
SEZs 130 1 5 4.58 0.575 4.65 -1.488 1.647 
Financial sector 130 2 5 3.27 0.722 3.24 0.306 -0.343 
Cluster industries 130 2 5 3.35 0.072 3.34 -0.299 -0.815 
Local/Regional dev 130 2 5 3.83 0.599 3.85 -0.512 0.629 
Market reforms 130 2 5 4.02 0.506 4.04 -0.491 1.913 
Exchange rate risk 130 3 5 3.71 0.582 3.67 0.407 -0.750 
Currency restrictions 130 1 5 3.72 0.646 3.73 -0.218 0.532 
Relocation costs 130 1 5 4.12 0.058 4.14 -0.935 3.403 
Profit making culture 130 2 5 3.35 0.066 3.34 -0.037 -0.040 
Market economy 130 2 5 4.07 0.047 4.10 -0.541 3.164 
Few trade restrictions 130 3 5 4.07 0.425 4.08 0.182 1.233 
Low set-up costs 130 2 5 3.73 0.068 3.75 -0.098 -0.414 
State incentives 130 2 5 3.62 0.063 3.62 -0.160 -0.153 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic df Sig 
0.318 130 0.000 
 
• No significant difference between the mean and 5% trimmed mean, indicating that extreme scores do not have a strong influence on 
the mean. 
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• Ten factors (SEZs, cluster industries, local/regional development, market reforms, currency restrictions, relocation costs, profit making 
culture, market economy, low set-up costs and state incentives) have negatively skewed distribution. Three factors (financial sector, 
exchange rate risk and few trade restrictions) have positively skewed distribution. 
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is (0.000) is highly significant (<0.05), breaching the assumption of normality.  
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Infrastructure Factor 
 
  N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
5% 
Trimmed 
Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Domestic markets 130 1 5 2.79 0.098 2.75 0.859 -0.332 
Telecommunications 130 3 5 4.42 0.049 4.45 -0.243 -0.923 
Energy/electricity 130 3 5 4.42 0.052 4.46 -0.454 -0.659 
Water supplies 130 3 5 3.95 0.058 3.95 0.048 -0.651 
Logistics facilities 130 2 5 3.69 0.066 3.68 0.252 -0.683 
Airport access 130 1 5 3.44 0.076 3.44 0.046 -0.273 
Maritime port access 130 1 5 3.98 0.065 4.00 -0.542 1.017 
Road access 130 2 5 4.68 0.048 4.73 -1.761 3.839 
Rail access 130 2 5 4.45 0.055 4.51 -0.892 0.754 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic df Sig 
0.306 130 0.000 
 
• No significant difference between the mean and 5% trimmed mean.  
• Five factors (telecommunications, energy/electricity, maritime port access, road access and rail access) have negatively skewed 
distribution. Four factors (domestic markets, water supplies, logistics facilities and airport access) have positively skewed distribution. 
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is (0.000) is highly significant (<0.05), breaching the assumption of normality.  
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Legal Factor 
 
  N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
5% 
Trimmed 
Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Immigration policies 130 1 5 2.45 0.110 2.38 0.786 -0.399 
Low income tax 130 1 5 2.38 0.093 2.33 0.646 -0.192 
Fair logistics 
practices 130 1 5 3.67 0.064 3.69 -0.486 0.828 
Flexible payment 
methods 130 1 5 3.81 0.059 3.82 -0.689 1.938 
Govt regulations 130 1 5 3.99 0.053 4.00 -0.212 0.527 
Labour/Tax laws 130 1 5 3.92 0.056 3.91 -0.114 -0.005 
New regulations 130 1 5 3.84 0.060 3.85 -0.240 0.101 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic df Sig 
0.313 130 0.000 
 
• No significant difference between the mean and 5% trimmed mean. 
• Five factors (fair logistics practices, flexible payment methods, government regulations, labour/tax laws, new regulations) have 
negatively skewed distribution. Two factors (immigration policies and low income tax) have positively skewed distribution. 
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is (0.000) is highly significant (<0.05), breaching the assumption of normality.  
333 
 
Managerial Factor 
 
  N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
5% 
Trimmed 
Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Knowledge of logistics 130 1 5 2.29 0.091 2.23 0.782 0.180 
Management experience 130 1 5 2.59 0.099 2.58 0.164 -1.093 
Knowledge of management 
concepts 130 1 5 2.53 0.098 2.50 0.273 -0.907 
Acceptance of new technologies 130 1 5 3.68 0.061 3.69 -0.587 1.195 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic df Sig 
0.262 130 0.000 
 
• No significant difference between the mean and 5% trimmed mean, indicating that extreme scores do not have a strong influence on 
the mean. 
• One factor (acceptance of new technologies) have negatively skewed distribution. Three factors (knowledge of logistics, management 
of experience and knowledge of management concepts) have positively skewed distribution. 
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is (0.000) is highly significant (<0.05), breaching the assumption of normality.  
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Spatial Factor 
 
  N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
5% 
Trimmed 
Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Entry into North Korean markets 130 1 5 2.56 0.085 2.51 1.086 0.560 
Inexpensive land 130 2 5 4.55 0.056 4.62 -1.309 1.426 
Proximity to regional markets 130 2 5 3.89 0.079 3.94 -0.368 -0.694 
New markets for NK products 130 2 5 2.82 0.071 2.77 0.690 -0.185 
Availability of raw materials 130 2 5 4.33 0.059 4.39 -0.974 1.591 
Lack of sizable markets 130 2 5 2.81 0.066 2.74 0.895 1.010 
Availability of natural resources 130 1 5 4.21 0.063 4.24 -0.462 -0.520 
Limited NK purchasing power 130 1 5 2.88 0.074 2.83 0.698 0.661 
Access to China and Japan 130 2 5 4.07 0.058 4.09 -0.402 0.478 
Proximity to major suppliers 130 2 5 4.09 0.054 4.11 -0.258 0.452 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic df Sig 
0.289 130 0.000 
 
• No significant difference between the mean and 5% trimmed mean, indicating that extreme scores do not have a strong influence on 
the mean. 
• Six factors (inexpensive land, proximity to regional markets, availability of raw materials, availability of natural resources, access to 
China and Japan and proximity to major suppliers) have negatively skewed distribution. Four factors (entry into North Korean markets, 
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new markets for North Korea products, lack of sizable markets and limited North Koreans purchasing power) have positively skewed 
distribution. 
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is (0.000) is highly significant (<0.05), breaching the assumption of normality.  
336 
 
Social Factor 
 
  N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
5% 
Trimmed 
Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Housing/School amenities 130 1 5 1.94 0.085 1.87 0.951 0.246 
Educated labour 130 2 5 3.82 0.081 3.87 -0.674 0.042 
Cultural affinity with Koreans 130 1 5 3.17 0.074 3.15 0.059 -0.516 
Common culture/language 130 2 5 3.22 0.077 3.18 0.394 -0.468 
Availability of industrial estates 130 2 5 3.90 0.053 3.91 -0.370 0.843 
Good supply of low labour cost 130 2 5 4.14 0.053 4.16 -0.285 0.579 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic df Sig 
0.289 130 0.000 
 
• No significant difference between the mean and 5% trimmed mean, indicating that extreme scores do not have a strong influence on 
the mean. 
• Three factors (educated labour force, availability of industrial estates and good supply of low labour cost) have negatively skewed 
distribution. Three factors (housing/school amenities, cultural affinity with Koreans and common culture/language) have positively 
skewed distribution. 
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is (0.000) is highly significant (<0.05), breaching the assumption of normality.  
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Organisational Factor 
 
  N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
5% 
Trimmed 
Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Plentiful logistics service providers 130 1 5 3.52 0.093 3.53 -0.101 -1.198 
Good logistics linkages and accessibility 130 2 5 4.06 0.055 4.08 -0.235 0.224 
Good logistics distribution system 130 2 5 3.97 0.056 3.97 -0.161 0.096 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic df Sig 
0.282 130 0.000 
 
• No significant difference between the mean and 5% trimmed mean, indicating that extreme scores do not have a strong influence on 
the mean. 
• All factors have negatively skewed distribution.  
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is (0.000) is highly significant (<0.05), breaching the assumption of normality.  
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Appendix XV Extraction and Rotation of Factors   
 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
  Component 
  1 2 3 4 
New regulations are not imposed suddenly .861 
   
Labour/tax laws do not change suddenly .850 
   
Income tax for foreign employees are low .828 
   
Entry into DPRK markets .822 
   
Good housing/school/environmental amenities .780 
   
Knowledge of logistics concepts .749 
   
Limited purchasing power of local markets .723 
   
Management experience .713 
   
New markets for DPRK products .708 
   
Knowledge of management concepts .693 
   
Common culture/language .669 
   
Lack of sizable markets .666 
   
Cluster of common industries .593 
   
Plentiful logistics service providers .589 
   
Competitive financial sector .584 .442 
  
Political stability .550 
   
Good supply of low labour cost .507 
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Regional stability .494 
   
Cultural affinity with Koreans .448 
   
Local/Regional development 
 
.744 
  
Unification 
 
.672 
  
SEZs 
 
.638 
  
Exchange rate risk 
 
.614 
  
Reforms encouraging a market economy 
 
.604 
  
Bureaucracy is not excessive 
 
.583 
  
Acceptance of new technologies 
 
.573 
  
Currency restrictions 
 
.562 
  
Risk of corruption 
 
.537 
  
Availability of energy/electricity 
 
.504 
  
Government and officials support business 
 
.460 
  
Low costs of relocation 
 
.440 
  
Availability of raw materials 
  
.705 
 
Availability of natural resources 
  
.660 
 
Proximity to major suppliers 
  
.641 
 
Inexpensive land 
  
.625 
 
Access to China and Japan 
  
.600 
 
Access to domestic markets 
  
.598 .447 
Clear rules governing regulations and contracts 
  
.578 .470 
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Availability of industrial estates 
  
.546 
 
Proximity to regional markets 
  
.541 
 
Immigration policies are flexible 
  
.527 
 
Good logistics linkages and accessibility 
  
.485 
 
Good logistics distribution system 
  
.454 
 
Road access 
   
.796 
Rail access 
   
.657 
Maritime port access 
   
.616 
Logistics facilities 
   
.599 
Water supplies 
   
.577 
Airport access 
   
.486 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
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